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1 Introduction 
In July 2005, I went to Sierra Leone’s capital, Freetown, for the first time. As an intern at 
the Kofi Anna Centre in Accra, Ghana, I was sent there to research security sector reform 
(SSR).1 Shortly after my arrival, a number of expat advisers, primarily from the United 
Kingdom (UK), shared with me their perspectives on state-building and SSR. First, they 
said that Sierra Leone as a state had collapsed, and that security was the pre-condition for 
long-term development to occur. Second, SSR, involving re-building the armed forces and 
police, a Ministry of Defense, Office of National Security, and Central Intelligence and 
Security Unit, had been successful and was crucial to building peace in Sierra Leone after a 
decade of conflict. Third, even though most external actors had concluded that ‘non-state’ 
actors enforced 80-90 percent of justice and security in Sierra Leone, it was nevertheless 
the state that had to be re-built.2 
Sierra Leone’s civil war began in 1991 with attacks by the Revolutionary United Front 
(RUF) on Bormalu, a village in the eastern part of the country, and ended officially in 
2002. The protracted conflict contributed in large part to the breakdown of the 
patrimonially networked governed space that had characterized is Sierra Leone since its 
independence in 1961.3 This is not the story of an effective and legitimate state that 
progressively fell apart. Rather, it is the story of a country that had historically been 
integrated with alternative logics and forms of power, embodied in part by paramount and 
lesser chiefs. Herein lies the foundational hybrid order upon which Sierra Leone rests. 
In the late 1990s, international efforts, led primarily by the UK, to make and consolidate 
peace in Sierra Leone, became synonymous with SSR as state-building (Jackson and 
Albrecht 2011). Support was given to contain and ultimately overhaul the armed forces, 
                                            
1 From 2005 onwards, I returned to Sierra Leone several times in different capacities to explore the SSR 
process in detail: see Albrecht 2005; Albrecht and Malan 2006; Albrecht and Jackson 2009; Albrecht 2010; 
Albrecht and Jackson 2010; Jackson and Albrecht 2011; Albrecht 2012; Albrecht and Jackson 2012. 
2 While not supported by statistical data, such estimates emerged in the case of Sierra Leone in 2002 
(Albrecht and Jackson 2009:42) and are cited in most current policy-related literature on informal or non-
state justice. See for example: OECD 2007c; UNDP 2009; Chirayath and Woolcock 2005; USAID 2005. 
3 Patrimonialism in the case of Sierra Leone, Richards (1996:34) says, “involves redistributing national 
resources as marks of personal favor to followers who respond with loyalty to the leader rather than to the 
institution the leader represents. Patrimonialism is a systematic scaling up, at the national level, of local ideas 
about patron-client linkages, shaped (in Sierra Leone) in the days of direct extraction of forest resources, 
about the duty of the rich and successful to protect, support and promote their followers and friends.” For a 
general discussion of patrimonialism see Chabal an Daloz (1999). 
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which had staged two coups in 1992 and 1997. Support was also provided to establish 
national security sector coordination and intelligence organizations and to re-establish the 
Sierra Leone Police (SLP). The collapsed, but internationally-recognized Sierra Leonean 
state was to be re-built; security was seen as not only a prerequisite for this process to 
begin, but its very foundation.  
 
1.1.1 The puzzle 
In the brief considerations above lies the puzzle that defines the scope of this dissertation. 
Why should the state be re-built and why was so much effort put into doing so, when the 
experts pushing state-building forward saw the state of Sierra Leone as having ceased to 
fulfill its primary functions? By extension, why were no alternatives considered feasible 
when, by international estimates, non-state actors, such as customary leaders, are the 
primary providers of justice and justice in the Global South and deal with an estimated 80-
90 percent of disputes? 
These puzzles suggest two fundamental questions that will be investigated in this 
dissertation. The first question addresses the reasons why the western universalist state 
concept came to guide SSR in Sierra Leone and why proponents of state-building 
considered the concept to be of such fundamental importance to stability in Sierra Leone 
and beyond. This becomes even more pertinent because, as Andersen (2010:29) argues, 
state-building “will not lead to the establishment of the ‘bordered power-container’ we 
know as the Weberian state: The central government in the state-being-built will remain 
unable to uphold a monopoly on legitimate violence and extend its authority evenly 
through the entire territory of the state” (see also Rothberg 2004:28; Wulf 2007). 
The second question addresses the widely-held belief that 80-90 percent of disputes are 
dealt with by non-state actors. How might authority be conceptualized when actors such as 
paramount and lesser chiefs, who are in effect neither state nor non-state, are the primary 
makers of order? 
I address these questions empirically by analyzing data gathered from international policy-
making processes around SSR, interviews among some of the key actors of Sierra Leone’s 
 10 
SSR process and ethnographic fieldwork in Peyima, a small town in Sierra Leone’s Kono 
District. Peyima is historically known for its considerable diamond deposits in the past, and 
one of the strongholds of the RUF during the 1990s. 
 
View of Peyima and surroundings from a hill above the town. 
 
 
1.1.2 The argument 
This thesis argues that SSR failed by its own standards to establish a ‘centrally-governed 
state’ and that a primary reason for this failure can be attributed to the concept of authority 
that state-building manifests and that much academic thinking supports. This concept of 
authority projects a split between society and state that guides the state-building effort; it is 
referenced in much of the existing literature on ‘failed’ and ‘fragile’ states (Helman and 
Ratner 1993; Fukuyama 2004; Rotberg 2004; Englebert and Tull 2008; Ghani and 
Lockhart 2008; Goldstone 2008; Call 2008:1499). Inherent to this view of authority is the 
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conceptualization of a political entity, a bordered power container, i.e., the state, which 
stands above and at the same time encompasses, controls and regulates society. 
In Sierra Leone’s state-building efforts, the practices of traditional leaders and their 
productive effects in the justice and security field were acknowledged. However, state-
builders failed to respond adequately to the central role of paramount and lesser chiefs in 
governing Sierra Leone’s countryside. First, they did not recognize the resilience and 
productivity of local actors and institutions and their authority to appropriate, interpret, 
translate, reject and above all shape the elements of what was offered through SSR.4 
Second, they did not recognize the hybrid nature of all justice and security actors, who 
draw their authority to act from numerous sources across physical and symbolic space, in 
local and national domains. 
In my theoretical framework, I analyze the concept of ‘hybridity’, drawing on Latour’s 
concept of assemblage and Bourdieu’s concept of field of practice (see Chapter 1). This 
framework proposes an understanding of authority that transcends dichotomous 
categorizations of state and society, and the real and ideal. This concept of authority is 
characterized by a hybrid order that captures what authority means in Sierra Leone more 
accurately than the ‘failed state’ analytical framework.  
Hybridity denotes the fact that authority always already emanates simultaneously from 
multiple sources, including sacred and other customary powers, kinship and secret society 
membership, as well as from an operative decision-making center of government, inter 
alia, bureaucracy and legislation. This concept of hybridity departs from recent studies, 
which point out that making order takes places in the interstices, contestation and 
‘hybridization’ between state-based and liberal practices and local customs and ‘everyday’ 
life (Richmond 2010, 2011; Boege et al. 2009; Brown et al. 2010; Moe 2012; Roberts 
2011). This thesis argues that the ‘liberal state’ and ‘tradition’ do not exist independently 
from one another. In fact, making such a distinction establishes a dichotomy between two 
separate domains that does not accurately project the simultaneity inherent to the concept 
of hybridity. 
                                            
4 This resembles a more general discussion on development processes as discussed by Ferguson (2006 
[1994]:284) and (Mosse 2005:14). 
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In the remainder of this introduction, the notion of state-building embedded in the 
international policy concept of SSR is explored, followed by an outline of the state concept 
critiqued in this thesis. Drawing on policy discourse as well as academic literature, this is 
the basis for arguing that talking of a hybrid order more accurately captures what authority 
encompasses in Sierra Leone. Central to this discussion is the meaning of ‘state-building’, 
and how it has been informed by concepts of ‘fragility’ and ‘failure’ of a centrally-
governed political entity of the western universalist variety (see Helman and Ratner 1993; 
Goldstone 2008). I argue that the dichotomy between the state and other actors of authority 
inherent to SSR as state-building and the literature that underpins it obscures the fact that 
authority has many sources with multiple origins. The introduction concludes by 
suggesting that these analytical views on what ‘the state’ is ignore the history of how Sierra 
Leone emerged as a political entity, the foundational hybrid order upon which it is based 
and the role that paramount and lesser chiefs in particular have played in that process.  
Finally, I outline the structure of the analysis presented in the thesis by summarizing the 
contents of each chapter. 
 
1.2 Security Sector Reform as state-building 
SSR centers largely on transforming ‘failed’ and ‘collapsed’ states into ‘effective’ and 
‘legitimate’ political entities. As a concept, SSR originated in international policy-making 
and is connected to state-building as part of “the process of restoring (or building) the 
functionality of state institutions” (UN and World Bank 2007:22). That SSR originated in 
the policy-making environment helps explain why the term has been under-theorized to the 
degree that it has, and why relatively little attention has been paid to querying the 
assumptions it is based upon, apart from the well-known mantra of security being a pre-
condition for development (see Egnell and Haldén 2009; Sedra 2010; Denney 2011; 
Krogstad 2012a).  
The international debate among policy-makers and policy researchers has in large part 
been a definitional exercise of what is variously referred to as security system 
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transformation, security system reform, justice and security reform and security sector 
reform. Generally speaking, these terms refer to a process leading to a similar condition: 
the “effective and efficient provision of state and human security within a framework of 
democratic governance” (Hänggi 2004:10). 
Based upon the principle that “national authorities” are to ensure “effective and 
accountable security for the state and its peoples” (UNSG 2008), the state takes center 
stage as the political entity that articulates authority. The Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD), for instance, holds that “state-building” should be the 
central objective for “good international engagement in fragile states”: “The long-term 
vision for international engagement in fragile states is to help national reformers to build 
effective, legitimate, and resilient state institutions, capable of engaging productively with 
their people to promote sustained development” (OECD 2007b:1). 
State-building is conceptualized as transcending post-conflict reconstruction processes and 
is considered an integral feature of sustainable development. The state is the backbone of 
long-term peace and stability. There are various policy definitions of what policy-makers 
think constitutes ‘the state’. In a paper titled Building the State and Securing the Peace, the 
UK Department for International Development (DFID) suggests that “[the] state equates 
with: (a) the institutions or rules which regulate political, social and economic engagement 
across a territory and determine how power and authority are obtained, used and controlled 
(i.e., constitutions, laws, customs)…” (DFID 2010a). While DFID does recognize the role 
of non-state actors who engage in social and political activity, they are defined 
predominantly as marginal to decision-making (civil society organizations) or as ‘informal 
groupings’ (e.g., gangs and drug cartels) (ibid.).  
In line with this concept of authority, a widely-accepted definition of which actors should 
be engaged in SSR stems from OECD’s Guidelines on Security System Reform and 
Governance published in 2004. They state that SSR should encompass core security actors 
such as the armed forces, security management and oversight bodies, including ministries, 
as well as justice and law enforcement institutions and non-statutory security forces 
(OECD 2004:5). 
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These types of organizations engaged in SSR indicate a movement away from a focus on 
civil-military relations towards development of systemic approaches to ‘effective 
governance’, ‘oversight’ and ‘financial mechanisms’ for administering the use of force 
(Albrecht and Jackson 2012). At the core of SSR is the image of an effective and legitimate 
state that establishes a coherent system of regulation, accountability and democratic 
governance. This should come as no surprise, since SSR donor agencies represent political 
entities in which the economy, politics and security are centrally-governed. 
In the next section I explore why the state came to such prominence; why instability, 
disorder and chaos in one part of international society were considered to have global 
ramifications, and why ‘the state’ was vital in shoring up these global threats. This is, I 
believe, fundamental to understanding how SSR became integrally linked to a state-
building agenda. 
 
1.3 ‘The problem of the state’, the cold war and the war on terror 
1.3.1 The neo-liberal concern with the wrong kind of government 
Compounded by the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s and consolidated by the terrorist 
attacks on the United States (US) in 2001, ‘the state’ in international thinking is considered 
vital to the process of preventing disorder and chaos in unregulated physical space (Coletta 
2007:393). This was the case in Sierra Leone in the late 1990s, as SSR programs pertaining 
were rolled out, a UK-backed military intervention was undertaken and as a British 
national was appointed as Inspector-General of Police in response to the country’s lengthy 
civil conflict (See Chapter 4).  
From the onset of international intervention in Sierra Leone, state-building always already 
underscored the separation between the state and society. It was the state of Sierra Leone 
and its institutions acting as a bordered power container standing above while at the same 
time encompassing, controlling and regulating society that were to be isolated and worked 
upon. 
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State-building emanates from a seismic shift in international thinking around external 
intervention (Englebert and Tull 2008:106). The 1991-2002 war in Sierra Leone and 
international responses to it took place during this period. A neo-liberal concern over 
excessive government dominated international policy discourse in the 1980s and 1990s and 
resulted in an emphasis upon privatization and the outsourcing of previously public goods 
and services such as security (see Abrahamsen and Williams 2007:134; Rose and Miller 
1992:198; Sen and Pratten 2007:3). Neo-liberalism came to represent a shift from 
‘Keynesian welfarism’ towards a political agenda that favors the ideal of a competitive 
market through privatization, deregulation and liberalization (Larner 2000:6; Lee and 
McBride 2007:1).  
For example, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank established 
structural adjustment programs (SAPs) in Sierra Leone (Keen 2005:22) and elsewhere to 
limit state involvement in economic management of the market by conditioning the 
allocation of aid on public sector restructuring and privatization (Hameiri 2007:130; 
Englebert 2000:8; Van Dijk et al. 2007:12; Bertelsen 2009:214). 
However, it is a paradox of the neo-liberal mode of state operation that it does not de-select 
the “will to govern” (Rose 2006:155). On the contrary, “the failure of government to 
achieve its objective is to be overcome by inventing new strategies of government that will 
succeed” (Rose 2006:155). The failure of the SAPs to “bring Africa back on the path of 
growth” is one reason why it became commonly accepted that it was “the lack of state 
capacity and institutional quality” that had led to economic stagnation in Africa (Englebert 
2000:8). 
State-building in Sierra Leone fit the neo-liberal agenda. Throughout the early phases of 
SSR, state-builders assumed that by increasing the capacity of administrative staff to 
enforce order and by applying the normative content of reforms – accountability, 
democratization and the rule of law – popular legitimacy would follow, which in turn 
would sustain the order of the state (see Egnell and Haldén 2009:35). 
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1.3.2 The globalization of western universalisms?  
Underpinning the concept of state-building, Andersen (2010) argues, is Weber’s definition 
of the state. In this view, the state is comprised of several political institutions that exercise 
legal sovereignty, which is binding on all citizens within its territory. Considering the 
general dominance of the Weberian state model in the social sciences, as Bartelson (2001) 
has pointed out, it is not surprising that the model also dominates the mindset of today’s 
international policy-makers (UNDP 2010; UNSC 2010; DFID 2010b).  
A raft of academic literature supports this view. Fukuyama (2004) focus on the necessity to 
build the capacity of state institutions; Dauvergne (1998) and Kabutaulaka (2005) 
emphasize the fit between the modern state and the society over which it is meant to rule. 
Social groups are inferior to the sovereign state, but since sovereignty is based on popular 
legitimation, the state is subservient to society as a whole (Bendix et al. 1992:2008).  
What these authors have in common with policy-makers is their propensity to evaluate 
states in terms of institutional capacity and compare their performance to what they 
consider to be the ideal state. They establish a binary opposition between the ‘domestic’ 
and the ‘foreign’ as fixed features of the modern inter-state system, and take the state to be 
a static, timeless and territorial ‘container’ that encloses economic and political processes 
(Brenner et al. 2003). In this view, the political entity that emerged through state formation 
in the post-colonial world is considered a flawed imitation of the mature western form. 
Sierra Leone might have fallen into conflict in the early 1990s, but its history since 
independence in 1961 has been characterized in much academic work as the steady, yet 
inevitable trajectory towards collapse (see Keen 2005; Peters 2006). 
The order provided by the western universalist model of the state rests on a monopoly of 
violence, which is one of the constitutive characteristics of Weber’s definition of the state 
(Gerth and Mills 1958:78). By extension, creating or reforming the political institutions 
comprising the security sector strikes at the heart of what makes a modern state (Egnell and 
Haldén 2009:35). In Weber’s own words:  
A ‘ruling organization’ will be called ‘political’ insofar as its existence and order is 
continuously safeguarded within a given territorial area by the threat and 
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application of physical force on the part of the administrative staff. A compulsory 
political organization with continuous operations (politischer Anstaltsbetrieb) will 
be called a ‘state’ in so far as its administrative staff successfully upholds the claim 
to the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force in the enforcement of its 
order (Weber 1978:54).  
Moreover, Weber emphasized that the use of force by any other type of organization would 
only be considered legitimate if it was permitted or prescribed by the state.  
While the ‘monopoly of the legitimate use of force’ is often put forward as key to Weber’s 
notion of the state, it evidently does not define it comprehensively. Legal order, 
bureaucracy and compulsory jurisdiction over a territory are among its equally essential 
characteristics (Weber 1947:252). This complex of factors emerged only gradually in 
Europe, and in Weber’s view is only fully present where legitimacy is located in a body of 
bureaucratic rules that determine the exercise of political authority. Thus, the state 
bureaucracy is a method designed to dominate, but such domination must be consistent 
with widely-held values that Weber refers to as legitimation.5 
It is in the conception of the bureaucratically-managed state that the rationale of state-
building can be found, i.e., the state as a necessary set of institutions that contains 
instability and disorder. In this context, it becomes relevant to consider in greater detail the 
discourse on ‘state failure’ that has been dominant in legitimizing internationally-led 
processes of state-building world-wide and came to guide UK support to Sierra Leone in 
the past decade. 
 
1.4 The technical failure of the state 
The policy logic of state failure is simple. It occurs when, as Andersen (2010:39) notes: 
“The state has ceased to fulfill its functions, its institutions have collapsed and the country 
                                            
5 Weber distinguishes between Macht and Herrschaft, where the latter is translated as authority by Parsons 
and Henderson (Weber 1947). Power needs readiness to be followed in social life, it is never absolute, and 
thus ‘legitimate herrschaft’ means ‘legitimate, or non-coercive rule’. Macht means ‘coercive rule’, and it is 
of course Herrschaft that is sought in the state-building effort. In brief, Herrschaft lies at the basis of Weber’s 
typology of legitimacy upon which a relationship of domination rests, where organization rests upon 
orientation to a rule or a principle rather than upon compliance to commands (see Spencer 1979:124). 
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has descended into chaos and anarchy which spills over the borders of the state”. In turn, 
Milliken and Krause (2003:4) identify the three fundamental functions of the state as 
security, representation and welfare, whereas Rotberg (2004:2-4) outlines a more 
comprehensive list, including health services, infrastructure, law and order and education.  
While some of these functions are, in these three scholars’ view, more important than 
others, the “provision of security is the most fundamental service states provide, in the 
sense that security is a condition for the provision of all other services” (Eriksen 
2011:231). SSR reflects this rationale, as its role in state-building is based on the 
assumption that security is a pre-condition for development (see Chapter 3). 
The ‘stateness of the state’ is founded on performance, i.e., the state’s capacity to make 
rules, exercise control over territory and people and plan official goals and implement 
these plans successfully (see Jackson and Rosberg 1982:6).6 The very distinction between 
the state and its antithesis, the non-state, lies in the concept of capacity, and certainly, 
many academics suggest that by the 1990s, Sierra Leone lacked the capacity to exercise 
control over its territory and to fight a war against the RUF (e.g. Keen 2005).  
In turn, the state’s capacity to exercise authority within its territory is a pre-condition for its 
right to retain legal sovereign status. Following this rationale, Goldstone (2008:285-286) 
argues that effectiveness and legitimacy are the two “general qualities that states must 
possess to remain stable”; it is in states where these qualities are lost that failure occurs. 
Effectiveness reflects how well the state carries out state functions. Legitimacy, in turn, 
exists when elites and the population perceive state actions as “just” and “reasonable” in 
terms of prevailing social norms (ibid.). Sierra Leone was considered to lack both; indeed, 
Keen (2005:16) notes, “development seemed to be going into reverse” in the post-colonial 
years; already “by the late 1970s, services across the country were clearly in decline” 
(ibid.). 
                                            
6 An alternative yet similar definition of ‘state capacity’ is proposed by Englebert (2000:8), which is 
“generally understood to refer to the capacity to design and implement policies, make credible commitments, 
run an efficient bureaucracy and provide constraints to opportunistic behavior.” Englebert (2000:8-9) 
suggests that there are three approaches to understanding the weakness of African states: 1. Africa's 
stagnation, poor governance and weak state capacity derive from its low level of civic culture and social 
capital; 2. African countries have weak institutions and adopt poor policies because of their ethnic diversity; 
3. African leaders, having inherited artificial political entities from colonialism, resort to neo-patrimonial 
strategies to foster their power and prevent the dislocation of their peasant societies. 
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In my research on the concepts that underpin state failure and state-building, I found an 
assumed juxtaposition between ‘authority’ and ‘the state’. I suggest that this juxtaposition 
is problematic if we wish to understand how justice and security are enforced in rural 
Sierra Leone, and how different elements of SSR have been translated into localities across 
the country.  
We should not start from a concept of the western universalist state and measure the 
legitimacy and effectiveness of all other political entities against it. Rather, we should 
understand that the authority to make order in the justice and security field of Sierra Leone 
is expressed by a number of actors, including the state-sanctioned police, chiefs, 
community-policing actors and institutions such as secret societies (see Chapters 6 and 7). 
The presence of these multiple order-making actors in Sierra Leone and indeed, in other 
Sub-Saharan countries, indicates a very different state formation experience as compared 
to the countries of Western Europe. 
 
1.5 European state formation and the colonial legacy 
The literature on politics and states in Africa suggests a disconnect, or tension between the 
legal status of states on the one hand, and the everyday exercise of authority and state 
control on the other (see Chabal and Daloz 1999; Mamdani 1996; Mbembe 2001; Lund 
2006). If we assume that African states are not ‘working’ as they should because they have 
failed to “adopt the formula that has worked elsewhere” (Clapham 2002:789), we follow 
normative assumptions about African politics and society, including a notion of the 
“problematic state” in Africa (Hyden 2006). 
Before concluding the introduction, this section lays the foundation for arguing why 
looking at how order is constituted in rural Sierra Leone is better conceptualized as 
foundationally hybrid. A key to understanding why this is the case is found in policies of 
indirect rule during the colonial era, a distinctly different experience from that of state 
formation in Europe. 
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1.5.1 The classic tale of the western state 
As suggested in different ways by Giddens (1985), Mann (1993, 1995) and Tilly (1975, 
1995), the genesis of the western nation-state was the unintended consequence of a long-
term and violent process of political expropriation of pre-existing deliberative assemblies, 
including, inter alia, rival nobility or trading bourgeoisie, ubiquitous peasant societies and 
the church (see Merkl 1977:464; Schulze 1998; Clapham 2000:6-7).7 Indeed, Anderson 
(1991:7) suggests that ‘the nation’ was erected on the often-violent fiction of cultural 
homogeneity, an imagined, if unevenly enacted, sense of ‘horizontal fraternity’. 
Only after a monopoly of physical violence was established by bargaining, co-optation, 
legitimation and sheer coercion, did the political setting of legal institutions and appointed 
rulers in Western European countries come under the control of ‘the public’. The making 
of states, i.e., the building of centralized, differentiated organizations with a monopoly of 
coercion over a defined territory, can not be said to come from within a distinct society, 
since state and society are inseparable in the process of state-making. Rather, the making 
of states is the result of external conflicts (Barkey and Parikh 1991:527). 
In Western Europe, tax extraction, for instance, ranged from outright plunder to the 
bureaucratization of taxation in the 18th and early 19th centuries. Both these tax methods 
depended on power holders heading state-making processes and pursuing advantages of 
security within a territory (Tilly 1985:181). It was through this process that one of the 
underpinnings of stateness was established, that of asserting territorial sovereignty through 
the monopolization of violence by permanent and visible military and police forces. Such 
activities were not intentionally undertaken to build states; they were the result of ousting 
formerly needed middlemen such as the nobility. From this perspective, current state-
building processes tend to invert the social logic of European state formation, in which the 
                                            
7 Bayart (2000:244) problematizes this point, arguing that we cannot simply assume a correlation in Africa 
between war and state formation, as it occurred in European history, “where the necessities of war favoured 
the creation of absolutist states with bureaucracies operating on rational principles, the development of 
systems of fiscal pressure and extraction and, in the last resort, mass democracies. The comparison, while 
useful, cannot be pushed too far, as a range of other cultural and economic factors were relevant in the 
European case.” And yet, “there is also no reason to suppose that similar developments will not take place, 
since conflicts are a fertile source of social transformations” (ibid: italics added). 
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coercive formation of state monopolies preceded both the juridification of political 
authority and the enhancement of state capacities (Jung 2008:39).  
The next section provides insight into how state formation occurred in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
and why we must be cautious to assume any immediate similarity with state formation 
processes in Europe. In the case of Sierra Leone, ‘deliberative assemblies’ were not 
expropriated, but rather established and consolidated. Warriors-turned-chiefs became 
central to how rural areas were governed, drawing their authority to do so from a multitude 
of sources, and thereby becoming constitutive of a foundational hybrid order (see Chapter 
5).  
 
1.5.2 The logic of incompatibility and the hybridity of authority 
The separation of local middlemen, traditional leaders, and colonial institutions was never 
under consideration by colonial administrators in Sierra Leone. Indeed, the colonial state 
relied on local intermediaries and alliances with local chieftain institutions to keep 
territories and populations under their control at a minimum cost. Thus, local 
intermediaries became integral to the political entity that emerged. 
Recognizing that the colonial state was an appendage to colonial military and 
administrative complexes does not negate the importance of agency of the colonized in 
shaping the encounter (see Comaroff and Comaroff 1993:xi-xii; Ray and van Rouveroy 
van Nieuwaal 1996:29). As Cooper (1994:1529) notes, “while the conquerors could 
concentrate military force to defeat African armies, ‘pacify’ villages or slaughter rebels, 
the routinization of power demanded alliances with local authority figures….” This was 
not just a matter of ‘adaptation’ or ‘resistance’ to colonial initiatives; it demonstrates that 
colonial administrative policies were appropriated and shaped by the colonized.8 It is in 
this history that the key to understanding the hybrid order in Sierra Leone lies (See Chapter 
5). 
                                            
8 As De Bruijn, van Dijk and Gewald (2007:10) have argued, drawing on Lonsdale (2000), no matter how 
constraining circumstances can be in environmental, economic, political or social-cultural terms, African 
societies have demonstrated time and again numerous ways in which such conditions are negotiated in often 
unexpected ways. Such conditions never become so totalizing or hegemonic that all creativity in countering 
or coping with the circumstances African societies are subjected to is annihilated. 
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The concept of hybridity helps explain the particular variety of authority that was shaped 
by colonial and post-colonial state policies and localized figures of authority. Beginning in 
the colonial period, the kinds of authority called upon included an extended system of 
constitutional and administrative rules of law, tradition, autochthon status, secret society 
membership and ancestral ties. This use of multi-faceted sources of authority to make order 
reflects hybridity, i.e., an assemblage of different logics. This assemblage is not that of two 
pure forms of ‘bureaucracy’ and ‘tradition’, but rather of two concepts that become 
constitutive of one another. It is the product of constantly evolving and contested, mutually 
antagonistic and integral sources of authority that become inseparable when subjected to 
empirical scrutiny.9 
Sklar (1993, 1999) refers to notions of ‘mixed government’ and ‘mixed polity’, and 
suggests that constitutional or extra-constitutional traditional authorities are central to how 
authority is expressed (Englebert 2002:346; Bank and Southall 1996:407).10 This implies 
that the state, colonial or post-colonial, was never the only kind of order-enforcing 
authority. In fact, given the existence of several kinds of authority, the state will always 
already be challenged by other logics, sets of knowledge, practices and forms of power 
(Bertelsen 2009:212). Thus, hybridity as a concept helps to capture these different logics 
within one conceptual framework and suggests the multitude of registers that are available 
to be drawn upon, notably by paramount and lesser chiefs, in Sierra Leone and other Sub-
Saharan African countries. 
                                            
9 In this context, we should be careful about applying Ekeh’s (Ekeh 1975) ‘two publics’ and Mamdani’s 
(Mamdani 1996) notion of the Janus-faced state, divided between an urban power that speaks the language of 
civil rights (citizens), and a civil power that claims to protect customary rights (subjects) (see Fanthorpe 
2001:368). Both create much too pure categories of spheres of authority, even though they both have made a 
critical, and not dissimilar, contribution to understanding that which is not well-captured by notions of the 
western universalist state. Ekeh argues that the experience of colonialism in Africa led to two publics, and 
that the continent’s current problems have to do with the dialectics between the two (Ekeh 1975:91). The 
civic public signified a political community that came with certain rights, privileges, duties and obligations 
(Ekeh 1975:92). In the other public, the individual sees his duties as a moral obligation to benefit and sustain 
a primordial public. Mamdani (1996:18) argues along similar dichotomous lines, separating civil power and 
customary power, rights and custom, freedom and tradition. 
10 Another concept is Menkhaus’ (2006-2007:78) “mediated state,” a state where “the central government 
relies on partnership (or at least co-existence) with a diverse range of local intermediaries and rival sources of 
authority to provide core functions of public security, justice, and conflict management in much of the 
country.” 
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The views of external actors of what ‘the state’ is and ought to be ignore the fact that, in 
practice, a broad range of actors and institutions enforces order. This is not an attempt to 
set up new dichotomies of the ideal state vs. the reality of how order is enforced, a 
distinction that characterizes much of the recent literature that addresses the concept of 
hybridity (Mac Ginty 2010; Richmond 2010, 2011; Boege et al. 2009; Brown et al. 2010; 
Clements et al. 2007; Darby 2009; Debiel and Lambach 2010; Kraushaar and Lambach 
2009; Moe 2012; Roberts 2011). Rather, it is to suggest that the state-centric approach 
leads to a reductionist conceptualization of authority, and thus an inaccurate analysis of 
how authority is expressed in the context of Sierra Leone (see Chapter 5, 6, 7 and 8). This 
is the reason why I propose an alternative concept of authority to make order that stems 
simultaneously from numerous sources and consists of not two or more pure sources, but a 
multitude of always already hybrid forms. 
 
1.6 Conclusion 
State-building was constructed around the concept of the western universalist political 
entity that stands apart from, and yet encompasses, serves and is accountable to society. As 
an approach to ‘weak’ and ‘failed’ states, state-building is the articulation of the neo-liberal 
propensity to diagnose, prescribe and cure (see Rose 2006:155). While neo-liberalism is 
not a principled rejection of government, it insists that failures of government to achieve its 
objectives can be overcome by simply inventing new government strategies that will 
succeed (ibid.). 
Neo-liberalism addresses the chaos that constitutes the ‘failed’ state by separating ‘state’ 
and ‘societal’ forces; the former are isolated and worked upon to constitute an ‘effective’ 
and ‘legitimate’ state. However, to do so in the attempt to establish a centrally-governed 
state indicates a fundamental disregard for the long-term historical processes of state 
formation both in Europe, from which the western universalist state entity emerged, and in 
Africa.  
Indirect rule became the colonial state’s attempt to identify and fixate interlocutors 
between colonial administrators and the population in the hinterland, in part to facilitate tax 
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collection (Fanthorpe 1998:116; van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal 1996:42). In the case of 
Sierra Leone, the approach led to the emergence of semi-autonomous administrative units 
or chieftaincies, which became and remain the focus of struggles for political control in 
rural Sierra Leone (Tangri 1978; Allen 1968; see van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal 1996:42). 
In the particular case of SSR as state-building as conducted in Sierra Leone, the process 
entails a fundamental overhaul of several institutions identified as belonging to the state 
system. The armed forces, the police, intelligence services and ministries were identified, 
isolated and worked upon as constitutive of the justice and security field. Inherent in this 
process was an attempt to marginalize, ignore or eliminate not only the ‘societal’ forces 
within institutions considered to be part of the state system, but also a variety of hybrid 
organizational forms in the justice and security field, such as warlords and traditional 
leaders who were either criminalized or considered to fit uneasily into the category of 
‘state institutions and actors’. 
This thesis argues that the state-building exercise of separating ‘state’ and ‘society’, and 
working on the former in isolation does not preclude hybrid institutions and actors. Indeed, 
it was inevitable that SSR would reproduce rather than eradicate the hybrid nature of the 
security and justice field. 
 
1.7 Outline of the thesis 
This thesis consists of eight chapters, an introduction and a conclusion. Chapters 1 and 2 
outline the concept of hybridity, and how it was operationalized. Chapters 3 and 4 explore 
the emergence of SSR in international policy-making and how it became integral to UK-
supported state-building in Sierra Leone in the past 14-15 years. Chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8 
describe and analyze how Sierra Leone’s foundational hybrid order was produced 
historically through indirect rule and the emergence of secret societies, and how this order 
was reproduced more recently through police reform. The following is a brief summary of 
the chapters: 
Chapter 1, Conceptualizing hybrid orders – beyond a state-centric approach, critiques the 
state concept that underpins SSR as state-building and suggests the need for a more multi-
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faceted conception of what authority to make order entails. I propose to disaggregate not 
only the concept of state, but also how the authority to govern, regulate and order space is 
articulated in academic and policy discourse. 
I argue that giving preferential treatment to the state as a political entity and identifying it 
as ‘weak’ or fragile’, ‘effective’ or ‘legitimate’ is a fundamentally biased analysis. This 
approach obscures the fact that authority has many sources with multiple origins. 
I suggest conceptualizing authority as a hybrid order of assemblages that take shape and 
fall apart in a security and justice field. In that process, these assemblages inter-link 
languages of both ‘stateness’ and ‘public authority’. Hybridity is foundational because it 
lies at the very base of how Sierra Leone emerged as an internationally-defined political 
entity. 
Chapter 2, The study of security sector reform in Sierra Leone – reflections on 
methodology, describes how I approached the study of assemblages and foundational 
hybrid orders in the justice and security field, how I accessed the field and the methods I 
used to collect and organize data. The chapter also presents the multi-sited approach that I 
applied and the different locations in which data was collected. 
Chapter 3, The emergence of security sector reform in the security and justice field, 
explores how SSR developed internationally in both discourse and practice to serve the 
state-building agenda of transforming failed states into functioning, centrally-governed 
political entities. Following the rationale of the notion of a failed state, it was the state as a 
bordered power container and the institutions that comprise it that were to be isolated and 
worked upon through state-building.  
SSR as state-building as it emerged in international policy-making led to a specific set of 
articulations of how to re-compose the justice and security field. SSR thus came to shape 
approaches to state-building in Sierra Leone, as experiences in Sierra Leone shaped 
approaches to SSR and state-building as a concept, a set of policies and program practices. 
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Chapter 4, Re-composing the justice and security field, looks at how Sierra Leone’s failure 
as a state has been articulated academically and how SSR became one of the important 
components of the state-building process that followed.  
Considered to lack both ‘efficiency’ and ‘legitimacy’, it was Sierra Leone’s perceived 
failure as a state that led to a devastating and brutal conflict and spurred the UN and the 
UK, in particular, into action. Through the deployment of troops and numerous programs 
labeled SSR, a process was begun that sought to transform the country into a centrally-
governed and permanent political organization which could capture and retain the 
monopoly over the means of physical and symbolic violence and contain instability, 
disorder and chaos. Despite international intentions to establish a state-centric approach to 
providing justice and security, the hybrid order of authority expressed in Sierra Leone 
historically was reproduced in the SSR process. 
Chapter 5, The making of hybridity: the history of chiefs in Sierra Leone, argues that SSR 
could not do anything but reproduce a hybrid order, because hybridity lies at the very 
foundation of how Sierra Leone emerged as the political entity and was “forced to behave 
(externally) as if it was a Weberian (territorial) state”, as Peters (2006:44) puts it. Rather 
than constituting a centrally-governed state, Sierra Leone became a multi-centered system 
of governance in which assemblages of power clustered around paramount and lesser 
chiefs. This is, in short, the hybrid order that state-building ultimately reproduced.  
Chapter 6, The reproduction and consolidation of hybridity through police reform, 
describes how police reform that was clearly intended to be a vehicle for state-building 
reproduced Sierra Leone’s foundational hybrid order. Rather than supporting an 
internationally-driven vision of a re-organized justice and security field that was to project 
‘stateness’, the position of paramount and lesser chiefs was corroborated.  
Chapter 7, Integral hybridity: The Poro effect in the justice and security field, moves the 
analytical focus from the productive effects of SSR to how the male secret society as an 
element in the foundational hybrid order is an integral component of the justice and 
security field. The chapter explores a space within the field of justice and security where 
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disputes are settled that do not fit into the discourse on state fragility and state-building 
policies. 
Chapter 8, Hybridity enacted: a case of diamond theft in Kamara Chiefdom, demonstrates 
that while state-building may have failed according to its own standards as a component of 
state-building, SSR has been productive in shaping the organization of the justice and 
security field. The chapter also draws on analyses in the previous six chapters and explores 
how elements of international SSR discourse, programs and historical developments 
confirm the hybrid order that characterizes the justice and security field. 
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2 Conceptualizing hybrid orders – beyond a state-centric approach 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter outlines a critique of the state concept that underpins SSR as state-building 
and suggests the need for a more multi-faceted notion of what authority to make order 
involves. This is not only a call to disaggregate the state concept, but also a call to 
disaggregate how the authority to govern and regulate space is generally articulated in 
academic discourse.  
Giving preferential treatment to the state – whether it works or not, how it works, whether 
people act in the name of it or as if they were its representatives – injects a bias into the 
analysis. It obscures the fact that authority has many sources with multiple origins.11 I 
suggest that conceptualizing authority as a hybrid order of assemblages that simultaneously 
articulates languages of ‘stateness’ and ‘public authority’ better captures this condition. 
The hybrid order is foundational, because it defines how Sierra Leone emerged as a 
political entity when the Portuguese began to visit the area in the late 15th century and 
named it “Lion Mountain”. 
This chapter begins by presenting elements of empirically-founded literature that explore 
authority in contexts where enforcing justice and security is not the exclusive domain of 
formal state institutions (Hansen and Stepputat 2001, 2005; Sharma and Gupta 2006; 
Abrams 2006 [1988]; Mitchell 2006 [1999]; Ferguson 2006 [1994]; Ferguson and Gupta 
2002; Lund 2006; Juul and Lund 2002). Authority to make order cannot be applied to 
when an actor – the state, traditional leader or elders – acts, because such pure institutional 
categories do not exist (see Latour 1987:118-119).  
Rather than speaking only of ‘languages of stateness’, as do Hansen and Stepputat (2001), 
I argue in favor of adding the concept of ‘languages of public authority’. Together, the two 
                                            
11 It is worth noting that legal pluralists in studies on customary or ‘living law’ have long recognized the 
existence of more than one legal order and that law may originate from various sources of authority – state 
and non-state. They explore the relationships, contestations and complementarities that state law may have 
with alternative norm-based or rule-making systems of order (Griffiths 1986; Black 2002). Radical or strong 
legal pluralism (as opposed to legal centralism) does not give conceptual priority to the state (i.e., that law 
should only be of the state) or that the state should engage only with those alternative normative orders 
recognized by the state), but accepts that alternative legal systems of order or “private governance regimes” 
may be equal to or indeed exclude the state (Griffiths 1986; Teubner 2003; Lehman-Langlois and Shearing 
2009). 
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languages of authority – stateness and public authority – more accurately capture the 
syncretism that characterizes how order is enforced in Sierra Leone. Notions of 
autochthony, which are particularly important in West Africa (Lentz 2007:43), reference to 
legislation and symbolic representations of uniforms come into play simultaneously and 
assemble to constitute authoritative expressions. 12 
I propose a model of hybridity that combines Latour’s concept of assemblage and 
Bourdieu’s fields of practice.13 Thinking in terms of assemblages and how people, things 
and discourses come together and fall apart in a field brings dynamism to how processes of 
enforcing order are seen. Such a perspective also points to the unexpected and often 
unpredictable course of how an assemblage unravels. At the same time, however, to 
paraphrase Bourdieu, ‘objective structures’ exist that are independent of the consciousness 
and will of agents.  
Thus, applying the concept of field has the advantage of elaborating on the resources – 
capital forms – available to a variety of actors, and does not privilege or necessitate any 
clear demarcation of whether they belong on one or the other side of the state-society split. 
To understand how these forms of capital are enacted, I propose that we engage ritual 
theory (Abélès 1986; Connerton 1989; Gluckman 1949) in its political manifestations, and 
the symbols that are put on display as part of assemblages in the justice and security field. 
In sum, hybrid orders are best analyzed as assemblages that are structured by field 
dynamics. This explanation takes into account that while we can never make social life 
fully predictable, we can explore the likelihood of how a criminal act will be acted upon 
and by whom. For example, in Peyima, the small town in the Kono District where I 
conducted my fieldwork, it was likely that a case of diamond theft would lead to the 
                                            
12 I will not go into a lengthy conceptual debate on the formation of nations and nationalism as conceived by 
a number of so-called modernist scholars who problematize and challenge perennial and primordial readings 
of the national community (Breuilly 1993; Mann 1993, 1995; Gellner 1983) and ethno-symbolism that seeks 
to mediate between modernists and perennialists (Smith 1986, 1995, 1998). I will note here, however, that 
‘autochthony’ in the context of this dissertation differs from, but at the same time relates to, the concepts of 
nation and nationalism as part of an administrative center and network of power (see Schulze 1998:99; 
Breuilly 1993:1). 
13 Latour is not the creator of the concept of the assemblage. Deleuze and Guattari use the French terms 
agencement and dispositif, which are usually translated as assemblage, and considered it a “site at which a 
discursive formation intersects with material practices” (Crary 1992:31). Latour’s combination of actors, 
discourse and things in the assemblage resemble this line of thinking. 
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involvement of the chief and eventually the police (See Chapter 8). Yet, precisely who 
would be involved and in what way could not be predicted, and therefore had to be 
subjected to empirical investigation. 
 
2.2 Languages of stateness + languages of public authority = hybrid order 
2.2.1 Disaggregating the state 
To capture the empirical reality of a place such as Peyima, we need a more inclusive 
conception of actors, processes and practices of authority in the security and justice field 
than what is captured by the concept of ‘the state’. A first step towards a concept of 
hybridity is to disaggregate the notion of authority, not only of the state, but also of 
traditional leaders, into a variety of different practices in the lives of ordinary people. In 
this perspective, the enforcement of security and justice is considered a field of action that 
is historically produced through particular discourses and practices that, in turn, constitute 
particular subjects and objects of governance. Rather than seeing the post-colonial state as 
weak or powerful, this approach emphasizes its multiple shapes and sets of rules, as well as 
its dis-unified center. 
This multiplicity is captured in much of the empirically-founded literature that explores 
authority in contexts where it is not necessarily the prerogative of state institutions to 
enforce order (e.g. Hansen and Stepputat 2001, 2005; Das and Poole 2004; Lund 2002, 
2006, 2008). On the one hand, an approach of this nature enables us to understand “the 
operation of authorities in a disaggregated manner and to de-emphasize the state as the 
ultimate seat of power” (Sharma and Gupta 2006:9). On the other hand, it supports the 
importance of “examining the dispersed institutional and social networks through which 
rule is coordinated and consolidated, and the role that non-state institutions, communities 
and individuals play in the mundane processes of governance” (ibid.). This analytical 
perspective expresses a ‘multitude-ness’ of what and who holds the authority to govern and 
exposes it to investigation, which the depiction of the ideal state as a Leviathan does not.14 
                                            
14 Hobbes’s (1985) Leviathan may be dismissed in today’s world of liberal democracies, but it could be 
argued that at the source of state-building discourses lies the concept of a ‘benevolent Leviathan’, a strong 
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Hansen and Stepputat (2001; 2005) take us further in this analysis. In their explorations of 
how to conceptualize the post-colonial state, they reject the concept of the state as an 
ahistorical entity that has certain assumed core functions (Hansen and Stepputat 2001:1). 
On one level, this analytical approach is in accord with the Marxist-inspired thinking of 
Gramsci and his reflections on the logic of how the state functions. Gramsci rejects that 
specific governmental institutions, together comprising “the State”, are the effective far-
reaching instruments of a “dominant group” (Gramsci 1971:182): “[T]he state is conceived 
of as a continuous process of formation and superseding of unstable equilibria … between 
the interest of fundamental [i.e., dominant] groups and those of the subordinate group…” 
(ibid.).  
In this way Gramsci de-naturalizes the state by portraying it as embedded in politics and 
therefore as an unstable, partial construct with a social foundation. This understanding of 
the state as unstable and interest-driven is not always addressed in literature on fragile and 
weak states. If it is addressed, it is done so only superficially (Stepputat et al. 2007:16). 
The political and ultimately unstable basis of the state construct is further captured in 
Mitchell’s (2006 [1999]:176) questioning of the state as “an actor, with the coherence, 
agency, and autonomy that this term presumes.” Similarly, Abrams (2006 [1988]) and 
Taussig (1991), each in their own way, de-naturalize the state as a set of unitary, technical 
and neutral institutions of governance, pointing to their political, violent and partial 
foundation (see also Emirbayer 1997:285)15. The aim of these authors is to render probable 
that the modern state is not a singular source of power, and following from this, to outline 
how it may be unfolded and conceptualized (see also Aretxaga 2003:395).16 
                                                                                                                                             
government as the most reliable and effective form of government. 
15 Emirbayer (1997:285) makes the point that holistic theories and ‘structuralisms’ posit self-subsistent 
‘societies’, ‘structures’ or ‘social systems’ as the exclusive source of action. Proponents of these approaches, 
from neo-functionalists to many historical-comparative analysts, all too often fall back upon the assumption 
that it is durable, coherent entities that constitute the legitimate starting points of all sociological enquiry. 
16 In Latour, we find a parallel argument for moving beyond Durkheimian thought of society as a separate 
ontological domain that can explain religion, law or politics. Instead, Latour (2000:113) argues for a concept 
of ‘society’ that is “composed, made up, constructed, established, maintained and assembled. It is no longer 
to be taken as the hidden source of causality which could be mobilized so as to account for the existence and 
stability of some other action or behaviour” (see also Latour 2005:45).  
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To do so, Hansen and Stepputat (2001) also seek inspiration from Foucault (1978, 1991), 
who sees the state as the effect of a wider range of dispersed forms of power.17 It is 
precisely the intensity of the unitary imagery condensed within the state that is an obstacle 
to understanding politics as the means by which we render our worlds governable (Dean 
2001).  
A simulacrum, “it” – the state – appears as a structure that stands apart from, and above, 
society. The conceptual separation between the state and society and the political 
significance of maintaining a boundary between the two domains are themselves important 
mechanisms to generate resources of power through inclusion and exclusion across 
boundaries (see Mitchell 2006 [1999]:174+175). Inherent in this imagined split between 
state and society is the creation of boundaries between those practices and spaces that are 
considered to form part of the state and those that are excluded (Nugent 1994). 
The state as a unitary actor might be a social fact as Abrams (2006 [1999]:122; see also 
Kapferer and Bertelsen 2009:6) suggests, but it is not a fact of nature. This leads to a 
problematization of the state as a material object of study, whether concrete or abstract, 
while taking “the idea of the state” seriously (Abrams (2006 [1999]:122). From this 
follows the need to study the internal and external relations of political and governmental 
institutions – what Abrams refers to as the state system – without postulating the reality of 
the state. Thus, the state encompasses both a system of tangible institutions and an idea of 
                                            
17 Foucault’s position in the social sciences, and particularly in anthropology, is precarious. While he has 
been a source of great inspiration (Carrier 1992; Knauft 1994; Coronil 1996; Mosse 2005), applying his 
theories to ethnographic data is methodologically problematic. Foucault’s focus was on the Western nation-
state, specifically France. It should be self-evident, therefore, that his considerable contributions to the 
workings of power and the governing of societies cannot simply be extrapolated to analyses of the provision 
of security and justice in rural Sierra Leone. Indeed, Dean (2010), in his development of the concept of 
‘international governmentality’, admits that Foucault’s work drew mainly on the history of European 
countries and made very little reference to how the arts of government operate in an international domain, 
which would preclude both the world outside Europe and international politics. A more serious 
methodological problem stems from Foucault’s ontological point of departure – his academic discipline. 
“Foucault was not a sociologist nor a social scientist,” Callewaert (2006:74) insists. He was a philosopher 
and a specialist of the history of sciences and knowledge, who questioned the very possibility of social 
science. He reconstructed the ‘liberal’ understanding of man and society as discourse, and was in this process 
describing the history of knowledge rather than social history (Callewaert 2006:91). In sum, therefore, while 
Foucault might be helpful in aiming the arrow, he will not help us hit the target. This should be part of any 
researchers ‘participant objectivation’ (Bourdieu 2003), prior to applying Foucault’s analytical considerations 
to data collected through ethnographic fieldwork. 
 33 
what it is or ought to be, and allows us to see it as both illusory and a set of concrete 
institutions, distant and impersonal as well as localized and personified. 
Inherent to the perspective that Hansen and Stepputat, among others, put forward is the 
danger of over-emphasizing the state. This is hardly a subverting critique, insofar as the 
aforementioned scholars all explicitly engage with and seek to understand its sociology. 
However, one is left wondering what exists between the cracks of the disaggregated 
political entity that we refer to as the state. It is to this area of the research that I now turn.  
I argue that authority should be understood as an amalgam of languages of stateness and 
public authority, which suggests the multiple sources that constitute the authority to make 
order. For example, legal documents, community policing discourse introduced through 
SSR, secret society membership and autochthon status obviously do not emanate from the 
same source of authority. And yet, paramount and lesser chiefs in Sierra Leone potentially 
draw on all of these different sources simultaneously to reflect the hybrid order they 
embody.  
 
2.2.2 Between the cracks 
It is the distinction between system and idea that causes Hansen and Stepputat to insist 
upon exploring the parochial sightings of the state. This particular outlook leads to a 
spatially- and conceptually-dispersed representation of what ‘it’ is (see also Das and Poole 
2004:6). Hansen and Stepputat emphasize that “modern forms of state are in a continuous 
process of construction,” and argue that this process takes place through “globalized 
registers of governance and authority” (Hansen and Stepputat 2001:5). They refer to these 
registers as ‘languages of stateness’ that are comprised of three practical languages of 
governance and three symbolic languages of authority.18  
                                            
18  The three languages of governance include: 1. “the assertion of territorial sovereignty by the 
monopolization of violence by permanent and visible military and police forces”; 2. “the gathering and 
control of knowledge of the population – its size occupations, productions, and well-being – of this territory”; 
3. “the generation of resources to ensure the reproduction and well-being of the population: in brief, 
development and management of the ‘national economy’.” The three symbolic languages include: 1. “the 
institutionalization of law and legal discourse as the authoritative language of the state and the medium 
through which the state acquires discursive presence and authority to authorize”; 2. “the materialization of 
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“The essential thing is,” Hansen and Stepputat note, “that a state exists only when these 
“languages” of governance and authority combine or co-exist one way or the other” 
(ibid.:8). Territorial sovereignty and the monopolization of violence constitute examples of 
the former, while the materialization of the state in a series of permanent signs and rituals 
exemplifies the latter (Hansen and Stepputat 2001:7+8). A study of the state must discern 
and explore how these different languages are produced, including their emic meanings,19 
and how the state is appropriated, translated and articulated by people, symbols, texts, 
iconography and practices. 
A disaggregated approach to exploring the state is the first step towards its de-
naturalization and constitutes a fundamental challenge to notions of its universal reach. At 
the same time, the approach that Hansen and Stepputat apply needs to be adjusted because, 
as noted above, it appears somewhat state-centric (see Bertelsen 2009:213). Both scholars 
are pre-occupied with exploring the disaggregated nature of the state to a degree that leaves 
little space for developing further how other types of authority may be conceptualized, 
what languages they speak, and how they are co-constitutive of authority.  
The two authors address this criticism themselves by noting in their later work that 
‘sovereign power’, taken to refer to state authority, might project itself as “given, stable 
and natural,” but that it is never able to achieve the status of a ‘master signifier’. Indeed, 
Hansen and Stepputat (2005:3) argue for disaggregating the concept of ‘sovereign power’ 
itself: “Whether exercised by a state, in the name of the nation, or by a local despotic 
power or community court, [it] is always a tentative and unstable project whose efficacy 
and legitimacy depend on repeated performances of violence and a ‘will to rule’.” 
Therefore, there is a gap between the state idea and the reality of more or less contradictory 
programs, initiatives and statements that people encounter (Gupta 1995). One is left 
wondering whether these fragmentary, local, personalized and frequently unsatisfactory 
                                                                                                                                             
the state in a series of permanent signs and rituals: buildings, monuments, letterheads, uniforms, road signs, 
fences”; 3. “the nationalization of the territory and the institutions of the state through inscription of a history 
and a shared community on landscapes and cultural practices” (Hansen and Stepputat 2001:7-8). Apart from 
stating what the languages are Hansen and Stepputat do not systematically elaborate their functions in any 
great detail. 
19 An emic account is the description of behavior or beliefs in terms meaningful to the actor making the 
account. In other words, an emic account comes from a person within the field of analysis, in this case that of 
justice and security. 
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encounters can really be ‘it’. Furthermore, there is a tendency to establish a dichotomy 
between ‘the ideal’ (idea) and ‘the real’ (system), rather than seeing both these analytical 
categories as articulated equally in practice, never fully detached from one another, yet 
never fully realized.  
Instead of speaking of ‘languages of stateness’ alone, I consider it useful to add the concept 
of ‘languages of public authority’ to emphasize the syncretic and hybrid character of 
government officials, paramount chiefs and other groups that in the case of Peyima in 
Kono District vie for a role in the enforcement of order.20  
The next section discusses how these languages – stateness and public authority – are 
simultaneously constituted in order to articulate authority. This lays the basis for discussing 
hybrid orders. 
 
2.2.3 Languages of authority 
By adding ‘languages of public authority’, I am challenging and circumscribing a number 
of Hansen and Stepputat’s (2001:7-8) symbolic and practical ‘languages of stateness’. I 
question the assertion that the state only exists when these languages “combine or co-exist” 
and suggest that the addition of the concept of ‘public authority’ recognizes the hybridity 
of the actors and institutions that combine to make up the justice and security field. 
Furthermore, I question the relevance of specifying whether the state, in fact, exists or not 
and argue that authority to make order, whether performed by a police officer or a town 
chief, always does so in some way, shape or form. This statement in turn demands a 
specification of additional languages, such as belonging, autochthony and the act of 
boundary-making, that are central to the notion of authority as it practiced in Peyima. 
This is not an argument for setting up clearly separable languages that would take us back 
to dichotomous thinking. Rather, I argue that the vantage point from which the 
establishment of order is articulated is constitutive of where the languages are located 
along a continuum between ‘stateness’ and ‘public authority’.  
                                            
20 Rouveroy van Nieuwaal (1996:62) uses these terms – ‘syncretic’ and ‘hybrid’ – to denote that on the one 
hand chiefs engage within the hegemonic state in alliances, and on the other hand they resist state practices. 
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It makes a difference whether the register that actors draw upon to act in the justice and 
security field is derived from the imagery of tradition, including sacred and other 
customary powers, kinship and secret society membership, or from the imagery of an 
operative decision-making center of government and bureaucracy and legislation. Yet, with 
respect to Sierra Leone, paramount and lesser chiefs are able to draw on these languages 
simultaneously, making them a prime articulation of the hybrid order. 
The empirical inseparability of these languages is evident because registers of both 
‘stateness’ and ‘public authority’ come into play simultaneously, not only in the formation 
of assemblages of a multitude of actors, things and discourses, but as embodied by 
individuals. This is the case, for instance, when a local police officer – who derives his 
identity and authority from languages of stateness – claims that he is working for and takes 
orders from the paramount chief. The paramount chief, part of the system of the state, is 
therefore not antagonistic towards it. At the same time, as an autochthon and a member of 
the secret society of a particular place, the Chief derives his authority from his relationship 
to a physically-defined locality. 
The hybrid order that the entanglement of the two languages creates is evident, but the 
component parts of this order do not lend themselves to investigation in their pure form, 
not least because the paramount chief gives shape to, but is also shaped by the state of 
Sierra Leone (see Chapter 5). The languages that may be considered of a state order may 
simultaneously be considered in terms of public authority, as I elaborate below regarding 
the language of territory, symbolic language, language of autochthony and language of 
relationality. Herein lies the basis of hybridity: both languages are articulated 
simultaneously and frame the discussion of the four languages of authority that are central 
to order-making in localities such as Peyima. 
Language of territory. First, one of the most important languages of public authority, 
which is also one of the central practical languages of stateness, centers on the assertion of 
territory by monopolizing violence through permanent and visible security forces. This 
monopoly is only tenuously held by the Sierra Leone Police (SLP) in Peyima, and is shared 
between state officials and traditional leaders, each of whom constitute hybrid categories of 
actors. The hybrid nature of both parties is accentuated by the fact that the monopoly to 
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enforce order is shared, that chiefs draw their authority from a variety of sources (state law, 
ancestral ties and secret society membership) and that chiefs and police officers draw on 
each other’s capital to act in the justice and security field (See Chapter 8). Hence, the 
hybrid nature of both parties is accentuated. 
Symbolic language. A second language of authority that does not automatically conflate 
with the stateness of an institution is expressed in the materialization of authority in signs, 
symbols and rituals, including, inter alia, buildings, uniforms and licenses. Symbols 
reproduce the imagination of an authority, perhaps the state, perhaps the chief or a 
combination of the two as hybrid societal centers, who, in principle, are capable of issuing 
what Bourdieu calls the ‘last judgment’ (Bourdieu 1999a:67).  
Because one authority is contained within the other and vice versa, i.e., they draw on the 
authority of one another to act in the justice and security field, it matters little which 
institution has the final say in a given case. In the aforementioned case of diamond theft, 
discussed in detail in Chapter 8, it was not significant whether it was the chief or the police 
who made the final ruling. The fact that the chief and police officer were dependent upon 
each other’s articulation of authority brought the case to closure. 
Lund (2006:691) emphasizes that “symbols of public authority are not moored to specific 
institutions”; indeed, they are evident in secret society membership and initiation marks, in 
legislation and mining licenses and inscribed on police uniforms. Such symbols do not 
merely signify one group’s challenge of another’s authority to enforce a particular order. 
They express the conglomeration of various actors who in themselves are hybrid in nature 
and carry hybrid symbols of public authority. 
Language of autochthony. A third language of authority is articulated by employing 
notions of belonging and autochthony that establish symbolic boundaries inside and 
outside a given physical locality. Autochthony is not merely used to claim “access to rights 
as citizens within a state” (Leonhardt 2006:70), but also in relation to more localized 
claims to tribal identity, strongly expressed in Peyima, and the ability to point to a ‘home 
land’ or a ‘home village’, which literally implies an origin “of the soil itself” and “a direct 
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claim to territory” (Geschiere and Jackson 2006:6).21 This is not surprising when the 
colonial history of Sierra Leone is taken into account, where the colonial policy of indirect 
rule led to the emergence of semi-autonomous administrative units and what Fanthorpe 
(2001:372) refers to as ‘extreme localization’ with regard to identity and belonging in rural 
areas of the country.  
However, claims to authority through autochthon status in a particular village or chiefdom, 
and the symbolic capital that flows from this claim, are not simply of colonial (state) origin 
and construct. They also arose out of transformed pre-colonial configurations of first-
comers and late-comers in a particular locality (Lentz 2007:45). As suggested in Chapters 
5 and 7 respectively, the institutions of the chiefdom and the secret society are strong 
tokens thereof. Claims of autochthony are thus inter-twined with colonial and post-colonial 
state formation, but cannot be reduced to these processes. Reference to the ‘publicness’ 
rather than the stateness of this claim is a way of emphasizing this point. 
Language of relationality. A fourth crucial language of authority relates to the relationality 
of groups and individuals and the setting up of symbolic boundaries between autochthons 
and allochthons, i.e., secret society member and non-members, chiefs and police. This type 
of boundary-making serves to exclude some and include others in making order, and to 
demarcate lines of symbolic authority between the police and the chief.  
What is at stake is an ability to draw on capital forms to construct and defend, but also 
when necessary, to demolish boundaries between inside and outside a locality.22 Chapters 7 
and 8 show how these languages of relationality are articulated at various times. They 
occur between members and non-members of the secret society, for instance, and between 
the paramount chief and the police as they seek to solve cases of theft together. The 
                                            
21 This is not to deny that autochthony and kinship do not figure centrally in languages of stateness as well, 
constituting a powerful expression of boundary-making. Herzfeld (1992), for instance, explains in the context 
of Western bureaucracies that kinship is “one rich source,” “a common figure” in the production of 
separation: “Outsiders do not deserve our attention, while those of ambiguous status must either be 
incorporated or fought.” The politics and rhetoric of kinship and identity, and the manipulation of both to 
serve hierarchies of power, is as central to the organization of ‘state bureaucracies’ as it is to security and 
justice in Peyima. When applied, it provides a strong basis for day-to-day solidarity. 
22 As Lamont and Molnár (2002:167) note, “boundaries are part of the classical conceptual tool-kit of social 
scientists.” 
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significance of these boundaries is the distribution of authority that they designate and the 
access to resources that they dictate. 
The language of relationality also allows people to occupy certain positions in the justice 
and security field, and thereby becomes an essential medium through which people acquire 
status and monopolize resources. In the end, insiders and outsiders are created (Lamont and 
Molnár 2002:167). Whether individuals establish boundaries as part of an explicit strategy 
or because they follow norms, these boundaries become inseparable from the practiced 
context within which they are set up.  
 
2.2.4 The hybrid condition 
Recognizing hybridity as a key characteristic of how authority through these different 
languages is articulated forces us to take into account its different sources. As a concept, 
hybridity is a way of critiquing separations and categorical divisions of what a state is and 
what it is not and what is ideal and what is real. It is also a way of encompassing the 
institutional formations that exist between the pure and the hybrid itself (Strathern 
1996:520). The term hybrid affirms the existence of a myriad of differently sourced forms 
of authority, which do not exist in isolation from one another or in a dichotomous 
relationship between state and non-state, state and tradition, but instead permeate and 
partly dissolve one another. It is their quality of simultaneity, and the fact that they exist 
because of, not in spite of one another, that makes orders hybrid. In Latour’s (2007:3) 
terms, they are organizations on top of organizations.23 
This hybrid order of stateness and public authority facilitates an exploration of the way that 
actors in the justice and security field simultaneously draw on different registers and logics 
and languages of authority. This re-configuration also raises the question whether public 
authority can be juxtaposed with the ‘stateness’ of an institution, as Lund (2006:686) 
                                            
23 ‘Hybridity’ (or ‘plurality’) is thus a comprehensive concept denoting inclusion of the public and private 
sectors, civil society and communities, as well as international and transnational entities (Bayley and 
Shearing 2001).  
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implies in his discussion of home-town associations, chieftaincies and vigilante groups that 
operate in the twilight between state and society, public and private.24  
On the one hand, it is useful to follow Lund (ibid.) and argue that multiple government 
institutions, traditional institutions and “emerging institutions and organizations” such as 
vigilante groups are integral to the justice and security field. On the other hand, as 
suggested above, it is also important to emphasize clearly that since each actor within the 
justice and security field draws upon numerous different sources of authority, it is 
impossible to establish clear distinctions between state and society (or non-state), public 
and private. 
‘Tradition’, for example, cropped up in numerous discussions with informants during my 
fieldwork. It was mentioned often by the chiefs, who saw themselves as mediators of the 
past and the present and ‘as guardians of custom’.25 Chiefs and other authoritative actors in 
Peyima used ‘tradition’ to explain a wide range of practices and institutions in the justice 
and security field, from the British colonial system’s reliance on chiefs to the emphasis on 
secret society membership, ‘black magic’, autochthon status and lineage.  
Tradition is understood here as a way of making sense of past lifeways, which in Peyima 
are used as a source to bolster authority to act in the field of justice and security. The 
inheritance of an authentic tradition is illusory, because those who project it themselves 
embody an order established through processes of hybridification of different sources of 
authority. The use of a defining tradition exemplifies the objectification of a symbolic 
                                            
24 Just as the state idea, its symbols and resources may be drawn upon as sources of authority, notions of 
tradition, identity and locality confer legitimacy on institutions’ claims to public authority. The term ‘local’ in 
contrast to ‘national’, for instance, is often invoked to assume a spatial mapping between ‘inside’ and 
‘outside’ the chiefdom. It is important to note, however, that by imagining the primacy of certain levels over 
others, we are likely to overlook the central question of how this primacy is established in a social and 
political process. Augé’s (1995) construction of the ‘anthropological place’, in all its simplicity, is alluring: 
“simply a place,” he notes, “the one occupied by the indigenous inhabitants who live in it, cultivate it, defend 
it, mark its strong points and keep its frontiers under surveillance, but who also detect in it the tracks of 
chthonian or celestial powers, ancestors or spirits which populate and animate its private geography.” This 
concept of an ideal type of ‘anthropological place’ takes seriously the sources of authority that exist in local 
spaces, but also appears somewhat romanticist, representing a yearning for essence, for the pure and 
unpolluted. Rather, what is at stake is the conglomeration of numerous sources of authority into hybrid actors 
operating in the justice and security field. 
25 As von Trotha (1995:469) says: “a chief should not only be, if he wants to survive in new political settings, 
an intermediary between the past and the present, but also be an agent of the present and an intermediary 
between the present and the future.” 
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construct (Cohn 1980:217). Tradition is not a coherent body of customs, lying “out there” 
and reified, a thing to be discovered; it is a dynamic model that shapes individual and 
group experience while also being shaped by it. The point is that what appears as tradition 
is constructed in the present, meaning that the content of the past is modified and re-
defined according to current significance (Linnekin 1983:41-42). 
In the field of justice and security, tradition becomes a rallying point and a symbol of 
power and authority. In this respect, paramount chiefs in Sierra Leone are equipped to 
enter the justice and security field by drawing not only on their status in formal legislation, 
but also from their autochthon status as descendants from those individuals who founded 
the chiefdom – or town – over which they rule. This cannot be understood in terms of the 
‘stateness’ of an institution, or even necessarily, as van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal (1996:48) 
notes, as the mobilization of forces against the “hegemonic projects of the state”. Rather, it 
should be explained in terms of the combination of different sources of authority, of both 
stateness and public authority. 
Above, I outline a concept of authority that is hybrid, which takes into account the 
multitude of sources that are constitutive of the order that is produced as a consequence. 
However, while I have spoken of authority as a hybrid order of different languages, I have 
not outlined the mechanics underlying hybridity as a concept. To do this, I now turn to 
Latour and Bourdieu in an attempt to avoid a dichotomous approach and to combine 
dynamism and structural effect in the analysis. 
 
2.3 The productive tension between Latour’s assemblage and Bourdieu’s field26 
Thinking in terms of assemblages brings dynamism to how order is made, because the 
concept points to the unexpected and partly unpredictable ways in which hybrid order is 
practiced. At the same time, ‘objective’ structures’ exist that shape these assemblages. 
Unlike the state-focused analytical approaches outlined above, the importance of the 
hybrid approach is that it does not give preferential treatment to either ‘the state’ or the 
                                            
26 I find it necessary to spend some time on the debates that took place between the two scholars, given the 
tensions and disagreements that existed between them in their respective epistemological points of departure. 
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‘local level’. It looks at the authority of each actor as well as assemblages that emerge from 
numerous sources, simultaneously. 
The notion of the hybrid order lies at the very basis of my attempt to overturn dichotomous 
views of authority. I suggest exploring crimes and their resolution within the justice and 
security field as heterogeneous, yet integrated justice and security assemblages that form 
and fall apart in a given locality (see Callon 2006:49; Leander 2010a:16).27 This is a view 
of practice that draws on Latour’s concept of the network and Actor-Network Theory 
(ANT) more generally (see Strathern 1996:520).  
Taking its point of departure from semiotics and social constructivism, ANT demonstrates 
how knowledge and truth is produced in the encounter between and among actors. From 
this perspective, the dichotomies we use to categorize the world set up false distinctions, 
and separate what are networked entities that in turn constitute a hybrid order.28 We 
separate the inseparable, as it were. I suggest that this is precisely what is at stake with 
respect to the languages of authority discussed above: languages of stateness and public 
authority do not exist in pure forms. 
As ‘radical constructivists’ (Vandenberghe 1999:35; on Latour, see Amsterdamska 
1990:495)29, proponents of ANT such as Callon (1986), Latour (1987) and Law (1994) 
focus on descriptions, re-descriptions and constructions of reality, but not on reality itself 
or on making claims about the ‘state of the world’ (Levi and Valverde 2008:808). Instead, 
                                            
27 In this regard, I have drawn inspiration from Abrahamsen and Williams (2011:3) who recently coined the 
concept of ‘global security assemblages’ in order to explore the evolution of the private security industry and 
“new security structures and practices that are simultaneously public and private, global and local.” 
Concretely, ‘global security assemblages’ that constitute processes of disassembly and reassembly are 
“transnational structures and networks in which a range of different actors and normativities interact, 
cooperate, and compete to produce new institutions, practices and forms of deterritorialized security 
governance” (ibid.:89). They are “complex hybrid structures that inhabit national settings but are stretched 
across national boundaries in terms of actors, knowledges, technologies, norms and values” (ibid.:95). 
28 Latour (1999:83) refers to “the most dramatic split” between humans and science in the phenomenological 
tradition, a split which we may apply to relations between other commonly used dichotomies such as those 
between state and society or private and public. To take the comparison further, it becomes a world between 
“a world of science left entirely to itself, entirely cold, absolutely inhuman; and a rich lived world of 
intentional stances entirely limited to humans, absolutely divorced from what things are in and for 
themselves” (ibid.). 
29 On reality, Latour and Woolgar (1979:236-37) argue: “By observing artefact construction, we showed that 
reality is the consequence of the settlement of a dispute rather than its cause. If reality is the consequence 
rather than the cause of this construction, this means that a scientist's activity is directed not toward reality, 
but toward these operations on statements.” 
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they aim to document the processes, networks and actors through which the world is 
assembled. The Nature/Culture divide is, for Latour (1993:29-35), emblematic of our 
“modern constitution” and efforts to split the world in this way represent modernity as we 
know it.  
Yet, Latour (1993) stresses that the divide has never been accurate; I find inspiration in his 
deliberations to suggest that languages of stateness and public authority cannot be divided 
either. The world has always been composed of hybrids, challenging epistemological 
divides such as ‘nature’ and ‘culture’, but also, as I suggest above, ‘public’ and ‘private’, 
‘state’ and ‘society’, ‘ideal’ and ‘real’. The point of scholarship is not only to demonstrate 
the instability of ontological categories, but to embrace these hybrids and not seek to 
relegate them to either end of a binary opposition (Latour 1993).  
Through this lens, ad hoc constellations of people, things – or props, as Leander 
(2010b:13) calls them – ideas and resources produce a given situation. The diamond theft 
case described in Chapter 8 does not simply show the superior position of the paramount 
chief in resolving the matter, but more accurately, that his authority to act on the case of 
theft depended on his relations with the Local Unit Commander of the police. Thus, 
resolution only happened by the combined force of the two figures that came to enact a 
hybrid order. In other words, SSR did not institute overpowering articulations of stateness, 
but as the case of theft suggests, it reproduced hybridity, of which police reform is 
absolutely central (See Chapter 6). 
Like Foucault, Latour considers non-human relations such as architectural arrangements 
and textual formats to be significant actors; hence his notion of Dingpolitik rather than 
Realpolitik (Latour 2005). Things or props, in particular, play a key role in Latour’s 
approach: not only do they become objects of human activity, but human activity is just as 
dependent on the response from and interaction with these elements. Thus, the non-human 
agent can be as important for the construction of a given social reality as the human actor. 
(A case in point is the stone in Chapter 8 that was not only stolen but never found again, 
and yet caused numerous figures of authority to act). This means, for example, that the 
presence of police uniforms, a potentially valuable stone, artifacts or buildings make 
people act and interact in a particular way, both with things and with other people. Agency 
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thus appears as a continuum, “a power differentially expressed by all material bodies” 
(Bennett 2004:355). 
Emic languages of stateness and authority and pieces of legislation are treated as temporary 
assemblages of actants, including people and their position, police uniforms, legal codes on 
chiefly authority, discourse on autochthony, international debates on SSR, physical 
structures and ideational concepts. In Chapter 6, I show how assemblages that consist of 
these elements take form and analyze the past decade of police reform in Sierra Leone and 
how it has been translated into Peyima. It is the networked combination and composition of 
these people, things, spaces and words that I intend to explore – it is this fundamental 
hybrid constellation that does something, has sufficient coherence to perform actions, 
produces effects and alters situations. 
Thinking in terms of assemblages and how people, things and discourses come together 
and fall apart in a field brings dynamism to how processes of enforcing order are explored. 
At the same time I argue with Bourdieu that ‘objective structures’ exist that are 
independent of the consciousness and will of agents. 
Juxtaposing Bourdieu and Latour in this way is not without problems. Eyal (2010) argues, 
for instance, that Bourdieu’s concepts of ‘space’ and ‘field’ represent an ‘objective’ 
moment of scientific inquiry with which it is possible to construct a representation of the 
total context of action. If so, Bourdieu’s approach runs entirely counter to Latour’s 
sociology of science, and his avoidance of privileging any point of view as the ‘truth’ or as 
‘objective’.  
Bourdieu himself expresses disdain for Latour’s – and Callon’s (1986) – attempt to 
challenge the distinction between human and non-human agents and considers it little more 
than a “literary game” (Bourdieu 2001:63-64). He regards Latour as a “naive observer”, 
who describes only the things he can make sense of, such as texts, conversations, 
instruments and rituals (Mialet 2003:615). Indeed, Bourdieu has said that because Latour 
objectifies the idiosyncratic individual who acts, rather than the position he or she occupies 
in social space, his work has constituted a “return upon the private person” of the 
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researcher, denunciated ethnographic writing and brought in thinly-veiled nihilistic 
relativism (Wacquant 1989:35).  
In turn, Bowker and Latour (1987:717) refer to Bourdieu as the most ‘sociologizing of 
sociologists’, as he sees society as a separate ontological domain that can explain religion, 
law and politics (see Latour 2000:113; 2005:84). “Bourdieu takes a neutral field like 
linguistics”, they argue, “and discovers society, or a neutral social community like 
academia, and discovers social determination…. What happens when he takes an 
ideologically-charged field like social science, or a community like that of sociologists? He 
discovers truth” (Bowker and Latour 1987:717).  
Thus paraphrasing Latour, justice and security should not be understood as a field to be 
studied independently, but instead as networks of people and of things, as a way in which 
the world is assembled and as an attribute that is attached to events, people, documents and 
other objects when they become part of order-making. The result is a theoretical approach 
that emphasizes a Nietzschean critique of static analytical tools as incapable of capturing 
the dynamism and flow of the world we study. Indeed, such theories have the pernicious 
effect of imposing artificial fixity of our view on those relations (Valverde 2005:452). 
Although they appear at odds, it is possible to combine Latour and Bourdieu; doing so does 
come with some benefits. It locates Latour-inspired justice and security assemblages – 
people, things and discourse – in the justice and security field. Bourdieu’s field of practice 
provides analytical categories that help clarify the resources that give shape to 
assemblages, i.e., different species of capital that are made available in the field.  
When I apply Bourdieu’s concept of field to Latour’s assemblages, I depart from the 
latter’s ‘radical constructivist’ approach and argue that structures do exist, and have an 
effect on how actors, things and discourse assemble. Thus, I combine the unpredictability 
of the assemblage with the structuring effect of the field. This makes it possible to say 
something about how order is constituted, but not precisely what the order looks like in 
practice, which must necessarily be explored empirically. In the following section, I go 
into some detail on how Bourdieu’s field of practice has informed my study. 
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2.4 The justice and security field 
2.4.1 The structure that shapes the assemblage 
Thinking in assemblages, and how people, things and discourses take shape in the field 
points to the partly unpredictable way in which this happens. Following Bourdieu, 
‘objective structures’ also exist that are independent of the consciousness and will of 
agents (or actants). Bourdieu has been criticized for employing the concept of ‘the field’ – 
‘the economy’, ‘the political sphere’, ‘the state’, ‘academia’, ‘science’ and so on – as 
distinct spheres whose contents are clearly bounded and separate from one another (Eyal 
2010). However, as Leander (2010b) notes, “the fixity” of the field should not be 
overstated; in fact, the concept may help lead us away from “blind and uncritical statism”, 
where the state is taken to be an actor with the coherence, agency and autonomy that the 
term presupposes. 
Bourdieu characterized his work as constructivist structuralism:  
By structuralism or structuralist, I mean that there exist, within the social world 
itself and only within symbolic systems […], objective structures independent of 
the consciousness and will of agents, which are capable of guiding and constraining 
their practices or their representations. By constructivism, I mean that there is a 
two-fold social genesis, on the one hand of the schemes of perception, thought, and 
action which are constitutive of what I call habitus, and on the other hand of social 
structure, and particularly of what I call fields and of groups, notably those we 
ordinarily call social classes (Bourdieu 1989; emphasis added).  
Habitus explains regularity by referring to the social embedding of the actor, the fact that 
actors are socially formed with relatively stable orientations and ways of acting.30 These 
are the processes that give shape to assemblages, which in turn help us see social reality in 
dynamic, continuous and processual terms. The concept of fields of practices, and the type 
of capital, whether symbolic or economic, that can be drawn upon to lay claim on the 
‘stake at stake’ lie at the heart of this discussion. 
                                            
30 The stability of the habitus is expressed in habits, disposition to act in a certain way and schemes of 
perception that order individual perspectives along socially-defined lines (see Keyes 2002:240). 
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In Peyima, the status of being an autochthon is central to the demands that can be made in 
the justice and security field. It may also be assumed that this claim outweighs those that 
can be made by a non-Kono or a police officer. In turn, involving a chief in international 
discussions of how best to formulate and develop SSR activities is close to unthinkable; the 
languages of authority that these two groups of actors articulate are not immediately 
interchangeable. Yet, it is SSR policies that speak to and of the state, which are 
incorporated into programs in order to transform how the justice and security field is 
organized in Peyima and beyond. In turn, it is inevitable that the logic of stateness that 
saturates the policies of SSR is shaped by their translation into Sierra Leone, in Freetown 
as well as in Peyima. 
Bourdieu’s usefulness in the context of this thesis is his persistent attempt to understand 
both agent and structure and both discourse and action (Bourdieu 1989; Callewaert 2006). 
Equally important, like Latour, Bourdieu was preoccupied with transcending some of the 
key divides in the social sciences, including inside and outside and public and private 
(Leander 2010b). Complexity, fluidity and instability (Leander 2010a) are three words that 
must be added to the equation, since “the social world is far too fluid and complex to be 
captured through the analysis of a social field. There is no one logic of a field to be 
uncovered” (Leander 2010a:6). 
A further destabilizing factor is that a field never simply is - it has to be reproduced 
continuously in practice, it has to be enacted. It is in this process that the potential for 
change lies, not least because the capital from various fields might be deployed to change 
access and control over a stake at stake. In Peyima, lethal accidents, violence, tribal 
tension, theft and unlicensed mining all came to constitute (potential) points of 
destabilization of power constellations among the actors of the field, if not the field itself. 
It is when these events occur that the ‘stake at stake’ is accentuated. It is at this point in 
time that assemblages begin to take shape, consisting of actors (criminals, victims, chiefs), 
things (stolen goods, uniforms) and discourses (explanations, oral manifestations of 
authority). In turn, it is how these assemblages take shape within the field that must be 
investigated empirically.  
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2.4.2 Capital: sources of authority 
The concept of how assemblages take shape in the justice and security field constitutes a 
framework to structure how authority is played out in practice in Peyima. The social field 
has been described as “a set of objective power relations that impose themselves on all who 
enter the field and that are irreducible to the intentions of the individual agent or even to 
the direct interactions among the agents” (Bourdieu 1985:724). 
The field is a structured space of positions; the relations among these positions are 
determined by the distribution of different kinds of resources, referred to as forms of 
capital (Bourdieu 1984:226-256). Paramount and lesser chiefs may draw their authority 
from being autochthons and secret society members who are embedded in state legislation, 
while the police as state agents can only draw on their status as state actors. This means 
that as a rule, the resources available to the former category of actors will always trump 
those of the latter, because of the hybrid order that chiefs forcefully embody. 
The nature of power can be explained by examining the relationship of actors to specific 
types of capital. The types of capital are: ‘economic capital’ (i.e., material wealth in the 
form of money, stocks and shares); ‘cultural capital’ (i.e., knowledge, skill and other 
cultural acquisitions as exemplified by educational or technical qualifications); and 
‘symbolic capital’ (i.e., accumulated prestige and honor). However, in practice, these three 
forms of capital are entwined and provide actors with different capacities to act in a given 
field (Abrahamsen and Williams 2011:102; Thompson 1991:14). 
The concept of field thus denotes a social space within which rules are generated through 
competition around a ‘stake at stake,’ with numerous, often conflicting, logics coming into 
play. The logic inherent to what is ‘fair’ and ‘legitimate’ necessarily depend on the position 
that an actor occupies in the field. Competition could be over how the enforcement of 
security and justice should be organized and who should benefit from community 
resources such as farming and diamond mining (i.e., land). The boundaries of the field are 
defined by who influences the ‘stake at stake’, in terms of physical as well as symbolic 
forms of power – and violence.  
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While physical punishment is always a possibility, it is symbolic power that has a 
considerable ordering and stabilizing effect – power that is not perceived as such, but 
which is the source of legitimate demands on the services of others (Brubaker 1985). In 
Peyima, these demands were embedded in languages of authority such as autochthony and 
constant references to the ‘founding fathers’ of the village. It is the taken-for-granted 
understanding of the world (doxa), the implicit and explicit rules of behavior, and valuation 
of what confers power onto someone, i.e., what counts as ‘capital,’ that define the field 
(Leander 2010b; Bourdieu 1990:54). Symbolic capital emanating from the status of being 
an autochthon, secret society or political party member are thus credits that define 
difference. They are a “power granted” to those who are recognized in a particular way and 
that allows them to impose recognition on others (Bourdieu 1985; Bourdieu 1989; 
Bourdieu 1998 [1994]:8). 
I have explored above how the hybrid order may be articulated in terms of assemblages 
that take shape and fall apart in the field, constituting one way of transcending 
dichotomous thinking between state and society, the ideal and the real. I conclude this 
chapter by exploring the ways in which assemblages and the field are reproduced, 
introducing the concepts of rituals as structural and structuring parts of these processes. 
 
2.5 Ritual enactments and projections of the assemblage 
The mechanics of rituals determine how assemblages, the field and, by extension, a hybrid 
order take shape and are reproduced. In analytical terms, when the concept of ritual is 
applied to the justice and security field, it provides a language to describe what 
assemblages do and the patterns of practice that they help create in the field.  
The concept of the political ritual is useful in exploring the way that authority assembles in 
certain formations and is articulated through the distribution of capital (Bourdieu 
1987:103). Bell (1997:128) talks about the political ritual as “a particularly loose genre,” 
but one that comprises “those ceremonial practices that specifically construct, display and 
promote the power of political institutions (such as king, state and village elders)….” In 
other words, public ritual and symbolic displays – inherently political because of the 
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distribution of authority that they enact – become explicit expressions of symbolic power 
and violence (see Bourdieu 1990:118). 
In Peyima, ritual performances were expressed on numerous occasions. Secret society 
members would frequently meet in and around Peyima; every time they did so, all non-
initiates were forced to go inside their houses. What was on display was the hierarchy that 
existed within the township between initiates and non-initiates (See Chapter 7).  
Ritual performances were also evident at chiefdom elections and court hearings held by the 
chiefs. In both instances, the ritual practice was not an instrument of the chief’s power, but 
was itself the production, reproduction and negotiation of power relations (Bell 1992:196). 
Also in both instances, the position of the chief, the way that he spoke to, and was spoken 
to by those present demonstrated his formal position at the top of the Chiefdom hierarchy.  
The structural effects of the field require reproduction in practice. This is all the more the 
case in Peyima where few decisions over land disputes and crimes committed within the 
township are recorded. Oral documentation is therefore vital, and requires the continuous 
staging of authority in order to repeat and reinforce the rules of the game and hierarchies of 
power. Both the ritual performances of secret society members and the court hearing 
during the case of diamond theft mentioned above are examples thereof (See Chapters 7 
and 8). Such continuous staging of authority underscores the fact that the claim of authority 
is an inherently fragile social achievement that no society may take for granted.31 
Historically, demonstrations of political power through ritualized performances and 
symbolic displays of authority in Sierra Leone are tied to languages of autochthony, with 
underlying magico-religious references to the ancestors who established the settlement 
(town and Chiefdom), as well as to tribal identity that includes a strong territorial 
component (Fanthorpe 2001). It was the opportunity to articulate these symbolic languages 
of authority that came to define the right to land for farming and mining.  
The exploration of assemblages along political ritual lines is not meant to indicate that 
participants in these practices see the ritual act as the group’s re-formulation of itself and 
                                            
31 This follows the basic understanding of Rouverroy van Nieuwaal (1996:55), in discussing state-chief 
relations, that no societies are “static, unchanging units, but are in a constant process of development.” 
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the straightforward act of communicating and enacting its traditional values. Participants in 
political ritual acts are aware that “ritual activities are themselves the very production and 
negotiation of power relations” (Bell 1992:196). This is an analytical approach that 
demonstrates the inherent dynamism of the assemblage and allows us to explore strategies 
that individual actors put into place to communicate their status and manage the relations 
(and networks) of power that they are part of. 
The exhibition of symbols, including those of a discursive nature, and the monotonous 
reiteration of rhetoric about origin (see Abélès 1986:395), family relations and tribal 
identity, in combination with the irregular presence of ‘uniformed personnel,’ gives a good 
indication of who makes order and how the authority to do so is distributed. These 
symbolic acts provide insight into the reproduction of the field and the forms of symbolic 
capital that are being drawn upon. The authority to enforce a particular order is that which 
is being ‘reproduced through ritualized, everyday confirmations’, which can be spectacular 
and public or secret and menacing (Hansen and Stepputat 2005:7). Ritual practices and 
symbolic representations thus become central to the analysis of how assemblages are 
enacted and how hybridity is reproduced.  
 
2.6 Conclusion 
The underlying assumption of most state-building is that the state – a particular and 
historical entity – is or has become ‘weak’ and ‘fragile’. This implies that the state must 
take it upon itself to act according to the imagery and shape of a ‘unified’ actor that is both 
willing and able to hold a monopoly of violence over a given territory and serve the people 
who live within its borders. The chapter has critiqued this concept of state, which underlies 
most SSR processes, and suggests instead that authority should be conceptualized as a 
hybrid order of assemblages, articulating languages of both ‘stateness’ and ‘public 
authority’. 
The first step in conceptualizing hybridity is to de-stabilize the ahistorical and apolitical 
undercurrents that sustain the notion of the unitary state. To do so, I take my point of 
departure in empirically-founded literature and disaggregate the concept of the state into a 
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multitude of discrete practices in the everyday life of ordinary people. From this, it 
becomes evident that the state encompasses both a system of tangible institutions and an 
idea of what it is or ought to be (omnipotent and omnipresent). Thus, we may see the 
political manifestation of the state as both illusory and as a set of concrete institutions; 
distant and impersonal, while also localized and personified. 
Hansen and Stepputat (2001:5) emphasize that the modern state is in a “continuous process 
of construction” and that this process takes place through “globalized registers of 
governance and authority,” which they refer to as ‘languages of stateness’. I propose an 
adjustment of their approach, introducing the additional concept of ‘languages of public 
authority.’ This supports my analytical departure from a notion of authority as inherently 
bound to ‘the state’ or ‘the stateness’ of a particular actor to a notion that takes more 
seriously the multitude of sources from which authority emanates. In doing so, I adjust the 
languages that Hansen and Stepputat propose – symbols, monopoly of violence – and add 
new ones – autochthony and boundary-making.  
This approach captures more accurately the syncretism and hybridity of order enforcement 
in Peyima than state-centric approaches do. It is the productive tension between the 
languages that constitutes the hybrid order. However, the languages do not constitute 
separate entities, the distinction between state and society, the ideal and the real. They are 
articulated simultaneously, and mutually constitutive, reflecting the fact that authority 
always already emanates from multiple sources, and thus constitutes a hybrid order. 
I conceptualize this hybrid condition by combining Latour’s assemblage and Bourdieu’s 
field, locating justice and security assemblages within a justice and security field. Thinking 
in terms of assemblages brings dynamism to the process of order enforcement by 
demonstrating the unexpected and unpredictable ways in which it often unfolds. At the 
same time, ‘objective structures’ exist independent of the consciousness and will of agents, 
giving shape to how people, things and discourse come together as assemblages. 
Bourdieu’s concept of field provides useful analytical categories for clarifying the 
resources that shape the assemblages, i.e., the different species of capital that are available 
in the field. As such, I combine the unpredictability of the assemblage with the structuring 
effect of the field. This makes it possible to say something about how order is constituted, 
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but not precisely what the order looks like in practice, something that is best explored by 
using a variety of qualitative data collection techniques. 
In Chapter 2, I discuss how the concepts of hybridity, assemblages and field have been 
operationalized and subjected to my empirical research. I also present the methods that I 
used to collect data, including a brief presentation of the sites in which I carried out my 
fieldwork. 
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3 To study security sector reform in Sierra Leone – reflections on 
methodology and methods 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents methodological reflections on how I approached the study of justice 
and security assemblages and the foundational hybrid order in Sierra Leone. The theme of 
the study, and the analytical framework developed to address it, calls for a research 
methodology that combines a range of different types of data which help to analyze the 
mutually constitutive relations of local, national and international political dynamics, as 
well as the relationship between discursive representations and practices in local settings. 
The study thus reflects an epistemological movement within sociology and anthropology 
away from ideas of holistic, ‘integrative’ ethnography (Baszanger and Dodier 2005) based 
on studies of ‘complete’ cultural communities. 
First, the chapter provides insight into how the methodological principles of location-work, 
situational analysis and multi-sited ethnography were combined to study what I refer to as 
justice and security assemblages within the framework of extended case studies. Following 
particular cases of crime enabled me to conceptualize the exploration of specific situations, 
and how the cases moved through time and space. This meant exploring specific cases as 
they occurred and who and what became involved in resolving them how and where. These 
methodological considerations are followed by a short presentation of the different sites in 
which I carried out the fieldwork, including Peyima (the village), Tombodu (the chiefdom), 
Koidu (the district), Freetown (the capital) and London (the international). 
The chapter then explores how I accessed the field in Peyima, the village where I carried 
out fieldwork in 2008-2009 and Freetown, where I had worked prior to beginning my PhD 
fieldwork. I then consider the concrete methods that I used, interviews, collection of texts 
and observations, as well as how informants were selected. Finally, the chapter reflects on 
the researcher’s position and the way in which different social locations came into play 
during the course of the fieldwork. My being a white Danish middle-class man in my 30s 
with no particular religious conviction and a student evidently influenced the type of data 
that I was able to collect. While my identity does not disqualify my data, it certainly shapes 
what I collected and how I collected it. 
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3.2 Studying security and justice assemblages 
This study centers on understanding how justice and security are enforced in Peyima, 
Kamara Chiefdom and Kono District, and interlinks processes in the locality with policy 
processes and practices in the national and international domains. I show how SSR has 
reproduced a hybrid order, and not established the state-centered system as envisioned 
through internationally-led state-building. I do this by tracing the associations between the 
different components that constitute justice and security assemblages (cf. Latour 2007:7). 
Following this line of thinking allows me to capture the unpredictability of lived life. It 
helps me not to default to a position of externality, thinking that if only I rise high enough 
above lived life I will obtain a panoramic view of social phenomena’s regularity, order and 
logic. In square terms, how assemblages take shape cannot be explained by some general 
fact – or structure – from which it descends. This does not, however, mean that there are no 
structuring effects that work upon how assemblages take shape. 
This approach requires a combination of various components of analysis, including 
ethnographic fieldwork and a study of the wider political and historical context in which 
the locality under scrutiny is positioned. Unlike Latour, I operate with a concept of a field 
that has a structuring effect upon how assemblages of actors, things and discourse are 
established. This approach draws on Bourdieu’s (1988:782) attempt to integrate “into a 
single model the analysis of the experience of social agents and the analysis of the 
objective structures that make this experience possible.”  
Furthermore, exploring how assemblages form in the justice and security field has required 
an exploration of how SSR emerged and developed in part from international experiences 
in Sierra Leone and from experiences elsewhere in Africa and beyond. Simply put, a focus 
on the productive effects of internationally-driven SSR programming in Sierra Leone and 
the hybrid order through which it is translated into a locality such as Peyima requires an 
analytical reach beyond the local. 
Although rural localities may have spatial boundaries in people’s minds and on maps 
produced by the state – and Peyima is no exception – they cannot be regarded in the 
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classical anthropological sense as ‘bounded cultural wholes’ or as ‘holistic legal systems’ 
(Gupta and Ferguson 1997:1-5). Indeed, this is the fundamental premise of foundational 
hybridity: unpolluted essence does not exist and is therefore not there to be revealed (see 
Czarniawska 2007:14). This, in turn, does not mean that regularities, patterns and ways of 
doing things do not exist. International, national and local institutions, officers, advisers, 
ideas, aspirations, laws, material resources, policies, program and evaluation documents 
shape and sustain, produce and tear down components of justice and security assemblages 
as they amass and as they fall apart.  
 
3.3 Location-work, situational analysis and multi-sited ethnography 
A structuring principle of my fieldwork that allowed me to study justice and security 
assemblages was to ‘follow’ the conflict, the idea, the case, the person. This allowed me to 
conceptualize the exploration of a specific situation or event, and how it assembled and 
disassembled in different localities, moving through time and space. I explored cases of 
theft and acts of violence in Peyima and Kamara Chiefdom, and analyzed who and what 
became involved, how and where. The criminal acts always already had the potential to 
instigate authoritative acts to resolve a matter – be they local or extra-local. They were 
analyzed as situations that articulated the interests and strategies of actors, disclosing 
processes which were otherwise hidden or impossible to examine, because they did not 
happen. Simply put, assemblages would not take form if a crime did not occur. 
 
3.3.1 Location-work 
Gupta and Ferguson (1997) suggest the concept of ‘location-work’ to discuss ‘the field’ 
and ‘fieldwork’ – “it is in the field that the actual production of accounts can be studied” 
(Czarniawska 2007:9). They argue for working “with an attentiveness to social, cultural, 
and political location” and emphasize the need to self-consciously shift and realign one’s 
own location “while building epistemological and political links with other locations” 
(Gupta and Ferguson 1997:5).  
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The use of ‘location’ is not to be conflated with a methodological return to studying 
locally-bounded communities. Location-work is the analysis of how different actors, 
including the researcher, are located and positioned in the field – including the 
contradictions and ambivalence of changing positions in different contexts. Gupta and 
Ferguson suggest a focus on “shifting locations rather than bounded fields” (ibid.:38). This 
point reflects precisely the multi-dimensionality – the multi-sitedness – of location in 
different contexts. Location-work is thus a particular aspect of fieldwork that focuses 
analytical attention on how social relations and modes of differentiation cluster together 
and are recognized and/or mobilized.  
Like Gupta and Ferguson, Haraway requires critical, mobile positioning to change the 
focus of the researcher and to research positions in reflexive and self-critical ways, in 
relation to both production and analysis of data. This aspect of location-work is 
methodological in nature in the sense that it relates to how research is produced and how a 
researcher produces knowledge (Guba and Lincoln 2005). Similarly, location-work relates 
to analyzing how informants position themselves and each other. Location-work thus also 
implies the act of analyzing the politics of location, i.e., the informants’ simultaneous 
‘situatedness’ and positionings in social spaces.  
This is an analytical strategy with a double focus on both the social locations and positions 
of the researchers and informants. It thereby turns our attention to the dynamics of 
positioning in which all social actors are embedded. In sum, just as I adopted a particular 
position qua my identity, a chief, a Temne, a young man or a police officer occupied 
different positions in the justice and security field. 
Thus, epistemologically, knowledge is always historically- and socially-mediated and 
constructed. Meaning and truth are temporary products of ongoing struggles and 
negotiations for stabilizing visions and perceptions of the social world – and of what 
counts as legitimate knowledge and research (Guba and Lincoln 2005; Laclau and Mouffe 
1985). There is no definite and objective truth to which the researcher has privileged access 
through means of objective procedures, no “well-polished Cartesian mirror of the mind” 
(Smith and Hodkinson 2005:916). 
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“With all respect to various authorities who say otherwise” Czarniawska (2007:18) notes, 
“only beings with consciousness are able to construct knowledge and have opinions; 
‘subjectivity’ is therefore the necessary requirement for any kind of knowing.” In other 
words, I do not aim to establish a model that includes a phenomenological understanding 
of the field or an underlying objective truth. My goal is to offer a theoretically-informed 
and qualified analysis that acknowledges subjective experience. It is only through these 
subjective experiences that a fuller understanding of practices will be captured. 
 
3.3.2 Situational analysis 
In my study of justice and security assemblages, I found it useful to capture them through 
‘situational analyses’ (Gluckman 1961; van Velsen 1978; Mitchell 1983). This approach 
helped shed light on the practices and maneuvers of actors in a specific situation by 
relating them to the structural position they occupy in social fields (Lund 1998:40), be they 
villagers who live and work in Peyima or international advisers who spend a period of time 
in Sierra Leone. 
A situational analysis begins with a specific occurrence and links it to contemporary and 
historical events in order to understand the significance and complexity of the situation 
(ibid.:41). This implies relating the situation to broader dynamics of the field that shape the 
possibility of an assemblage to emerge (and to fall apart). The perceived criminal act – the 
event itself – was an assemblage that triggered other assemblages to form in the justice and 
security field. This necessitated following cases around, from when an act of theft 
occurred, for instance, to when meetings were held at chiefdom level and the SLP were 
involved (See Chapters 7 and 8). 
The situation is temporarily-staged and spatially-bound, and although it is ‘an occurrence 
out of the ordinary’, it is seen to reflect ‘everyday practices’ with respect to how people act 
when crimes are committed. Such ‘situations’ lie at the foundation of the data collected for 
this dissertation, as they gave me vital insight into the process whereby crimes are dealt 
with and resolved, the issues that are at stake in such cases, how positions of authority are 
represented and what official discourses are at work (Alvesson 1996:50). Such insights 
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emerge from paying attention to a variety of factors, including spatial location of the actors 
who constitute the event, conveying relations of power and authority, organization of the 
meeting site, timing of the event, display of material symbols (flag, dress, furniture, etc.), 
concrete actions, gestures and postures and speech acts (including official speeches, small 
talk and gossip among participants).  
 
3.3.3 Multi-sited ethnography 
The fact that assemblages are variously sourced and form in unpredictable ways and that 
data to analyze them come from various physical places in time and space and in different 
locations of the justice and security field may be articulated by using Marcus’s (1995) 
concept of multi-sited ethnography. In the context of this dissertation, multi-sitedness 
means following actors, things and discourses – or actants, humans and non-humans 
(Latour 1993) – temporally and spatially as they assemble, disassemble and re-assemble in 
the justice and security field, both as crimes and as discourses that describe or are meant to 
guide practice (various SSR policies, for instance). In other words, to paraphrase 
Czarniawska (2007:17), there is a need to see my fieldwork as a mobile ethnography.  
A major critique of multi-sited ethnography is that some of the in-depth understanding that 
comes from staying put in the same place is lost. First, however, collecting data in different 
locales was necessary because the focus of this study is on how SSR as a policy concept 
emerged and reproduced a hybrid order in Sierra Leone. Second, the different spaces and 
places in which fieldwork was carried out provided useful perspectives on the different 
components of justice and security assemblages. Third, the multi-sited approach allowed 
me to cross-check gathered data, and finally, the approach helped me honor the fact that 
foundational hybrid orders cannot be explored if the focus is limited to one site alone. 
Components of international projects and advisers, police officers and chiefs may assemble 
in a locality as the product of numerous processes that are specific to a particular event. 
Assemblages are not merely the structural effect of field dynamics, which is why the 
process of assembling is never entirely predictable. However, structuring local and extra-
local constitutive effects of the field come into play. Some actors, things and discourses 
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were situated in the ‘field site’ of Peyima, others in Tombodu, Koidu and farther afield in 
Freetown and beyond. This meant that the field of research extended across time and space 
and that a narrow focus on one location alone – Peyima – would have limited the scope of 
the study of how SSR supported the reproduction of foundational hybridity. 
To summarize, a key question to ask when deploying a multi-sited approach is where the 
site or the field is. Exploring how SSR has reproduced a hybrid order is, in fact, an 
exploration of SSR assemblages and their journey through time and space where it engages 
a myriad of localities (London, Freetown, Koidu, the headquarter town of Kono District, 
Tombodu and Peyima). While SSR does have a shaping effect with respect to the localities 
it is translated into, it is at the same time incorporated into and shaped by how authority is 
distributed within them, specifically, the justice and security field.  
In the following sections I present the localities that were included in my study. The way 
that SSR policy travels, becomes part of and detached from individual assemblages in 
London as well as Peyima, means that they never are (or were) free-floating or de-
territorialized (i.e., fetishes or abstractions) and never become part of and detached from an 
assemblage in entirely similar ways. Thus, SSR assemblages emerge in part as the product 
of field dynamics, and are appropriated and translated in physical space and different 
settings, even if those setting are temporary. This is to say that SSR components are 
articulated at different points, including in policy discourse and program designs and 
simultaneously overtaken and shaped by international advisers, police officers, chiefs and 
community policing groups. 
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3.3.3.1 Peyima – the village 
 
 
View of the main street in Peyima and Bafi River. 
 
 62 
Peyima is a small town in Kamara Chiefdom, Kono District.32 It lies on the banks of Bafi 
river, has around 2500 inhabitants and is known for its diamond deposits. While fairly 
close to the largest town in the district, Koidu, it is relatively inaccessible, particularly 
during the rainy season when the path through a forested area that leads to the town is 
flooded. Peyima’s main authorities are town chief Gborie and a group of elders; police 
come to the township only if summoned. 
Due the glut of workers who have migrated to western Kono in search of quick diamond 
riches, the demography of Peyima reflects the tribal composition of Sierra Leone, with the 
most numerous tribal groups being the Temne, Mende, Limba, Kuranko, Mandingo and 
Konos. The economy has been focused primarily on alluvial mining, a labor-intensive 
process in which gravel is dug and sifted, i.e.,‘washed’ for gems. During the mining 
season, which in Peyima starts after Christmas, diggers spend their days exposing, sifting 
and washing gravel under the watchful eye of a gang foreman. He, in turn, represents an 
investor, who may also hold the right, given by the town chief, to exploit the land. 
Alternatively, the investor may collaborate with someone in town that does have that right, 
and may be based elsewhere. Commonly, the diggers are male, poor – but not always 
young. 
Peyima, like other diamond-rich towns, was occupied by the RUF during the civil war and 
became a rebel base from around 1996 until the early 2000s. During this period, most of 
the town’s population fled to Guinea or Freetown. Those who stayed behind were forced to 
work with and for the RUF fighters, pointing out where there were diamond deposits and 
doing the actual mining. People began to return to the destroyed town after the war 
officially came to an end in 2002. 
Kono – and with it Peyima – was originally chosen as the location of my fieldwork 
because the conflict hit particularly hard in the district, and because of its importance as a 
diamond rich area (Reno 1995). I was interested in exploring what SSR, which had been 
                                            
32 The Kono as an ethnic group are northern-based and Mande-speaking, and live in an area of about 2,178 
square miles in Kono District of the Eastern Province of Sierra Leone. The Mende live to the south and the 
Kuranko live to the north. The eastern and western boundaries of the Kono area are marked by the Kissy and 
Temne ethnic group groups, respectively. At the time of the 1974 government census there were 
approximately 13,000 Kono living in the District; according to Thomas (1983), the total population in the 
District is 328,930 (a census in 2004 recorded a population of 335,401) (GOSL 2004b:3).  
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hailed as a great success by many of those involved, might look like in such a setting.33 As 
it turned out, the war did not take center stage during my fieldwork, while mining, the most 
important source of income generation in Peyima, ended up doing so. During my time in 
Peyima and Kamara Chiefdom, people spoke about the golden days of the 1970s and 
1980s, when diamonds were plentiful, before the horrific events during the decade-long 
war, when villagers had to choose between saving their own lives and those of their 
children.  
At the same time, it was the present that was of interest to me, i.e., what making order in a 
small town such as Peyima meant and who was involved in doing so. Diamonds were 
scarce when I arrived in Kono, and Peyima’s inhabitants were preoccupied with making 
ends meet from day to day. I decided to pay attention to what people told me rather than 
steer the conversation to topics of the past. You have ‘to follow the actors themselves’, 
Latour (2007:12) notes, learn what their collective existence has become for them, and so I 
did. 
The initial purpose of my study was quite squarely to explore how SSR was appropriated 
and translated into a locale where the state was not immediately present to make order; 
Peyima seemed like a good place to do so.34 Its proximity to a police post in the chiefdom 
headquarter town of Tombodu nine kilometers away and its relative inaccessibility meant 
that the police was not immediately present, but could be summoned. Its proximity to 
Koidu also allowed me to split my time between Peyima, Tombodu and Koidu, in order to 
pursue a multi-sited approach. (For instance, a crime committed in Peyima may initially 
become a matter for the police in Tombodu, the headquarter town of Kamara Chiefdom, 
then taken up by the paramount chief, and only after that, sent to police headquarters in 
Motema division). 
Peyima was suitable for my fieldwork for other reasons. Because its mining activity 
attracts tribes from across the country, its town authorities had to deal with inter-tribal 
                                            
33 In addition, one of my first encounters with a person from Sierra Leone was with a man from Kono, 
Patrick Tongu, who was a course participant at the Kofi Anna International Peacekeeping Training Centre in 
Accra, Ghana, where I worked in 2005. 
34 I paid visits to and discussed my research in several other chiefdoms, including Nimikoro, Nimyama and 
Sandor. 
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tension. Furthermore, crimes involving diamond theft were likely to occur, which provided 
insight into which authorities became involved and how, when such cases arose, and how 
hybrid orders were made explicit. 
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Different steps of the alluvial mining process. 
 
3.3.3.2 Tombodu – the chiefdom headquarter town 
As Kamara Chiefdom’s headquarter town, Tombodu was also central to my fieldwork. The 
paramount chief is officially based here, the town’s police post is located in the center of 
the town, as is the Local Policing Partnership Board Chairman. If ever the police were 
called to Peyima, one of the two officers manning the post in Tombodu would respond. 
 
3.3.3.3 Koidu/Sefadu, its surroundings and Motema police headquarters – the district 
Approximately 20 kilometers away, Koidu/Sefadu was important as the headquarter town 
and economic center of the district. Eastern Kono depends primarily on agriculture for 
income generation. Western Kono, however, has been dominated by mining in the areas 
around Koidu, Yengema, and Sefadu since the early 1930s when British surveyors 
discovered gem deposits. Mining concessions were initially owned and operated by the 
British, then by several companies that included both British and Sierra Leonean managers 
(TRC 2004:7-18).  
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From 1988 and onwards, mining concessions were government-owned, and leased by 
several companies, notably Branch Energy Limited, currently named Koidu Holdings 
Limited (TRC 2004:24-25; Keen 2005:151-152). A number of studies have explored the 
impact of mining on Kono, how it has fundamentally shaped social and political life, and 
its general importance to Sierra Leone’s economy (Conteh 1979, Rosen 1973, Reno 1995). 
Numerous studies have analyzed the region’s strategic importance during the war (Keen 
2005, Peters 2006). Kono remains an economic center in Sierra Leone, even if deposits are 
becoming more scarce and difficult to access, and therefore continues to be fought over by 
the country’s two primary political parties, the All Peoples Congress (APC) and the Sierra 
Leone Peoples Party (SLPP). 
Western Kono shows the scars of conflict and poverty: abandoned houses are now 
overgrown with grass and other vegetation. Mining has made its undeniable, visible 
impact, and has turned parts of rural Kono into a moonscape dotted by abandoned mining 
pits inundated by exposed underground waterways. Tropical forest is now barren and often 
fails to return to the greenery typical of this part of the world. Instead, these areas are 
caught up in their own seasonal cycle, alternating between muddy washes and packed red 
clay or dust.  
Koidu/Sefadu town is the place where most diamond dealers are based, including those 
trading small, rough diamonds that have been dug without a license. As the district 
headquarter town, it is also where the District Council is located, as well as Tankoro police 
station, a division covering eastern Kono and Koidu town. However, Peyima falls under 
Motema police division, and while Koidu was my base away from Peyima, Motema was a 
central location with respect to accessing the police hierarchy, particularly the Local Unit 
Commander, and gaining access to and participating in meetings of the Local Policing 
Partnership Board of the division. 
 
3.3.3.4 Freetown – the capital 
While I did not spend much time in Freetown during the fieldwork, it was a crucial site for 
data collection, in particular with respect to written material and interviews. As the center 
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of the state system, it is where most government agencies and bi-lateral and multi-lateral 
donor agencies are located. Furthermore, I also met with a number of key security sector 
actors in Freetown, both during my fieldwork and on previous projects (Albrecht and 
Jackson 2009; Albrecht and Jackson 2010; Jackson and Albrecht 2011). 
Richards (1996:31; cf. Peters 2006) speaks of “a long history of violent opposition between 
‘bush’ (the forest) and ‘town’ (established patrimonial authority linked to overseas trade).” 
It is a tension that harkens back to colonial rule and the administrative distinction between 
Colony (Freetown) and Protectorate (rural Sierra Leone), the latter of which was governed 
indirectly (Brownlie 1979; Wylie 1969). While chiefs thus became integral to governing 
the countryside of Sierra Leone, this was not the case in the capital and the broader 
Western Area. 
This circumstance accentuated the importance of conducting research outside Freetown. I 
worked on the assumption that the rule under chiefs and how they appropriated SSR 
components would be crucial to how the justice and security field was organized.  
 
3.3.3.5 London – the international 
I use London as a common denominator for the international level, but interviews were 
also conducted elsewhere, including Bordeaux (France), Cheshire and Birmingham in 
England. While no observations relevant to this dissertation were made in these locations, I 
spent a considerable amount of time – before and after my PhD research – with numerous 
people in the UK who had been important to how SSR was approached in Sierra Leone. 
The capital of Sierra Leone’s former colonial master, London as a site for data collection 
was crucial, not least with respect policy-making processes around SSR. 
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3.4 Extended case studies 
The situational analysis of how assemblages take form and fall apart in different sites was 
viewed as constitutive of particular extended case studies,35 because assemblages in the 
justice and security field extend beyond the particular locality and event (Gluckman 1961; 
Epstein 1967; van Velsen 1978; Mitchell 1983). An extended case study consists of a 
detailed examination of a sequence of events over a rather long period of time where the 
same actors are involved and in which their social positions are specified (Mitchell, 1983). 
As such, it was a useful method in my research because it takes into account how actors, 
discourses and things are governed by different and sometimes conflicting norms and 
usages. It emphasizes the process aspect of a particular social phenomenon and traces the 
events in which the same set of main actors are involved (Mitchell 1983:194). The focus in 
the extended case study on process allows for a time-oriented perspective on both 
continuity and ruptures in ongoing events (Moore 1987).  
In this sense, the extended case study allows the analysis to go beyond the immediate issue 
of order enforcement to de-construct larger processes of power that are integral to field 
dynamics and thus affect how assemblages take form. In other words, the immediate issue 
might appear to be a criminal act, but a thorough analysis of actors, actions and claims 
made reveals how social processes evolve. Only by combining observations of how a case 
of theft is dealt with, for instance, and subsequent discussions with the individuals 
involved, is it possible to reach a comprehensive understanding of precisely how order is 
made in a concrete situation.  
A case study focuses on a particular place and specific events, but these places are neither 
bounded nor isolated (Gupta and Ferguson 1997). Peyima, Tombodu, Freetown, and 
London are all connected by political and productive processes, events, times, places, 
people and things. In this way, a case study is simultaneously specific and also related to 
larger processes (Hammar 2007:53) and multiple sites. This does not mean that cases are 
necessarily representative or generalizable. Rather, they are to be perceived as what Moore 
                                            
35 The Manchester school was the first to conceptualize the ‘extended case-study’ as ‘extending out’ from the 
field (see Burawoy, 1998).  
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(1987) calls a ‘diagnostic event’, in that they reflect the larger processes under 
investigation and reveal the tensions and dynamics of social change. 
I chose to follow crimes that occurred in Peyima and Kamara Chiefdom. Since few cases 
are recorded in this local justice and security system, being present, waiting for 
‘something’ to happen and observing how people reacted to a criminal act was important. 
To understand normal types of crime, two research assistants carried out a survey among 
90 respondents in Kamara Chiefdom, Nimikoro Chiefdom and Nimiyama Chiefdom. The 
answers to the survey resulted in a basic inventory of ‘threats to security’, and included 
issues such as ‘abusive language’ (‘threatening remarks’), theft of poultry, palm oil and 
diamonds, acts of physical violence (fighting and rape) and disagreements over land 
demarcations.36 
I chose the cases explored in this dissertation because they were rich in detail, included a 
number of events and had the potential to constitute in-depth narratives of how various 
types of authority came into play to constitute a hybrid order and its reproduction. These 
cases were studied as diagnostic, rather than for the ability to generalize from them.  
This was an inductive process, pursuing a strategy of grounded theory where the notion of 
‘foundational hybridity’, for instance, was derived from data (see Charmaz 2005; Thomas 
and James 2006). While I did not have a clear theoretical framework that I went out to 
‘test’ in the field, I did have a clear sense of the area that I wanted to explore, at least on a 
rudimentary conceptual level that changed fundamentally as the project progressed: how 
non-state actors create order in rural Sierra Leone. The theoretical reflections of this 
                                            
36 In addition, for the project regarding SSR in Sierra Leone that I conducted in 2007-2009, a survey of 250 
respondents was carried out, indicating listing three broad categories of crimes: 1. Social violence, including 
sexual violence: rape, gendered violence, street violence, drug taking, youth unemployment, armed theft, 
unlawful allocation of land, town mining, chiefs’ misallocation of land; 2. ‘Classic’ security threats: 
inadequate coverage of security forces, too few SLP night patrols, bribery of security forces, lack of 
screening of security personnel, use of ex-combatants as security personnel, poor judicial system, inadequate 
conditions of service for security personnel; 3. Wider environmental threats from outside the community: 
predominance of small arms and smuggling, international smuggling, criminal activity related to drugs, 
smuggling of people, especially children) (Albrecht and Jackson 2009:192). Primary information was 
collected from 250 respondents through questionnaires, group discussions and focus group interviews. The 
survey gathered information about the following issues: 1. The visibility of the armed forces and the SLP; 2. 
The degree to which changes relating to the security system transformation process have been accepted by 
the local population; 3. The degree to which the armed forces are accepted by the population; 4. The 
perceived impact of security SSR; 5. Knowledge of SSR processes. 
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dissertation, including that the ‘non-state’ concept does not help us understand how 
authority is articulated, developed from this point of departure. 
There is, of course, a danger in selecting some cases over others. Walton (1992) argues that 
a duality is inherent in the use of the term ‘case’. Cases imply particularity. They are 
situational and provide specific, limited views of social life. At the same time, cases are 
presented under the pretense of doing something more, of implying that something general 
is being said from the particular (ibid.:121). This claim to generalizability, Nuijten 
suggests, makes it important to elaborate the background upon which cases are presented 
and to make conscious theoretical reflections on the way we present the cases. For 
example, it is important to reflect on whether a case is intended to convey how conflicts are 
normally settled or whether the case is chosen to trace how different, even diverging, 
elements may be decisive in the resolution of a conflict (Nuijten 1998:26-7). 
In this research, I use the extended case study approach in both senses, made up of 
triangulated data. These case studies were analyzed in relation to the greater number of less 
detailed cases that were collected through conversations, observations and by research 
assistance. 
 
3.5 Accessing the field 
3.5.1 Peyima 
Accessing reliable data on how order is enforced in a place such as Peyima is a challenge, 
if only because life in a small rural town in Sierra Leone is so radically different from 
living in places such as Freetown, London or Copenhagen. Furthermore, a lot is at stake 
when a crime is committed, both for the criminal and for the victim. Losing a valuable 
stone – perhaps the only one found for several mining seasons – or the death of someone 
are issues that need to be handled with sensitivity. Naturally, it took time for people to 
open up to a stranger and engage in conversations on these issues. Moreover, white people 
who come to Kono commonly are investors, and therefore are seen to equate with access to 
much needed cash. Therefore, I spent quite a lot of time telling people both inside and 
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outside Peyima why I had come to ask questions, and talking to them about my research 
(without taking out my recorder).  
Before arriving in Kono District, I had met Patrick Tongu, the Regional Director of a 
national non-governmental organization called the National Movement for Justice and 
Democracy. Patrick was an acquaintance rather than an informant, but he helped me get 
settled in Kono, and eventually I stayed in his compound on the outskirts of Koidu 
whenever I was in town. Most importantly, one of his employees, Fasalie Marah, helped 
me get around for the first period of my fieldwork.  
Fasalie had previously been in the army and had worked in the mining industry buying and 
selling stones for The Red Lion, one of Koidu’s many diamond offices. He had been 
unemployed for a while, however, and Patrick had taken him in (he and Patrick were both 
from Sewafe, Nimiyama Chiefdom). As a native of Kono, and given his general 
knowledge of the district, his assistance was crucial and ended up being quite formative for 
the way that my fieldwork developed. He was an important source of information about 
how mining works in Kono, how people steal stones from one another and secret society 
practices, and introduced me to the informal diamond market and diamond dealers. 
My first contact with people from Peyima came one day when Fasalie took me to visit 
Motema police headquarters to speak to the Local Unit Commander. In his office sat Isaac, 
the town’s Local Policing Partnership Board member at that time. He knew Fasalie, who 
had mined in Peyima and had built one of the markets in the town. I was introduced and we 
agreed that I could talk to them about how they provided security for the town. 
A few days later, I came to Peyima for the first time and encountered an extremely formal 
affair organized for me. Isaac had gathered 20 people for a meeting; after he made a long 
speech about the importance of keeping the peace in town, I was able to talk briefly with 
people attending the meeting about why I had come to Kono. I returned over the next 
couple of weeks and slowly started to build relationships. I was careful to emphasize my 
identity. I was white, and kids were yelling ‘white man’ after me; some broke out in tears 
when they saw me. (Apart from white people looking different, children in Peyima are told 
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that the devil is white). Clearly, I was not going to change that part of my identity. Kids 
yelling and staring at me would be part of my existence in Peyima until the day I left.  
However, being a student means that you are poor in Sierra Leone, and I was able to 
convince people that I had not come to invest in mining, even though they knew that 
relatively speaking, I had more money than most of them. Formally, I was considered a 
student, and therefore without money, an identity that they were more or less willing to 
accept. 
Within the next couple of weeks, I spoke to Isaac about staying in Peyima overnight, and I 
was introduced to Jimmy Sadr, one of the town authorities, a descendant of chiefs (but not 
currently the chief). I was allowed to stay in a small house next to his. I would spend more 
and more days in Peyima, returning to Koidu ever so often to re-boot. It was on the 
veranda of this house that I spent most evenings with people from the town, drinking palm 
wine (‘pojo’, an alcoholic drink from palm trees considered a gift ‘from god to man’), 
smoking cheap cigarettes, talking about events that had occurred during the day, in the 
mines, in town, in Freetown and the world outside. In the morning I would sit with people 
and drink instant coffee with powdered milk before going to see someone in town, in the 
mining areas or just hanging out in my house, digesting what I had experienced. 
 
3.5.2 Freetown and beyond  
Unlike Kono District, which I had never visited prior to beginning my PhD, I had been to 
Freetown and the Western Area on many occasions in different capacities. Working for the 
Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre in Accra and for International 
Alert, a London-based non-governmental organization, I had coordinated and headed 
relatively large policy research projects related to SSR in Sierra Leone (Albrecht and 
Malan 2006; Albrecht and Jackson 2009; Albrecht 2010; Albrecht and Jackson 2010; 
Jackson and Albrecht 2011). The focus, structure and purpose of these studies were state-
centric, the approach that I try to break with in this dissertation. This PhD deliberately 
steps away from discussing the ‘successes’ and ‘failures’ of SSR as a state-building 
 75 
exercise, and explores how order is established in its own right, and the role, if any, that 
SSR came to play in establishing, consolidating or reproducing that order. 
The projects that I had previously been involved in dealt with how and under what 
conditions UK-financed SSR as a set of internationally-driven policies and programs were 
implemented in Sierra Leone. Having carried out these studies meant that I had good 
networks among the main players in Sierra Leone’s security sector and among the 
international advisers who had been involved in the country’s SSR process. I had 
established a working group for the aforementioned policy project, including the 
Permanent Secretary to the President, Chief of Defense Staff, the Inspector-General of 
Police and the National Security Coordinator. These people were easily accessible, spoke 
relatively freely with me about my project and were helpful when my PhD fieldwork 
occurred. 
The fact that I had been in a position to contact DFID when I began to canvas the key 
people in Sierra Leone’s security sector – and the fact that DFID is a primary donor of SSR 
programming – meant that my initial access to key security actors was relatively easy. 
After all, I had ended up telling their story in my previous engagement in Sierra Leone, and 
they were happy to tell their part of it and keen to project their version of what SSR was 
and their role in making it a success. Switching my identity from a ‘practitioner’ to an 
‘academic’ did not matter much in terms of access, and I was able to have the same 
conversations with people as I did prior to my PhD research: relationships had already 
been established. 
 
3.6 Engaging and leaving the field 
A number of ethical concerns should be taken into account when conducting a research 
project that addresses how people live, particularly in settings where financial gain and 
status are at stake and where people are poor. These concerns include how to enter a new 
field setting, how to develop relationships with people, how to be attentive to the situation, 
knowing when to step back, how to listen and how to leave in such a way that other 
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researchers may find receptive communities (Bernard, 1995; DeWalt and DeWalt, 2002: 
195-209). 
First, the safety of people who participated in this study was crucial. I often spoke to 
people in private, sitting on a huge rock on a hill above the town, during the day at my 
house when most people were working, in the pojo corner and in the mining areas. Clearly, 
speaking to people about how to steal diamonds, trick or overpower local or extra-local 
authorities and about secret society matters (which is strictly forbidden) were sensitive 
matters.  
In addition, people inevitably gossip about one another, which is an effective way of 
obtaining information.37 A golden rule is not to ‘gossip back’ or disclose information about 
other community members that could compromise confidentiality (DeWalt and DeWalt, 
2002). However ‘talking about people’, say, talking about someone who wants to challenge 
the town chief or a person’s overt use of physical or symbolic force clearly requires a 
reaction and engagement so as not to appear distant and ignorant. A lot of the men around 
my age were frustrated by the lack of job opportunities, for instance, and often blamed the 
chief and elders for this. 
Generally speaking, I maintained the principle of informed consent by being clear about 
why I was in Peyima. That said, I did, of course, do what I could to get people to tell me 
about the sensitive issues that I was in Kono to explore. In the beginning of such 
conversations I would always explicitly ask if it was okay if I turn on my recorder. In the 
latter part of my fieldwork, I was comfortable enough in my relationships with 
townspeople that I often turned on my recorder during my evening conversations with 
people without asking first. I simply assumed that it was okay. 
While I stayed with one family in Peyima, I was careful to entertain good relations with a 
variety of people. I came as close as I could to becoming friends with men of my own age, 
some of whom were struggling to make ends meet in a resource-scarce environment. These 
                                            
37 Often it seems clear that what is said during an interview which has been scheduled beforehand, recorded 
and written down will be used as information. It can seem less obvious that information acquired during 
informal discussions and participant observation also contribute to the data collected for the analysis (DeWalt 
and DeWalt 2002:198). 
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included Taylor Kondeh and Ibrahim ‘Kalilu’ Kamara, both of whom I present in greater 
detail in later chapters. Furthermore, during the mining season after Christmas, I made it a 
habit to meet with miners, usually in a bar, and as I got to know people from Peyima well, 
they would come to the place I stayed in Koidu where we could discuss sensitive issues.  
It was also evident that I was going to leave Peyima eventually – and given that it is a 
mining town with a history of considerable finds, the townspeople were used to ‘white 
people’ coming and going. They accepted that I was a student, but they also told me that 
they hoped that I would come back and invest in mining activities. While I did get attached 
to people in Peyima, I never went ‘native’; I was always clear about the fact that I would 
be there only for a short period of time and then go home (Bernard 1995).  
 
3.7 Research assistance and languages in the field 
The use of capable research assistants was important for this study. During the first period 
of fieldwork, I realized that it would be useful to have ‘insider assistance’ from people who 
knew whom to address in order to obtain the right kind of information and how to get in 
touch with people. Furthermore, the information that people would give to a white man 
was likely to be different from the information they would give to a black woman from 
Kono, who spoke the local languages, knew her way around and had done research for 
other organizations in the past. What I found particularly useful was to have research 
assistance to locate and record interesting cases in Kamara Chiefdom outside Peyima. This 
gave me a deeper insight into the nature of cases that arose that I was not privy to and the 
opportunity to follow-up on events that might be of interest. 
Because I am not fluent in Kono, interpretation was also an issue. Although most people 
speak Krio, old people sometimes do not, and at times it was vital to have assistance in this 
regard. In the early stages of my fieldwork, Fasalie translated my discussions with people 
who spoke Kono. As I came to know people in Peyima, however, people who spoke 
English (and Krio) would assist me. Working with people who lived in town meant that I 
got both research assistance and interpretation in one person. Inevitably, after a meeting I 
would discuss what was said during an interview with the person helping me that day. 
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They would pay attention to little things such as reactions to certain questions, if they 
thought lies had been told and would compare what they thought people really meant with 
what they actually said. It was then left up to me to make up my own mind, and triangulate 
information that I was given by other people. 
 
3.8 Collecting and producing the data 
This thesis is based on data gathered from mid-2005 until February 2011, centered around 
seven months of fieldwork in Kono District during 2008 and 2009. During the period of 
five to six years, I travelled to Sierra Leone 11 times for up to four months per visit in a 
number of capacities. Each visit built on preceding visits, in the sense of establishing 
relations with actors in Sierra Leone’s public service, and thus each in their way 
contributed to this dissertation. 
My approach to data collection follows the imperative of triangulation between different 
forms of data produced in the field: textual and public discourse analysis, participant 
observation and interviews/conversations. In this section I primarily focus on how data was 
collected during my fieldwork in Kono District. 
 
3.8.1 Text 
Textual and public discourse analysis included the review of secondary sources, newspaper 
articles, academic articles, donor reports, and ministerial and legal documents. Analyses of 
these texts are central to exploring the emergence of chieftaincy historically, i.e., state 
formation, the emergence of SSR as a policy concept and how it developed in the case of 
Sierra Leone specifically. The texts were on one level regarded as preparation for interview 
and research questions.  
On another level, the underlying grammar of different concepts in these texts, including 
their historical and ideological connotations, was also critical. This included how the 
concept of ‘community’ was used in discussions about Local Policing Partnership Boards 
and the way that ‘legitimate authority’ and ‘the state’ were produced in discourse. In 
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particular, however, what was omitted from the literature on fragile or failed states became 
a central preoccupation, including in-depth discussions of the order that exists when the 
state is not located at the center of making it, and the words we use to describe this order. 
In the course of my previous projects that centered on writing the history of SSR in Sierra 
Leone, I gained access to considerable amounts of written documentation, including 
internal reports, angry email exchanges among advisors, letters from Sierra Leoneans 
demanding that certain advisors be sacked and formal letters from the President requesting 
assistance. This information – much of which was classified – was not on DFID’s file, but 
was given to me by advisors who had played a key role in the Sierra Leone SSR process, 
particularly in its early stages (l998-2002). While this dissertation is not intended to 
provide a chronological overview of the SSR process in Sierra Leone, this information was 
central to understanding how external actors in particular perceived their role as part of 
Sierra Leone’s SSR process. I also gained access to the SLP library, a small room with 
piles of reports, books and essays by many of the police officers who had traveled to the 
UK to take law enforcement classes. 
 
3.8.2 Participant Observation 
Participant observation was a vital data collection technique in Peyima and Kono District 
in general. My analyses would not have been possible without having pursued a multi-sited 
participant observant approach, sometimes as a participant, sometimes as an observing 
non-participant shadowing an informant, even if neither role was from an insider’s 
perspective (Czarniawska 2007:14+21).38 While I might have been considered a participant 
in the general sense, I was always a stranger, someone who was in Kono for only a short 
period of time, and, most tellingly, a white man. In this capacity I often participated in 
public events, including section chief elections in Nimikoro, local court sessions, hanging 
out in the mining area, in the pojo corner, at the house I was allocated in Peyima, at (if not 
                                            
38 This is not dissimilar to Bourdieu’s (2003:282) reflections on participant objectivation, namely that “one 
does not have to choose between participant observation, a necessarily fictitious immersion in a foreign 
milieu, and the objectivism of the ‘gaze from afar’ of an observer who remains as remote from himself as 
from his object.” 
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in) rituals, at the police station in Tombodu and Motema, and at the informal diamond 
market in Koidu.  
In other words, I made use of observations, both when events occurred and when meetings 
relevant to my study were taking place, including between and among different categories 
of inherently hybrid authorities (state officials, chiefs, politicians, NGOs, partnership board 
members). The importance of this technique is clear, as it facilitates an understanding of 
what is going on, rather than what should be going on (as presented in formal documents 
and, at times, interviews) (ibid.:33). 
 
3.8.3 Qualitative in-depth interviews 
Participant observation and general observations were combined with qualitative 
interviews and, in particular, casual conversations, in order to deepen my understanding of 
practices that I had seen or points that people had made. I conducted more than 100 
interviews and had countless conversations on how miners steal from one another, how 
work in the mines is organized, what would happen if a non-initiate went into the bush of 
the secret society, ambitions for the future, and so forth.39 Because of the nature of what I 
spoke to people about (how to be a successful criminal or the implications of being a secret 
society member, for instance), I found that the best way to approach interviews was 
through informal conversation, rather than following a pre-designed interview guide. 
Often, it was a matter of having a situation explained, i.e., who was involved how and why; 
it was also a matter of dissecting the details of a case to explore what was general about it 
and what was specific according to the interviewee. The purpose of the interview was not 
only to gather ‘factual’ information. It was also to explore reflective speech acts that 
communicated interviewees’ representational and operational models and definitions of 
key concepts such as ‘community’, ‘authority’, ‘state’ and ‘chieftaincy’, to name but a few. 
                                            
39 In the selection of informants, I covered both the official categories (chiefs, speakers, elders, state officials, 
police officers, NGO workers, youth leaders, and so forth) and representatives of the rural population, taking 
into account gender, age, level of education and socio-economic position. I conducted a total of 40 interviews 
with rural residents and approximately 100 semi-structured interviews (not including informal conversations) 
with the official categories of actors. 
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Furthermore, I set out to explore the relationship between cases that I followed, the 
strategy that those involved in the cases used, their understanding of what had happened 
and the perceived fairness of the outcome. Interviews can often be quite formalistic and 
confined to ideal models of action at first-time encounters. While this does provide useful 
information on official discourse of ‘how things ought to be’, it does not always reflect 
actual practice. At the beginning of my fieldwork in the autumn of 2008, there was 
sometimes a sense that people were telling me what they thought I wanted to hear. Finally, 
it may sometimes be a challenge to describe in nuanced detail how rules are made and then 
broken or circumvented. In my attempt to go more deeply into the meaning of a particular 
event and what people made of them in terms of how authority was exercised, it was 
therefore an advantage to combine interviews with observations. 
During fieldwork, it proved relatively easy to speak to chiefs, police officers, state 
officials, NGO workers, representatives of political parties and other public figures of 
importance in the local political landscape. At the same time, however, I was of relatively 
little interest to Kono’s paramount chiefs, because I had not come to mine, and therefore 
was not a potential source of income. 
Going beyond these categories of authoritative figures was not an obstacle in Peyima. I did 
not experience resistance to my speaking to the different tribal heads in Peyima and the old 
women in town. However, while I sought to secure a valid representational sample of 
interviewees, it was also clear that I connected better with men around my own age. Four 
of them, Kono and non-Kono, became indispensable ‘sounding boards’, people that I 
trusted to speak what they believed to be the truth. With these men, I developed what 
became the closest to friendship that I experienced while doing my fieldwork. 
 
3.9 The positioned researcher 
I conclude these reflections on methodology and methods by outlining some of the 
elements of how I, as a researcher, took up various positions in the field. For an 
ethnographer, positioning in the field is inevitable and should be taken into account when 
analyzing data (Hammersley and Atkinson 1992:80-81). Indeed, the social distance and 
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immediate unfamiliarity between me as the researcher and those who were being studied, 
made the potential for ‘violent’ communication very real because of my ignorance of what 
could and could not be said (Bourdieu 1999b:609-610). This is an asymmetry that can 
never be completely overcome, but one that can be reduced by spending lengthy periods of 
time in the field where, momentarily, glaringly obvious social and cultural differences are 
forgotten. Combined with making use of locally-recruited research assistants, some of this 
asymmetry may also be decreased. One might hope to reach a reflexive state of thinking, 
where it is not the relation to the object, but the object itself that is being explored and 
analyzed (Wacquant 1989:33; Bourdieu 2003:286). 
Following Gupta and Ferguson’s location-work (1997) and Haraway’s (1991:195) notion 
of “politics and epistemologies of location, positioning, and situating,” the question of my 
positions as a researcher is crucial. As reflections on location-work and situated knowledge 
indicate, there is no simple answer. There is embodied location as well as strategic 
positioning during fieldwork. Hasse (2000:43) writes that we are always participants in the 
social space within which we do fieldwork and observe, we are always interpreting as well 
as being interpreted. My embodied and social position – white Danish middle-class man in 
his mid-30s, without any particular religious conviction, single, university-based PhD 
student and non-Kono speaker – constitutes the backdrop of how I, as point of departure 
was located. There was no way that I could ‘pass as’ or be ‘taken for’ one of the informants 
myself (Grünenberg 2006; Fortie 2000). My participation was always visible – I was 
always already positioned as the white man who had come as a student to ask questions.  
That said, social location does not necessarily determine what we see or how we see it. 
Rather, social location is relational and contextual and changes which modes of 
differentiation that are the most apparent – whether they be gender, age or race (cf. 
Bourdieu 2003:283). This was also apparent in the way that I was positioned during the 
fieldwork. While I stood out by my skin color, my age and gender naturally determined the 
way that I spoke to people in town, be they old men or women or men my own age.  
In most cases I encountered hospitality, friendliness, confidence and willingness to spend 
time with me, even if some of the informants were busy people. While not everyone 
understood – or cared about – why I was in Peyima, most of them wanted me to understand 
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the context correctly. At times I felt like I was an entertainment figure, an albeit brief 
escape from difficult circumstances – and as a source of free cigs, coffee and pojo. Some 
informants emphasized how they found it important to share their opinions about life in 
Peyima. Often, I was positioned as the external listener to whom people relayed 
frustrations about not having money, not finding any diamonds, being excluded from 
decision-making despite being a secret society member and so forth. My position as a 
stranger could thus both enable and disable communication. I might not have been a native 
to the Peyima habitat, but this also meant that I had no long-term interest in the place, and 
therefore could be trusted with certain personal information (cf. Czarniawska 2007:21). 
The question of race and nationality was important, but they were not the only ones of 
relevance. Being a trustworthy person also played a role in terms of positioning, gaining 
access and carrying out my fieldwork. At the end of the day, I was only in Peyima because 
its inhabitants allowed me to be there. Due to the importance of trust in establishing 
rapport and confidence, I often used the ‘snowball’ method, citing my contacts in different 
networks. This was particularly the case when talking to diamond dealers and miners. 
Being introduced and recommended by others who ‘already knew me’ clearly made it 
easier to build immediate trust.  
 
3.10 Conclusion 
This chapter has explained how I approached the study of hybrid orders methodologically, 
and the data techniques that I applied to do so. Following Gupta, Ferguson and Marcus, I 
introduced the concepts of location-work and multi-sited ethnographic work as central 
tenets, which emphasize the movement in time and space and multi-local positioning of 
both the researcher and the researched. I integrated location-work into my fieldwork by 
exploring how actors, discourse and things assemble in certain ways in the justice and 
security field and by pursuing a multi-sited research strategy in Peyima, Tombodu, Koidu, 
Freetown, London and beyond. I organized the data that emerged from this approach 
according to principles of the extended case study. 
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This chapter reflects on the researcher’s position and how different social locations came 
into play during the course of fieldwork, furthering or hindering relations with informants. 
This fieldwork was primarily carried out in Peyima, a small town in Kamara Chiefdom, 
Kono District, but data was also drawn from extended periods of work on other projects in 
Freetown and London. Fieldwork was divided into three overlapping stages: an initial 
orientation and mapping stage in Kono District and Kamara Chiefdom specifically; a 
second stage of immersing myself in the field, building up relations and discussing the 
contours of my fieldwork; and a third stage where I carried out systematic interviews and 
participant observations. 
The data material consists of interviews, collection of texts, including academic literature, 
notes written by villagers in Peyima, reviews of the SSR program and notes of an 
autobiographic nature. The informants were selected according to their involvement in 
cases of crime and in formulating, designing and implementing SSR policies and 
programs. I also interviewed a number of individuals who were not involved in committing 
or solving crimes, but who had specific knowledge, for example, about the hierarchy of 
power in Peyima, in Kono, and Sierra Leone in general. Furthermore, I endeavored to 
include a variety of positions, in particular in relation to age, tribal identity, autochthon 
status and an individual’s role in the secret society bush. 
  
 85 
4 The assembling of security sector reform in the security and justice 
field 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter explores how SSR developed in discourse and practice internationally. It 
describes how SSR became a central assemblage in the justice and security field and the 
form that state-building took in order to re-establish failed states as functioning, centrally-
governed political entities. In this state-building process, the state as a bordered power 
container and the institutions that comprise it – standing above and at the same time 
encompassing, controlling and regulating society – were to be isolated and worked upon. 
In this regard, a creeping reductionism is evident, caused in part by the propensity of state-
builders to reproduce the state-society split. This resulted in attempts to eliminate or 
criminalize hybrid actors who did not fit easily into the construct of centrally-governed 
state institutions and actors. 
In the late 1990s, as SSR programming began in Sierra Leone and as the clustering of 
security and development was taking place in the justice and security field, a coherent 
concept of the security sector had not yet emerged. A clear sense of which institutions to 
work upon – the armed forces, the police, the judiciary or all of them simultaneously – was 
not evident. In the years to come, this question came to dominate practical aspects and 
discussions of SSR. What was clear in the late 1990s, however, was that the object of SSR 
was to support and simultaneously build centralized, differentiated organizations with a 
monopoly of coercion across a territory – i.e., the state. 
The first section of this chapter explores some of the assumptions upon which SSR as a set 
of policies and programs was based. It provides an overview of a number of the key themes 
in the SSR debate. These include the concept of fragile or failing states and their security 
apparatus as well as the international security environment that emerged after the end of 
the Cold War.  
Subsequently, I outline the process whereby SSR emerged, based initially on developments 
in the UK’s DFID and then multi-lateralized through the OECD and the UN. The variety of 
SSR that came into being during the 1990s was dominated by a push from development 
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agencies to an extent that has not been possible since the War on Terror and the 
militarization of international politics that it entailed.40 
Regarding the central role played by development agencies in shaping the SSR agenda, a 
subsidiary argument of this chapter also argues that SSR is explained more accurately as 
the consequence of developmentalization of security rather than the securitization of 
development (Albrecht et al. 2010). This is not an argument for a less intrusive form of 
state-building. Indeed, seeking to re-establish failed states as functioning, democratically- 
and bureaucratically-governed entities is a fundamentally more intrusive exercise than 
‘merely’ providing training and equipment to the police or the military of a given country. 
Rather, it is to suggest that SSR was constituted by a reciprocal relationship between 
development and security, and that development agencies in the 1990s sought to colonize 
the security field as much as security organizations sought to colonize the development 
field. 
The chapter concludes by analyzing the policy concept of the ‘multi-layered approach’ that 
attempts to involve ‘non-state’ actors in SSR activities, including, inter alia, traditional or 
customary authorities and community-based policing groups. However, apart from 
establishing a dichotomy between the state and the non-state, the multi-layered approach 
was considered by international policy-makers and experts to be an interim strategy until 
such time when “the state can take over service provision” (OECD 2007a:28). In other 
words, how state institutions operate and should be operated may be discussed, but it is the 
state as a centrally-governed political entity, that is to be built and consolidated. 
 
 
                                            
40 The “War on Terror” was initiated by the US and its coalition partners in the wake of the terrorist attacks 
of 11 September, 2001. Its aim was “to root out and destroy not only al-Qaeda, but all international terrorist 
organizations that supported, associated with or shared its ideology of global jihad” (Sherman 2010:59). 
Indeed, in the words of George Bush, US President at the time of the terrorist attacks: “Our war on terror 
begins with Al Qaida, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has 
been found, stopped, and defeated” (Bush, Address before a joint session of the Congress, 20 September 
2001). 
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4.2 ‘War-shattered states’   SSR   ‘market democracies’ 
Until the end of the Cold War, security and development were considered relatively 
autonomous fields of intervention. As they merged up through the 1990s, war and conflict 
were seen as integral to that process and became mainstream in development discourse 
(Duffield 2001). Donor agencies regarded the lack of development as a cause of insecurity 
instead of an issue of inequality or injustice (Albrecht et al. 2010:74). Indeed, the shift 
from macro-development approaches to ‘good governance’, ‘pro-poor’ policy-making, 
sustainability and poverty reduction was considered a figurative reflection of the desire to 
contain ‘failed states’ that had come to represent areas of potential instability. The process 
of merging security and development led to what has often been described as the 
securitization of development (Duffield 2001, 2006; Harrison 2001, 2004; Craig and Porter 
2003; Abrahamsen 2004, 2005; Fraser 2005).  
SSR as one of the instruments of state-building emerged during the relatively short period 
between the end of the Cold War and the beginning of the War on Terror (Albrecht et al. 
2010:80). The global distribution of power and capital after the Cold War has often been 
highlighted as one of the main reasons why the intervention in Sierra Leone combined with 
SSR was possible. Conflicts were no longer considered tokens of US-Soviet proxy wars, 
but as part of a complex of weak or failing states, ethnic violence and poverty (Lacina 
2004).  
In the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, this shift confirmed the political and 
economic hegemony of the core countries of international society, the United States in 
particular, and the generic West in general (Clark 2001).41 Discourses centered on what the 
correct or proper political entity might look like, revolving around democratic ideals and 
the unconstrained operation of the market for capital and labor. International bi-lateral and 
multi-lateral donor agencies became bearers of an increased trans-national flow of neo-
liberal ideology that was supported by overlapping concepts of human rights and liberal 
democratic norms. 
                                            
41 My use of the term ‘international society’ is inspired by the English School, rather than the ‘international 
system’ of American realism, the latter of which proposes that the anarchic international system is governed 
on the basis of transcendent parameters of state power and interests. Advocates of this constructivist 
approach argue that interaction among states is governed by norms, implying a fundamental volatility of 
international society’s ontological basis (Mayall 1991:8-17; Reus-Smit 1999). 
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Following this line of argument, the legitimacy of the correct manner of governance 
proposed by Paris (1997, 2001, 2004) and other proponents of the liberal peace thesis 
could hardly be questioned. In one agenda-setting article, Paris notes that the problem of 
peace-building is not the objective of political and economic liberalization, but the 
measures taken to achieve it (Paris 1997:57). In other words, his purpose is to correct the 
‘how’ of peace-building rather than the ‘why’:  
Peace-building agencies should preserve the principal goal of liberal 
internationalism – the transformation of war-shattered states into market 
democracies – but re-think the way in which they pursue this goal, seeking in 
particular to limit the conflict-inducing effects of political and economic 
liberalization in war-shattered states (Paris 1997:58).  
In sum, therefore, failed states are to be built to reflect the state-centric, western 
universalist model. 
The ephemeral concept of legitimacy expressed in international discourse should be 
viewed in light of the concentration of capital forms in geographically-specific parts of the 
world and within the framework of the global distribution of power. “We are told,” 
Douzinas (2003:169) argues, “that the new world order is based on respect for human 
rights” (and, it might be added, democratic governance and liberal economies). This 
“moral order,” he continues, “provides legitimacy to a new configuration of power 
relations” (ibid.:173). 
To back up these claims about the potential power and capital of the liberal democratic 
nation-state, and to legitimize external interventions to support the building of this type of 
political entity, a number of views on the non-western world have been produced by both 
academics and policy-makers. Abiew and Keating (1999:80) argue that one of the primary 
reasons for developing the discourse and practice of peace-building, in which the concepts 
of state and state-building are closely connected, had to do with a ‘substantial increase’ in 
internal conflicts that followed the end of the Cold War (see also Paris 1997:54).  
The notion of a sudden surge in the number of conflicts has been quantified and, in turn, 
used to provide the evidence that externally-supported or -driven state-building was a 
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necessity. Findings in Eriksson, Wallensteen and Sollenberg’s data on armed conflicts 
from 1946-2002 show that there were 31 ongoing conflicts in 2002, of which 26 took place 
within states.42 In 1991-1992, 50 out of 54 active conflicts were of an intra-state nature 
(Eriksson et al 2003:594), which accounts for the largest number of conflicts for the entire 
post-World War II era. Following Jakobsen (2002:270) and Lederach (1997:6), it may be 
argued that while there has been no permanent rise in the number of conflicts following the 
Cold War, the international environment in which international interventions have 
proliferated has been characterized by relative instability.  
Moreover, conflicts after World War II have largely taken place within the borders of 
politically-defined state spaces (see Gantzel and Schwinghammer 2000). The growing 
internationally-perceived legitimacy of interventions in intra-state conflicts should thus be 
seen as the consequence of changes in the global balance of symbolic and physical capital 
and power, rather than as a sudden surge in the number of intra-state conflicts. It is as part 
of these general developments in international society that I now turn to how SSR 
assembled in international policy-making circles. 
 
4.3 Merging security and development in the justice and security field 
The emergence of SSR was based on an assumed integral relationship between 
development and security, and the need to narrow state-building down to one core 
component that could be operated upon. The concept originated from narratives of policy-
makers and academics about the failure of governance and the waning and disappearance 
of state capacity and legitimacy, which resulted in the intensification of intra-state conflict.  
The focus on fragility, i.e., lack of capacity, emerged after the end of the Cold War, and 
was accentuated by the post-9/11 understanding of the security-development nexus. The 
absence or weakness of government control in the Global South was assumed to be a direct 
                                            
42 Of the last five of the 31 ongoing conflicts, four were so-called ‘internationalized intra-state’ armed 
conflicts, meaning that the government, the opposition or both sides received support from external 
governments. Only one was of an inter-state nature (Eriksson, Wallensteen and Sollenberg 2003). 
Wallensteen and Sollenberg (2000:648) define a violent conflict as “a contested incompatibility which 
concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one 
is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths.” 
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threat to the security of Western states. “Rogue and failing states,” Coletta (2007:393) 
argues, were looked upon as “the ones most vulnerable to exploitation by millennial 
groups.” Hence, ensuring or strengthening government authority and control emerged as 
the main solution to problems of both security and development. 
 
4.3.1 Effective + legitimate states = human security 
As formulated in the mid- to late 1990s, SSR was, on the face of it, not explicitly or 
conceptually centered on working on state institutions. It emerged in the wake of the 
‘human security’ paradigm, within which the individual rather than the state became a 
priority for multi-lateral and bi-lateral donor agencies (see Kaldor et al. 2007; Ball 
2010:32, Sedra 2010:16). The Human Development Report, published by the United 
Nations Development Program (UNDP) in 1990, argues that development must focus on 
people, even though they are grouped by country, rather than on the security of national 
(state) boundaries, and on advancing health, education, political freedoms and economic 
well-being (King and Murray 2001:587). 
However, ‘human security’ was formulated with the important and somewhat contradictory 
caveat that the state should continue to be the key provider of these services. That the state 
should have the mandate to make order in the justice and security field was not questioned. 
Any alternatives to the state and its centrally-governed institutions as the sole enforcers of 
order could hardly be imagined.  
The primary questions in this state-centered policy-making discussion were how and 
towards whom these ordering effects were to be directed and how states could fulfill their 
functions effectively and legitimately. Lack of development was seen as a cause of 
insecurity and financial support was now starting to be allocated to the production of 
defense white papers and the building of ministries of defense and intelligence services in 
Sierra Leone and beyond (for Sierra Leone see Ashington-Pickett 2010:20; le Grys 
2010:43; Gaeta 2010; Kondeh 2010).  
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4.3.2 ‘Securitization of development’   ‘developmentalization of security’? 
SSR emerged along the lines of the ‘developmentalization of security’ rather than the 
‘securitization of development’. This focus constituted an attempt to depart from train-and-
equip programs,43 where training and military hardware is provided to make internal and 
external security forces more effective (see Sugden 2006:10).44 Characterized as ‘holistic’ 
in scope and ‘politically sensitive’ in approach, SSR as one of the practical expressions of 
state-building was structured to deal with the governability of a country’s internal and 
external security institutions. Moreover, emphasis was put on their democratic 
accountability through ministerial management and external oversight by parliaments and 
civil society organizations. In other words, a technical process was articulated in languages 
of stateness (see Sedra 2010:16; Albrecht et al. 2010:75; van de Goor and van Ween 
2010:98; Fitz-Gerald 2010:163; Hutton 2010:197).  
During the 1990s and early 2000s a primary focus on individual military and police 
institutions and technically-driven reform efforts was giving way to an approach that 
regarded security and justice as part of a single system, underpinned by concepts of 
accountability and rule of law (Bryden and Hänggi 2005:26; OECD 2007a, b and c; 
Albrecht et al. 2010:75). On paper, therefore, SSR can be seen as a considerably more 
intrusive approach to state-building than train-and-equip programs. Figuratively speaking, 
SSR seeks to tear the state apart in order to build it back up from within. It targets not one 
organization within, but the justice and security field as a whole. In other words, the 
system of related actors would be re-composed as a set of centrally-governed institutions 
that resembles a state of the western universalist variety. 
Train-and-equip is ultimately about building up the effectiveness of a security institution, 
but rarely considers how the justice and security field as a whole is affected, and how 
power is distributed across it. This narrow and rather technical approach was pursued 
                                            
43 The two approaches are often conflated, however, as was the case in Sierra Leone, where “training and 
equipping the new army and police force” has been seen as constitutive of SSR (Bellamy and Williams 
2005:183). 
44 The SSR label has been applied to train-and-equip activities in other countries. In Liberia, for instance, 
DynCorp, a private security company, was contracted by the US Government to train 2,000 men to become 
Liberia’s new army. While initiated under the SSR label, the process was conducted without engaging 
Liberia’s legislature or other organizations in defining the nature, content or character of the new army. 
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globally in its purest form by the US from 2001–08.45 SSR, however, had been formulated 
in opposition to the train-and-equip approach, based on the assumption that isolated and 
targeted projects such as military training ultimately do not help establish ‘the state’ as the 
all-important bulwark against instability, disorder and chaos in otherwise unregulated 
physical space. In the case of the US, therefore, the rising concern with insecurity and 
terrorism was detrimental to the advancement of SSR as the ‘developmentalization of 
security’ (see Sherman 2010; Ball 2010). 
 
4.3.3 The US, SSR and the effects of 9/11  
9/11 had three major implications for how SSR developed within the US, which 
consequently shaped how SSR could be operationalized globally. First, the terrorist attacks 
led to the most comprehensive revision of the US national security architecture and policy 
since the end of World War II, including a sweeping expansion of executive authority and 
a broad erosion of civil liberties.  
Second, these changes led to a disproportionate militarization of US foreign assistance in 
areas of strategic interest to the US, not least in Iraq and Afghanistan (Coyne 2011).46 
According to Sherman (2010:59), this type of assistance has often undermined or 
contradicted principles of democratic governance, reinforcing repression and 
radicalization. Third, this change in US security policy has provided justification for a few 
countries to repress dissident and opposition movements under the mantle of counter-
terrorism, while making it more difficult to challenge such practices internationally (ibid.).  
                                            
45 Between 2001 and 2008, the budget of the US Department of Defense eclipsed the combined resources of 
the Department of State and USAID by a factor of 350:1, compared to 10:1 in other Western governments. 
Furthermore, until recently, US-funded SSR projects were not called “SSR.” Most of them still are not, as 
they fall under such rubrics as military assistance, police training and democracy and governance. Under the 
Bush administration, the priorities of counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism meant a relatively narrow 
focus on training military and police as complements to – and eventual replacements for – international 
forces. Prioritizing hard security has meant that oversight mechanisms of recipient countries, parliament and 
the judiciary in particular, suffered as a consequence (Albrecht et al. 2010:81). 
46 For instance, the US Department of Defense was placed in charge of police reform in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, which has meant an emphasis not on community policing and civilian protection, but on 
engaging the police in military-led counter-insurgency operations. In Iraq, US military police officers trained 
civilian police, despite State Department pleas for a ‘military-to-military and cop-to-cop’ approach. 
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With specific reference to the intervention in Sierra Leone in 1999–2000, the realization of 
the fundamental militarization of foreign policy after 2001 was captured during an 
interview with Clare Short. As the Secretary of State for International Development when 
DFID was actively formulating SSR policies and intervening in Sierra Leone, Afghanistan 
and Iraq, Ms Short noted: 
The possibility of absolutely merging commitments to development with all your 
other instruments of foreign policy, including the military, which was conceivable 
in those days [in Sierra Leone], is now sort of lost [because of Afghanistan and 
Iraq], but I think it will come around again (Clare Short, interview, June 2008).  
“We were a new Government, there were no mixed messages then,” Short continued, 
referring to debates over Iraq: 
You can see a country like Britain taking on the idea of a stronger, multi-lateral 
world order, and this is all pre-Iraq obviously, where there was an aim of deploying 
troops alongside the objective of having a strong international law, well-organized 
states (Clare Short, interview, June 2008). 
Short captures a dominant discourse among bi-lateral and multi-lateral agencies in the 
decade that followed the end of the Cold War and prior to the announcement of the War on 
Terror in 2001. SSR as a comprehensive solution rather than merely an extension of train-
and-equip is the result of the particular worldview that existed in the aftermath of the Cold 
War. The ‘well-organized state’ that Ms Short mentions – effective and legitimate, to 
paraphrase Goldstone (2008:285-286) – was considered pivotal in combating instability 
and chaos. Unlike programs that merely make individual justice and security providers 
more effective, however, SSR became a matter of building the ability of ‘the state’ to 
execute security governance. Above all, this was to be sought by increasing the capacity of 
administrative staff to enforce order and the normative content of reform (accountability, 
democratization and rule of law). 
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4.4 Amalgamating security and development in the UK and the emergence of 
SSR 
In the late 1990s, DFID played a critical role in developing SSR as a set of policies and 
programs. The beginning of this process has often been dated by a speech given by Ms 
Short on 9 March 1999 at King’s College in London. In the speech she states: “We want 
increasingly to integrate a security sector reform perspective into our country programmes 
and into the thinking of other donors and multi-lateral development institutions” (Short 
1999). By embracing SSR in this manner, DFID crossed an important threshold as a 
development agency with its acknowledgment of a direct link between the security sector 
and poverty reduction (Hendrickson 2009:3; DFID 1999, 2001b, 2002). 
As the head of a new Government department established in 1997, Ms Short was charting 
new territory. Her agenda, however, was motivated by politics. Short was neither a 
development expert nor particularly interested in the subject matter. She was, however, in 
the process of building a power base in 1 Palace Street, DFID’s new address in London.47 
She did this by engaging in policy-making as well as with the security services, which, 
according to Short, were looking for new roles to play in the post-Cold War security 
environment.48 SSR emerged on the basis of struggles over policy-making and the power 
to define foreign policy priorities by DFID, in collaboration – and confrontation – with the 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) in particular, but also with the Ministry of 
Defence (MOD). 
                                            
47 When I talked to Short in 2008, she explained to me that her appointment as Secretary of State for 
International Development had been an act of punishment rather than reward: “He [UK Prime Minister Tony 
Blair] was annoyed with me for taking transport seriously, and it was a big drama. As I said at the time, if I 
was given the choice between transport and development, I would have chosen transport. But then again, a 
lot of people were not put into the jobs they’d had in opposition” (Short, interview, June 2008).  
48 Short provided interesting detail about the politics of merging security and development and the evolving 
role of DFID relative to other UK agencies: “When I first went to DFID, the MI6 would come and see me, 
and say: ‘don’t you think we should work together in Africa?’ And I’d say: ‘we’re working with 
governments. I don’t think I necessarily want to work with somebody spying’. And at that stage, this was 
before the War on Terror, all these people were looking for new jobs, Cold War is over, what’s their job? 
You know, diminishing role, diminishing budgets, we are the coming thing, they want us. I am not interested. 
And then, I got very interested in the military, due to the Sierra Leone experience, you know, and the Uganda 
experience and so on. And then somebody in MI6 came and said: ‘you do know, don’t you, that in Africa we 
always get direct access to Presidents, they always want to know us; they are interested in our kind of guys’. 
And I said: ‘Oh, really’. And then I thought, I mean, we included them in security sector reform and I 
thought: ‘Right, in that case, we want you to be part of this as well’, which we did. The guy from MI6 
interested in Sierra Leone I got to know and like – so there’s another little piece of story. At that stage, 
you’ve got MI6, and the military, to a degree, short of a job. And there is constant disorder and chaos, and 
really a need of re-building states” (Italics added). 
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Under Ms Short’s leadership, DFID began to play “a leading role in several aspects of 
foreign policy, especially in relation to UK policies towards Sub-Saharan Africa” 
(Williams 2004:916).49 And indeed, Ms Short explained why SSR and Africa were top 
priorities at the time: 
We were in that Cold War phase where there was a massive growth in conflict, new 
kind of conflict within and between countries causing enormous suffering and 
holding out the prospect of development in Africa. I mean, you couldn’t be 
intelligently interested in development in Africa and not be very focused on how 
you bring all these conflicts to an end. If you’re serious, it drives you into these 
issues (Clare Short, interview, June 2008). 
Policy-making processes are in general both internal and external to a policy-formulating 
community, and “policy ideas are important less for what they say than for who they bring 
together, what alliances, coalitions and consensus they allow, both within and between 
organizations” (Mosse 2004:649). SSR not only reflected the emerging conviction that 
security was a pre-condition for development, it became an important driver of merging 
security and development. Ms Short was driven to make DFID an important player in 
Whitehall and UK foreign policy and SSR was a vehicle for doing so: “For us, of course, 
[becoming involved in SSR] meant really getting into the policy-making, including [with 
respect to] the security services” (Clare Short, interview, June 2008). 
 
4.4.1 The ever-changing assemblage of SSR and Sierra Leone’s role in its articulation 
It is often noted how Ms Short’s speech at King’s College explicitly defined the security 
sector: “the military, paramilitary and intelligence services, as well as those civilian 
structures responsible for oversight and control of the security forces” (Short 1999). Ms 
Short was equally clear that SSR would not involve the police or the wider criminal justice 
system (ibid.). This separation within DFID of what may broadly be referred to as internal 
                                            
49 That Short was on a mission to establish and consolidate DFID’s power base was undeniable: “Short 
interpreted her department’s remit broadly and as a consequence became embroiled in a variety of 
departmental turf wars: notably with the Ministry of Defence (over who should lead security sector reform 
initiatives) [and] the FCO (over where to focus the pooled DFID-FCO-MoD funds for conflict 
prevention)…” (Williams 2004:916). 
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and external security provision had real consequences in Sierra Leone. Keith Biddle, a 
retired British police officer who was appointed to be Inspector-General of Police in Sierra 
Leone in 1999,50 recalls from this period: 
CHAD [Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs Department] was running the show 
regarding security in the military, and came out on visits. On the other hand, you 
had the Government and Institutions Department, which said that they would retain 
all policing aspects throughout the world under all circumstances, because it was 
about governments and communities, and not military solutions to conflict. There 
was a lot of turf war involved in this. Logically, the police should have been part of 
the security sector reform part, and DFID, in 1998, in fact issued a book [sic] that 
stated that the police are actually dealt with on their own provisions. 
So security sector reform was not part and parcel of what we were doing and never 
formally became part and parcel of what we were doing. There was clearly a lack 
of integration of thought in London (Keith Biddle, June 2009, interview, France). 
The fact that direction of police and defense programming did not come from the same 
office in DFID had serious consequences for how SSR unfolded, and led to rivalry on the 
ground. Robert Ashington-Pickett – adviser to the Office of National Security (ONS) 
within the Sierra Leone Security Sector Program (SILSEP) from 2000 to 2003 – articulated 
this type of rivalry well. Indeed, he was part and parcel of it:  
It is a regrettable fact that many government departments, especially in the security 
sector, create unproductive rivalries, petty jealousies and prejudices towards other 
security agencies. Inappropriate, exaggerated identification with one’s own 
programme can also arise, leading to isolation among SSR advisers and 
overprotectiveness of one´s agency or department. At times, this behaviour is 
imported into post-conflict arenas, where it creates a new arena for rivalries to be 
played out, thus undermining key SSR principles and setting a bad example. While 
                                            
50 Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, then President of Sierra Leone, appointed Biddle as Inspector General of Police 
(IGP) in November 1999. Biddle was appointed to the position for an initial two-year period, which was 
extended until June 2003. He had come to Sierra Leone as head of the Commonwealth Police Development 
Task Force (CPDTF), which was planned to start in 1997, but delayed until 1998, due to the Armed Forces 
Revolutionary Council (AFRC) coup (Albrecht and Jackson 2009:36). 
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SSR programmes in Sierra Leone benefited from the […] professional behaviour, 
they still suffered from inter-agency rivalries and turf battles (Ashington-Pickett 
2010:32).  
In later communication with Ashington-Pickett, these general reflections were concretized. 
Keith Biddle had become Inspector General of the Sierra Leone Police when Ashington-
Pickett arrived. According to Ashington-Pickett “there was competition between Biddle’s 
vision of the police and the other intelligence agencies, since he [Biddle] was partisan and 
had little experience of national intelligence and inter-agency cooperation” (Ashington-
Pickett, email, August 2008). 
Such turf issues were partly a consequence of inconsistencies in London about what SSR 
entailed, inconsistencies that translated into Sierra Leone. In both places, decision-making 
and thinking were only partially connected and were primarily determined by personalities 
rather than by a comprehensive framework of conceptual SSR thinking. Therefore, while 
state-building and SSR may be presented as coherent policies and programs with clear 
aims and objectives, this does not reflect their disorderly and multitudinous origins in 
power struggles or how they are transformed from one context to another and shaped in 
numerous physical locations (i.e., London and Freetown). Biddle recalls: 
No one was coordinating this [i.e., various programs] in DFID, because we were 
reporting to separate desks, some dealing with country-specific issues, others with 
humanitarian matters. DFID didn’t regard community policing as part of SSR at 
that stage (Keith Biddle, interview, June 2009, France). 
The reciprocal relationship between policy compromises in London and the practices of 
formulating processes of change in Sierra Leone supported the formation of SSR as a 
policy assemblage in the justice and security field. In brief, new policies were being 
formulated in London while events that called for security-oriented programs occurred in 
Sierra Leone.  
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Peter Penfold, UK High Commissioner in Sierra Leone, was one of President Kabbah’s 
close international allies at the time.51 When the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council 
(AFRC) coup took place in May 1997, Kabbah, who had been elected in 1996, was 
overthrown and fled to Conakry in Guinea. During this time, Penfold recalls: “I used [UK] 
ODA [Overseas Development Assistance] funds to keep the government going in Conakry 
– to show that the government was still active” (Peter Penfold, March 2008, interview, 
Freetown). 
During his exile in Conakry, Kabbah did some thinking, Penfold told me, about actors to 
engage in security-related programs. Unwittingly perhaps, Penfold explained how SSR 
became the articulation of a reciprocal relationship between discussions in London and 
thinking in Conakry – from inside the displaced Sierra Leonean state that, for the time 
being, had no country to govern. From the period immediately after the AFRC was ousted 
to when Kabbah was able to return to Freetown, different elements of SSR as state-
building were coming together. Penfold explained: 
At that time [upon return from Conakry in May 1998], there was a strong feeling 
from people around Kabbah to do away with the army. The argument was that if 
you looked at history, military coups had prevailed, and we came back [from 
Conakry] with those ideas still going around. But we brought in some military 
experts, and produced a plan, identifying the ideal size of an army to be around 
6,000. That was sufficient for the army to do what it had to, and it would be 
bearable [financially]. We also discussed getting the police going – and I argued 
that assistance to the police was equally important, if not more. Then we don’t have 
to resort to military.  
What we also said at the time, although the police was becoming moribund, there 
were enough good people around. In the military there were none. It’s no good 
getting the police operational if we don’t look at the judiciary, the prison services, 
and so forth. And so it began – what was demonstrated at the time, a reason for the 
                                            
51 Penfold was blamed by the British government for an illegal arms deal that became known as the Sandline 
affair. As a consequence, he retired from his diplomatic career after serving nearly forty years with the 
Foreign Office (see: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/events/newsnight/1807756.stm). 
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coup, there was an inadequate intelligence system. Short, ODA [sic] Minister at the 
time, she very quickly realized the link between poverty and security. She came in 
with a personal commitment. I remember that I said to her that I fully supported her 
in that. She, back home in London, began to assemble the idea that you needed this 
integrated policy as security sector reform. Essentially, it was joining the 
Departments, and the FCO, ODA [sic] and MOD were able to develop relationships 
(Peter Penfold, interview, March 2008, Freetown). 
As the above indicates, the concept of SSR was based on concrete experiences in Sierra 
Leone, among other places, and an emerging DFID that was aiming to establish itself as 
force to be reckoned with in the UK. SSR as state-building, constitutive of a particular set 
of articulations of state re-composition in the justice and security field, should therefore be 
seen not as a structuring effect produced in isolation from and external to the context of 
Sierra Leone. On the contrary, what was emerging as SSR emanated from numerous 
political processes in physical and symbolic locales of the security and justice field, 
interacting and shaping one another. 
 
4.5 International debates on military expenditure 
Short’s 1999 speech on SSR at King’s College occurred during a time when the role that 
development agencies could play vis-à-vis military, defense and broader security issues 
was being re-assessed by international donors and policy-makers (Ball 2010). For example, 
four donor meetings took place during 1992–93 in The Hague, Tokyo, Berlin and Paris, 
where it was decided that limits could be imposed on the military spending of developing 
countries. However, an OECD–DAC conference in Ottawa in 1997 recognized that merely 
imposing such limits would not be effective. Thus, an important shift occurred, whereby 
emphasis was placed on the need to strengthen budgetary decision-making processes, i.e., 
matters to do with the governance of security institutions in recipient countries (Omitoogun 
and Hutchful 2006; Sugden 2006:11). 
In 2000, the ‘developmentalization’ of donor approaches to military expenditure and 
performance was further advanced when DFID decided that policy formulation, budgeting 
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and implementation in recipient countries’ defense sectors should be handled in the same 
manner as other areas of the public sector. In brief, key concepts of ‘transparency,’ 
‘accountability’ and ‘comprehensiveness’ were introduced into what planning the re-
composition of the security and justice field might look like (DFID 2001a).  
This new approach, characterized by being “process”-oriented or “governance”-focused, 
combined good governance practices and sound financial principles with security issues 
(ibid.). Attention was also directed towards the institutional framework for managing trade-
offs between different sectors and for the effective management of the resources devoted to 
defense (Omitoogun and Hutchful, 2006).  
As in the case of train-and-equip approaches to military and police reform, attempts to 
impose limits on military spending is less intrusive in its potential effects than SSR. SSR 
not only seeks to make a particular organization more effective or determine how it is 
resourced financially. It also seeks to re-compose the justice and security field in its 
entirety so that how the various bodies it encompasses are organized, inter-related and 
governed is worked upon and transformed. 
 
4.6 The shaping power of institutional turf wars  
The debates on military expenditure that occurred during the 1990s and Short’s distinction 
between the “security sector” and the “criminal justice system” remained relatively far 
removed from conceptions of “holistic” approaches to SSR that developed up through the 
2000s. These debates called attention to an inherent tension within the concept of SSR, 
which was reflected in organizational divisions that continue today, including within 
DFID. Debates about whether policing falls within the justice sector or the security sector 
continues: the justice sector is seen by some technical advisers as relating to human or 
individual safety, and the security sector is seen as relating to state or government security 
(Howlett-Bolton 2008).  
To a large extent these debates reflected turf wars within DFID. As a result, while 
agreement was being reached on a preliminary definition of “security sector reform,” there 
was no coherent concept of the security sector itself. It was also unclear what the 
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implications would be for policy development if some institutions and not others were 
included in the definition and implementation of SSR. It is worth emphasizing that these 
debates did not transcend languages of stateness. They dealt with issues such as whether 
the military and the judiciary should be considered part of the same system or as 
organizations within entirely separate domains, which was the way the concept of SSR was 
initially formulated by Short. Similarly, the distinction made between protecting the state 
and protecting the individual was formulated in a way that prevented discussion of the 
hybrid order in the justice and security field.  
The SSR community at DFID remains relatively small, but it has been the most adamant in 
promoting what has become a growing trend to conceptualize and operationalize 
connections between security, development, justice and democracy. Indeed, in the mid-
2000s, as Sugden (2006:12) noted, there was “an overwhelming [international] agreement 
that the UK is the leader in the field of SSR,” the “Godfather” of the variety of SSR that 
emphasizes the holistic approach. 
The push for engagement in SSR was driven by many other developments, including a 
perceived ‘massive growth in conflict within and between countries’, as described by Ms. 
Short, and her ambition on behalf of DFID to establish political leverage and a clear and 
distinct identity vis-à-vis the FCO and MOD. This was true in London, and it was reflected 
in the field. The shift to security-related programming, as occurred in Sierra Leone in 
1998–99, constituted a watershed for a development agency. Development and security 
were coming together as a means to establish, maintain and consolidate peace. As the 
concept of SSR and concomitant practices traveled through space and time, it was morphed 
accordingly by individual actors and institutions in the global justice and security field, but 
was nonetheless still recognizable. SSR, detached from its point of origin in DFID, was 
branching out and claiming new territory. 
 
4.7 Branching out and colonizing the justice and security field 
4.7.1 Blueprints as props: OECD developments 
In the international field of policy-making, other European countries soon took up the SSR 
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concept. In the Netherlands, SSR became a vehicle for furthering civil–military 
cooperation; the government introduced an operative, cross-departmental SSR team in 
2005. Germany also promoted a holistic approach to SSR, even though the country 
emphasized internal security organizations (Wulf 2004). Within OECD-DAC, the UK, the 
Netherlands and Germany further promoted the assembling of the security and 
development domains from which the SSR concept was emerging in the European context. 
As a multi-lateral agency, OECD–DAC came to play a fundamental role in giving further 
shape to the SSR concept of the late 1990s as it evolved into the 2000s. In this respect, the 
OECD was a vehicle for multi-lateralizing and transforming the assemblage of SSR that 
had first emerged in the UK.  
Between 2000 and 2005, based on concrete experiences from post-conflict reconstruction, 
the OECD became the multi-lateral body which developed and designed the policy concept 
of SSR that is considered a blueprint for policy-makers and practitioners alike. This was 
initially done by producing the 2005 reference document Security System Reform and 
Governance, which states that “the overall objective” of SSR “is to create a secure 
environment that is conducive to development, poverty reduction and democracy” (OECD 
2005b:16).52 
There is little doubt that the UK, and DFID in particular, has been and continues to be a 
key player within OECD in furthering SSR-related policy developments. DFID reputedly 
influenced the OECD-DAC (and UNDP) to promote SSR and the strong linkages that exist 
among these organizations. (DFID has for many years funded the programs and salaries of 
UNDP’s Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery.) In addition, an overlap of experts 
exists among organizations. For example, in the mid-2000s, DFID’s Senior SSR Advisor, 
who was deeply involved in UK programming in Sierra Leone, also chaired the OECD-
DAC’s Conflict, Peace and Development Cooperation Network. 
                                            
52 The OECD has chosen the concept of “security system reform,” while others talk of “transformation” or 
“restructuring.” OECD’s usage of “system” as opposed to “sector” reflects the fact that the conglomerate of 
institutions involved in the reform process cannot easily be referred to as a sector, but rather as a number of 
institutions that fall within different sectors. The use of “transformation” rather than “reform” should also be 
viewed as an attempt to clarify and emphasize conceptually the extensive nature of the undertaking. 
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Between 2005 and 2007, two SSR documents were formulated which have become 
blueprints in international policy discourse for what SSR encompasses in the ideal-typical 
sense of the term. The 2005 reference document Security System Reform and Governance 
(OECD 2005b) provided a consolidated list of institutions to include in SSR, including 
core security actors, security management and oversight bodies, justice and rule of law 
institutions and non-statutory security forces. This could be seen as a checklist for those 
security organizations to be worked upon in order to establish a centrally-governed 
political entity. 
The OECD–DAC Handbook on Security System Reform, which followed in 2007 and had 
strong UK backing, was produced to provide “guidance to operationalize the OECD–DAC 
guidelines on SSR and close the gap between policy and practice” (OECD 2007c:15). It 
morphed together hitherto separate domains. Unlike SSR formulations in the late 1990s, 
the police and judiciary were now placed together with military and intelligence services to 
constitute one seamless security framework. This shift reflected earlier thinking within 
DFID that security and justice were integrally linked, as both contribute to ‘community 
safety’ and ‘human security.’ The shift was also a token of the dynamism inherent to the 
SSR assemblage as ever-evolving, with components constantly being added and withering 
away. 
These two documents capture the breadth of what ‘ideal’ SSR entails. The overall aim of 
SSR, as reflected in these documents, is to ensure that the security sector in a given country 
is capable of meeting the security needs of both the state and the people in a manner 
consistent with democratic norms, good governance and the rule of law (OECD 2005b). In 
addition, the OECD emphasizes the necessity of approaching not any one security provider 
in particular, but security providers as a system of actors, thereby addressing the overlap of 
security, law enforcement and justice simultaneously (Andersen 2006). This is the 
application of what has been dubbed a ‘holistic approach’ and a focus on the ‘governance 
aspect’ of security providers which have become fundamental to how SSR is formulated. 
The commitment to the holistic norm is a key component of what developmentalizing 
security means, namely, to establish a system of institutions governed by civilians that can 
manage and direct internal and external security. This also emphasizes that governance is 
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not envisioned as just one set of activities on a par with other more technical approaches. 
The act of governing lies at the core of SSR and is, as such, one of the central implements 
to work on in order to strengthen the state as a centrally-governed political entity. 
 
4.7.2 The global spread of a concept, labeling practices and a ‘stake at stake’ in the 
UN 
The diffusion of SSR and its further development from how it was formulated in the UK 
and the OECD became evident as it was picked up in the UN system as a ‘stake at stake’ 
between different departments. The focus on governance sets SSR apart from train-and-
equip approaches to strengthen national security and provide military assistance. This, 
however, has also made the concept appealing to actors beyond development agencies. 
Calling for a focus on governance and a holistic approach to the organization of security 
has provided a framework that explains why security institutions need support, rather than 
how it should be provided.  
As an assemblage in the security and justice field, SSR thus took the position of a stake at 
stake that enabled the building of broad, albeit superficial, consensus among the different 
groups involved in UN policymaking. The OECD blueprint may not have been re-
formulated substantially, but SSR was becoming an important label in policy-making. 
To illustrate this, it is worth quoting the UN Secretary-General’s report on the role of the 
UN in supporting SSR and subsequently, review how the SSR has fared within the UN 
system: 
For the United Nations, the importance of security sector reform is that it 
demonstrates that security goes beyond traditional military elements and involves a 
much wider range of national and international institutions and actors. It also 
highlights the need for security arrangements that take into account the linkages 
between the different actors. Equally, security sector reform underscores that 
effectiveness, accountability and democratic governance are mutually re-inforcing 
elements of security. Thus, security sector reform offers a framework to assist 
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national actors, the United Nations and other international partners in implementing 
a shared vision (UNSG 2008:6-7). 
By emphasizing that effectiveness, accountability and democratic governance are 
‘mutually reinforcing’ and that SSR offers a framework for implementing a ‘shared 
vision,’ the Secretary-General downplayed the inherent tension that exists between 
different actors and their various interests. The security and justice field is no longer 
related to conflict, but rather a harmonious field of co-operation, without fundamental 
conflicts of interest. Clearly, this is not the intention of the Secretary-General, and later in 
the report he makes the point that SSR is a highly political process that requires knowledge 
and sensitivity (ibid.:11).  
By trying to embrace the justice and security field as a whole, SSR policies in their 
holistic, all-encompassing configuration allowed numerous agencies within the UN to 
claim to be working within its remits. This was one of the conclusions from a review 
undertaken in 2006, which mapped out peace-building capacities in the UN system. Seven 
UN entities indicated involvement in SSR. Despite this, the report stated that “the overall 
UN capacity in SSR, understood as support both to governance and to the development of 
national capacity in core security operational tasks, remains limited, when not practically 
non-existent” (UN 2006:21).  
SSR as an emerging constitutive assemblage of the justice and security field had become 
an international policy to which a number of UN agencies were now subscribing. As a 
formula to operate on dysfunctional political entities and establish them as effective and 
legitimate states, SSR was being taken up as one of the significant concepts de jour in the 
mid-2000s. Even agencies that had hitherto actively avoided engagement in the justice and 
security field were now using, articulating and fighting over how and when to apply the 
label.  
 From its point of origin, articulated by Short in the late 1990s, the concept of SSR was 
shaping speeches made far beyond Palace Street in London as part of an international 
working discourse in the justice and security field. Short might have articulated a process 
that was already under way, but the manner in which the concept was developed by DFID 
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in the late 1990s and early 2000s was given further shape by and shaping OECD-DAC and 
UN debates and other discursive developments. In short, SSR had become a stake at stake. 
 
4.7.3 UN Development Programme >< Department for Peacekeeping Operations 
In 2006, only the UN’s UNDP and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) 
had dedicated resources – albeit limited – for working with questions of security 
governance, law enforcement and defense institutions. Little love is lost between the two 
agencies, and the fact that SSR was being discussed – and fought over – as a stake at stake 
is indicative of this. Both agencies considered themselves to be the natural focal point for 
developing a coherent UN approach to SSR. Having been actively involved in the 
conceptualization of the field in OECD-DAC deliberations, and having formulated its own 
approach to SSR and transitional justice in 2003, the UNDP considered it obvious that they 
should be in charge. In the end, however, the Secretary-General requested DPKO to host 
an inter-agency support unit for SSR; since then, the DPKO has been taking the lead in 
formulating UN policies.  
This conflict did not only relate to power struggles, access to resources and positioning in 
terms of defining the contours and direction of the SSR concept. Organizational origins 
matter, of course, and the siting of SSR within DPKO affected the balance between the 
various elements of SSR and how it developed. UNDP tends to be concerned with 
governance and development, thus following DFID and OECD-DAC 
(‘developmentalization of security’), whereas DPKO’s main focus is on security and 
stability, which are more closely aligned to train-and-equip (‘securitization of 
development’).  
However, the aim of both UNDP and DPKO has been to encompass the justice and 
security field as a whole and ensure that justice and security institutions are both effective 
and accountable. Comparing the SSR discussions in the UN with the OECD-DAC debates 
of the mid-2000s, it seems that the focus now is on the need for effective security 
institutions, especially with respect to the police and the military. In effect, the 
consequence within the UN has been a re-balancing of SSR towards a focus on 
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securitization rather than a developmentalization of SSR as promoted by DFID and OECD-
DAC. 
As the concept of SSR travelled from its inceptive articulations in London to other capitals 
in Europe and was used in debates and policies of intergovernmental forums, it continued 
to be formulated in languages of stateness. SSR emerged during the early to mid-2000s as 
an instrument of state-building that outlined ways to build the capacity of a given security 
organization, and was developed to support the transformation of the justice and security 
field altogether.  
The UN Secretary-General’s (2008b) notion that “security goes beyond traditional military 
elements and involves a much wider range of…institutions and actors” should be taken 
quite literally. SSR morphed and was articulated differently, depending on the institutional 
setting in which it assembled and the meaning that was applied to it. While the emphasis 
might have been different, however, it was evident that the overarching aim was the same, 
namely, to build a centrally-governed state entity that was legitimate and effective. This 
was the case even when the ‘non-state’ appeared on the stage of international policy-
making. Yet while the non-state was an uncomfortable issue for SSR to deal with, it was a 
clear indication that developmentalization of security was occurring. 
 
4.8 Separating state and non-state in the multi-layered approach 
In debates on SSR, discussions on the ‘effective and legitimate state’ have included the 
engagement of non-state actors, which refers to, inter alia, traditional or customary 
authorities, community-based policing groups, restorative justice and mediation 
organizations and work associations (DFID 2004; OECD 2007a; DANIDA 2010; OHCHR 
2006; Albrecht and Kyed 2011:10). One could argue that the articulation of this category 
of actors acknowledges a hybrid order, i.e., that the authority to act in the justice and 
security field comes from multiple sources in concrete physical space and from the 
symbolic space of the national level. And, indeed, its emergence in SSR discourse 
constitutes one of the most innovative elements of SSR as it has evolved since the 1990s 
within bi-lateral and multi-lateral development agencies. However, emergence of the non-
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state also inadvertently re-produced the state as standing above, while also encompassing 
society. 
In the discourse of international policy-making, the rationale of what has been dubbed a 
‘multi-layered’ approach is that rather than providing support to those security and justice 
organizations that are tied specifically to the state idea and system, state as well as non-
state actors must be involved in SSR processes simultaneously. “What fragile state justice 
and security delivery requires, therefore,” OECD (2007a:11) notes, “is a multi-layered 
approach. It is a methodology that is highly context-specific, targeting donor assistance to 
those providers – state and non-state actors simultaneously – at the multiple points at 
which actual day-to-day service delivery occurs.” This approach has been particularly 
pronounced in the area of justice, where informal mechanisms of dispute resolution, 
through customary law, for instance, are regularly included in rule of law programs. It is 
also an approach that DFID is more comfortable with, as it appears to be more in line with 
the mantra of development agencies, i.e., support of the poor, the vulnerable and the 
marginalized. 
The 2007 OECD report quoted above, Enhancing the Delivery of Justice and Security, 
draws on a definition of non-state actors produced by DFID in 2004,53 and argues that the 
intention is to “reinforce the already existing range of choice that users have in fragile 
states while developing providers’ service delivery to make it more effective, fair, 
accessible, accountable and rights respecting” (OECD 2007a:7; Scheye and McLean 
2006). This realization by external actors was caused by their frustration with collapsed 
and fragile state institutions that were considered not to develop at a suitable pace; it also 
was also a genuine attempt to be what in policy-making circles is referred to as ‘context-
sensitive’. Thus, the “local context should determine what development occurs when, how 
and in what order, as the provision of justice and security is based upon historical legacies, 
                                            
53 In 2004 DFID published its first coherent brief on the issue, Non-state Justice and Security Systems, which 
states that security and justice institutions presided over by non-state actors are “critically important in the 
context of DFID’s pro-poor approach to security and justice.” These actors,” the brief continues, “deal with 
the vast majority of disputes” and are “widely used in rural and poor urban areas, where there is often 
minimal access to formal state justice” (DFID, 2004:1). The brief recognizes that this approach to reform is 
politicized, is neither neutral nor technical, and raises broader governance issues. There often is no separation 
between providing security and justice, on the one hand, and local governance institutions on the other: “A 
person who exercises judicial (or quasi-judicial) authority through a non-state justice system may also have 
executive authority over the same property or territory” (DFID 2004:3). 
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cultural value systems, political calculations and intricate balances of power” (OECD 
2007a:6).  
Inherent to this debate, however, has been a separation of the state and the non-state and a 
consolidation of the two categories of actors in separate domains (Boege et al. 2009; 
Eriksen 2011; Albrecht and Kyed 2010, 2011). This means that while the importance of 
non-state actors is acknowledged, it is the conceptual principle of state-building, the 
centrally-governed political entity, that continues to dominate, a point of departure that is 
consolidated in the 2007 OECD Handbook on Security System Reform. This report states 
that a multi-layered approach “helps respond to the short-term needs of enhanced security 
and justice, while also building the medium-term needs of state capacity and critical 
governance structures” (OECD 2007c:17). 
The category of a ‘non-state actor’ becomes etymologically defined by what it is not, 
namely a centrally-governed functioning state; it is ‘a local context’ in which other rules 
than those of ‘the state’ presumably apply. These rules are, however, precisely context-
specific, locked in a black box labeled non-state, and therefore not to be spoken of in the 
same general terms as the state, its accountability and rule of law. This may be because the 
western universalist state is considered equivalent to the correct political entity, but it is 
certainly also because the language to eloquently talk about what ‘the non-state’ is, is 
poorly developed. 
In sum, state-building remains innate to the multi-layered approach to SSR. OECD’s 
Enhancing the Delivery of Justice and Security (OECD 2007a), which represents the multi-
layered approach in its most radical form, warns that whatever support is provided “to non-
state systems [must] be balanced by the establishment of mechanisms to link them to state 
systems” (OECD 2007a:24; Scheye and McLean 2006:32). This assumption is not hybrid, 
but implies that the non-state exists in isolation due to the weakness, fragility or failure of 
the state. The multi-layered approach suggests that it is necessary to extend state control 
into areas where the influence of the state is limited or non-existent by means of building 
state legitimacy and capacity.  
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In other words, the multi-layered approach is not a matter of recognizing, working with 
and supporting a hybrid order. It is a plea to accept and work with the ‘local’ order that 
exists until such a time when the state can take over. How state institutions operate and 
should be operated may be under discussion, but it is the state as a centrally-governed 
political entity, standing above and at the same time encompassing, controlling and 
regulating society that is to be built and consolidated. “Benign neglect or toleration (by the 
state and donors) of non-state systems” may be necessary, the OECD (2007a:28) notes, but 
this is only “until the state can take over service provision.”  
Multi-layered approaches to justice and security programming thus become tautological. 
They take the fragile or failing state as their point of departure and argue that it needs to be 
re-built because it has failed. Until this happens, swathes of other actors may fill in, and as 
such, ‘multi-layered’ becomes a means, not an end (Scheye and Andersen 2007; Baker 
2007). “In the long term,” OECD (2007a:20) notes, “supporting the delivery of state justice 
and security may be the ‘first best’ solution. However, even with the political commitment 
of the government, most fragile states have exceedingly limited resources and means to 
provide safety and justice to their citizens in the short- and medium-term.” 
 
4.9 Conclusion 
This chapter describes how SSR emerged as an international policy-making concept in the 
justice and security field and produced a particular amalgamation of security and 
development. At first glance, this is an example of a securitization and subordination of the 
development agenda (Duffield 2001, 2006). However, with respect to SSR specifically, it 
is equally the case that this process of policy development has been one of 
developmentalizing security (Albrecht et al. 2010).  
First, SSR assembled as a policy concept and branched out within the framework of 
development agencies. DFID initially articulated this melding of numerous processes, 
including post-Cold War changes in the global security environment, Short’s political 
ambitions in the UK as the head of a new department within a newly-elected UK 
government and events unfolding in places such as Sierra Leone. Thus, SSR developed as 
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a set of discourses and practices in the justice and security field emanating from numerous 
political processes and physical locales that interacted and shaped one another. 
Concurrently, and inter-twined with this process, the SSR agenda was promoted 
internationally to a large degree by DFID, as well as by other governments and multilateral 
agencies such as OECD-DAC and the UN. 
Second, and of importance to the developmentalization of security argument, the justice 
and security assemblage that SSR came to represent did not simply constitute the 
advancement of train-and-equip exercises narrowly focused on making a particular security 
institution more effective (if not legitimate). On the contrary, SSR took form and was 
articulated in international policy discourse during the 2000s, when new development 
concepts were spawned and old ones were incorporated, dissected and reconfigured, 
including ‘good governance’, ‘holistic’ and ‘multi-layered’ approaches. Compared to only 
procuring equipment and providing training to armed forces, SSR thus constitutes a 
comprehensive and considerably more intrusive approach to state-building. Being holistic 
implies the targeting of not one organization within, but the justice and security field as a 
whole, as a system of related actors to be reassembled within a framework of centrally-
governed institutions. 
Introducing the multi-layered approach into the SSR discourse reflected a nascent 
realization that in re-assembling the justice and security field to form part of an ‘effective 
and legitimate state’, the engagement of so-called non-state actors would be critical in a 
fragile state setting. This was not, however, a fundamentally different approach to state-
building, but rather an attempt to separate the state and non-state and work on both “until 
the state can take over service provision” (OECD 2007a:28).  
However, the concept of justice and security assemblages that I deploy to analyze the 
hybrid order challenges the idea that non-state and state actors exist as pure entities to be 
worked upon rather than as inter-connected network of things, discourse and actors. The 
focus on the ‘non-state’ as separate from, and yet etymologically emerging from what it is 
not (i.e., a state), ultimately re-produces the split between state and society. State-building 
remained the primary goal of SSR, and the multi-layered approach was articulated to allow 
intermediate steps to be taken until the state would emerge. 
 112 
In the next chapter I turn to how SSR as a component of state-building became part of re-
composing the justice and security field in Sierra Leone. However, while it came to define 
the building of a state in Sierra Leone, as an assemblage it was inter-twined with a number 
of other activities and events, including a military intervention and the arrest of actors who 
explicitly articulated hybridity. At the same time, it proved to be inevitable that hybridity 
would lie at the base of this process, and thus inevitable that the hybrid order would be 
reproduced. 
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5 Re-composing the justice and security field 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter explores how seeking to re-compose the justice and security field became one 
of the most important efforts of the state-building process in Sierra Leone, an effort that 
has continued to this day. It demonstrates that while SSR in the late 1990s became a vital 
element of this internationally-supported process of re-composing the Sierra Leone justice 
and security field, so was fighting a war against the RUF and arresting a number of war 
criminals. While the UK drove these actions forward in the name of the Sierra Leone state, 
they ultimately lay the foundation of reproducing the hybrid order of authority upon which 
Sierra Leone as a political entity rests. 
Perceived by a number of academics to lack efficiency and legitimacy, Sierra Leone‘s 
eventual failure as a state led to a devastating and brutal conflict that spurred the UN and 
the UK in particular into action (Jackson and Albrecht 2010:6-7; see Fanthorpe 2006; 
Gberie 2005; Keen 2005; Pham 2006). However, since speaking in languages of stateness 
is the only way in which Sierra Leone may be articulated as a failed state, it can fail only in 
comparison to what is considered to be a functioning state. As this chapter demonstrates, 
Sierra Leone never was the kind of political entity envisioned through state-building, and 
therefore can not be measured according to the concept of the western universalist state 
(see Jackson 1990; Clapham 1996; Mamdani 1996; Herbst 2000; Young 2004; Englebert 
and Tull 2008). 
By the mid- to late 1990s, articulating trends in global policy discourse, insecurity and 
conflict were “holding out the prospect of development,” as UK Minister of Development 
Clare Short put it, in Sierra Leone and elsewhere (Clare Short, interview, June 2008). Once 
underdevelopment and poor governance came to be seen by international policy-makers as 
the ‘root causes’ of fragility and failure (see Buur et al. 2007:9), they had to be addressed 
in order that Sierra Leone could emerge as a state that stands both above and encompasses, 
controls and regulates society. 
This chapter first looks at the history of Sierra Leone and how it has been represented, not 
least in much academic writing, as destined to fail and collapse into conflict following its 
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independence in 1961. The chapter then explores the perceived state of dissolution that met 
external actors as they arrived in Sierra Leone in the late 1990s to embark on state-
building.  
The latter part of the chapter outlines the process of re-composition of the field, which 
occurred in the first stages of state building in Sierra Leone. Led in large part by the UK, 
these processes included a military intervention and arresting identified war criminals. 
They also included the initiation of a number of programs under the heading of SSR that 
together were to begin the process of transforming Sierra Leone into a centrally-governed 
political entity of the western universalist variety. While the history of the state of Sierra 
Leone may have been marked by a trajectory that led to failure, re-composition of the 
justice and security field would reverse this trend.  
 
5.2 Sierra Leone’s articulation as a failed state 
When Sierra Leone became independent in 1961, Sir Milton Margai, the country’s first 
prime minister, greeted the event with the words: “Sierra Leone will become a model state” 
(Allen 1968:305). This section outlines Sierra Leone’s recent history and how it evolved as 
a political entity, eventually articulated by external observers as failing to emerge as a 
‘model state’. 
 
5.2.1 Sierra Leone: underdeveloped and chaotic 
In 1994, at the height of Sierra Leone’s civil war, an article titled The coming anarchy: 
How scarcity, crime, overpopulation and disease are rapidly destroying the social fabric of 
our planet was published in Atlantic Monthly. Written by journalist Robert D. Kaplan, it 
vividly described the political entity Sierra Leone had become: underdeveloped, poorly 
governed and in a state of anarchy. Sierra Leone’s conflict was seen as a prime example of 
“new war,” i.e., war fought within a country, as compared to the traditional paradigm of 
inter-state war articulated in the 19th century by Clausewitz. It was also an example of what 
transpires when states collapse. Kaplan wrote: 
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Sierra Leone is… a microcosm of what is occurring, albeit in a more tempered and 
gradual manner, throughout West Africa and much of the underdeveloped world: the 
withering away of central governments, the rise of tribal and regional domains, the 
unchecked spread of disease and the growing pervasiveness of war. West Africa is 
reverting to the Africa of the Victorian Atlas. It consists now of a series of coastal 
trading posts, such as Freetown and Conakry, and an interior that, owing to violence, 
volatility and disease, is again becoming, as Graham Greene once observed, ‘blank’ 
and ‘unexplored’. However, whereas Greene’s vision implies a certain romance, as in 
the somnolent and charmingly seedy Freetown of his celebrated novel ‘The Heart of 
the Matter’, it is Thomas Malthus, the philosopher of demographic doomsday, who is 
now the prophet of West Africa’s future. And West Africa’s future, eventually, will 
also be that of most of the rest of the world (Kaplan 1994). 
Kaplan’s core thesis was that after the Cold War, Sierra Leone’s “modern” state vanished, 
leaving its people to live in collapsing state spaces. In the absence of centrally-governed 
institutions, the people turned to traditional organizational modes of governance that were 
not constrained by modern law or human rights. Sierra Leone, Kaplan explained, had 
become an ideal type failed state, molded partly by conflict between the National 
Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC), which had come to power through a military coup in 
1992, and the main rebel group, the RUF.  
Kaplan described the “withering away” of Sierra Leone as a governed space and what 
happens when the state as a bulwark against instability, disorder and chaos dissolves. 
Warlords, shadow economies, collapse and ensuing violence prevailed, along with 
environmental degradation, illegal trading, child soldiers and extreme violence against 
civilians. Atrocities committed during the war were unspeakably violent.  
However, two questions emerge after reading Kaplan’s analysis: What were the standards 
by which the Government of Sierra Leone failed? If languages of stateness are not 
articulated ‘effectively’ and ‘legitimately’, how and by what means is authority expressed, 
in order to make order?  
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5.2.2 The disappointment of patrimonial promises and its consequences 
By all accounts, the Sierra Leone government after independence in 1961 failed to 
articulate stateness, which, according to most academic (and policy) accounts, contributed 
in large part to the conflict that began in 1991. However, measured against standards of 
effectiveness and legitimacy, Sierra Leone never experienced a state formation process that 
would cause it to become the form familiar to those accustomed to the centralized state that 
emerged in 19th century Western Europe. 
This circumstance is often emphasized in the literature on post-colonial states, and African 
states in particular. The literature points to these states’ low levels of civic culture and 
social capital, considerable ethnic diversity, and inheritance of what are often considered 
artificial frameworks of governance from the colonial state (Jackson, 1990; Clapham 1996; 
Mamdani 1996; Herbst 2000; Young 2004; Englebert and Tull 2008).54 
In the words of Peters (2006:44), “the international system of states from 1960 forced 
Sierra Leone to behave (externally) as if it was a Weberian (territorial) state.” The Sierra 
Leone state is therefore better described according to Peters (ibid.) as a “personal-
amorphous polity,” a form that favors personal linkages between rulers and ruled, and 
resists bureaucratization. However, the “steady decline in state power” that Peters 
(2006:44) speaks of is not a decline from a bureaucratized and centrally-governed state. 
What the ‘decline’ has been from is therefore worth further investigation.  
In his analysis of Sierra Leone as a ‘shadow state’ and why it collapsed, Reno (1995) 
emphasizes the significant accumulation of riches by the powerful few; a miniscule and 
shrinking formal economy; accelerating mass impoverishment; a crushing debt burden; and 
the collapse of basic state institutions. Since independence from the UK in 1961, Sierra 
Leone’s political system was characterized by attempts to increase centralization of power 
and resources in Freetown and the continuing of the split in governing structures from the 
rest of the country (Jackson and Albrecht 2011:6). Part and parcel of this split was a 
continuation of the colonial bifurcation of western legal systems in Freetown and indirect 
                                            
54 Indeed, Tilly (1985) refers to 19th century state formation in Europe as ‘organized crime’, a top-down 
system which expressed the spatial logic of coercion and extraction and which was driven by war (Tilly 
1985:304).  
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rule in the countryside based on a system of District Officers – with no executive powers 
from 1972 – and Chiefs exercising customary law. Indeed, one could say, lack of, rather 
than resistance to bureaucratization in the state system and beyond has in effect meant tacit 
consent to what Peters (2006:43) refers to as “the legalization of various states of domestic 
dependency, amounting at the most extreme to de facto domestic slavery.”  
However, the failure of the state of Sierra Leone was not caused by the inability of a 
centrally-governed set of institutions – the state system – to provide public services. 
Rather, the leadership in Freetown failed to maintain the extensive neo-patrimonial 
network which had been established and consolidated during the post-colonial era (Reno 
1995; Keen 2005; Peters 2006; Fanthorpe 2001). This was the case under the Margais, who 
ruled until 1968 when the mayor of Freetown, Siaka Stevens, who became Prime Minister 
and then President in 1972, as well as under his successor, Major General Joseph Momoh, 
who came to power in 1985 and was ousted in the 1992 military coup by the National 
Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC). 
Richards, (1996) referring explicitly to Sierra Leone as a ‘patrimonial state’ where national 
resources were (and continue to be) re-distributed as marks of personal favor, considered 
this type of political entity to be in a double crisis in Africa in the mid-1990s. The price of 
raw materials was in free-fall and the termination of the Cold War had caused aid money to 
dry up. In addition, the best sources of minerals had been exhausted (see Peters 2006:32). 
As Peters (2006:6) notes, “Young people, socio-economically marginalized [from 
networks of patrimony], soon proved to be a large reservoir to be tapped by those who 
wanted to cause mayhem.” Indeed, the RUF recruited mainly from a social and economic 
underclass of people, such as poorly-paid diamond diggers (ibid.:5). 
By the 1990s, Sierra Leone had developed into what Reno (1995) describes as “one of 
Africa’s most decrepit and weak states,” a dramatic use of language that leaves one 
wondering just how failed a state might become. Failed or not, according to Reno, the 
success and strength of the patrimonial network of Stevens and his successor, General 
Momoh, was also evident. Despite a “shockingly rapid economic decline and falling 
standards of living, the country remained immune from coups or popular uprisings which 
some outside observers had long predicted” (Reno 1995:148). Nonetheless, due to the 
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breadth and depth of the crisis that the country was considered to be in, the collapse of 
Stevens’ patrimonial system would prove inevitable.  
 
5.2.3 Demands for structural adjustments 
Pressures on patrimonial networks were compounded by Sierra Leone’s relationship with 
international financial institutions, the IMF in particular. To access IMF loans, Momoh 
agreed to the aforementioned structural adjustment program (SAP), but failed to comply 
with its provisions.55 By late 1987, the country was approaching default and Momoh 
declared a state of economic emergency. This proved to be the final blow for the country 
that hit average citizens the hardest: electricity blackouts, petrol shortages and delays in 
paying civil servants for months on end became the harsh reality. In effect, both the system 
and the idea of the state were soon to become the target of violence. 
In order to survive, the patrimonial regime was forced to choose between the 
accommodation of immediate patrimonial demands – for instance, by supplying cheap 
imported rice to its clients, including the army and the police56 – and its longer-term needs 
for survival through the provision of jobs and educational opportunities for loyal subjects 
(Richards 1996). Momoh, a former commander of the army, did not want to upset the 
already delicate balance in the justice and security field and run the risk of a coup or 
uprising. But his choice to prioritize his personal short-term security came at a high cost. 
The educational sector, the health sector and other social services were now deprived of the 
extra resources they needed to survive, and the general public – young people in particular 
– became restive. 
                                            
55 In 1979, the IMF negotiated an economic stabilization plan, which included the demand that the Sierra 
Leone government limit state spending. This meant, in particular, reducing civil service expenditures. Minor 
government jobs were an important means of securing loyalty to the state system. However, Stevens also 
planned to host the Organization of African unity conference in 1980. This yearly conference – an 
opportunity for the host country to impress visiting presidents – left Sierra Leone with huge debts and an 
almost useless infrastructure. With total costs amounting to US$ 200 million, equal to the country’s entire 
foreign exchange reserves, the government sharply cut its budget for development and social programs 
(Peters 2006:32; 2011:43-44). 
56 Sierra Leone had a vested interest in declaring itself in food deficit. Food imports allowed the president to 
buy the loyalty of junior cadres by showing an interest in family welfare. Stevens gave exclusive import 
authorization to the former state-owned enterprises, in which he often had a share. In 1984, Sierra Leone 
imported almost three times as much rice as it did in 1978. Domestic production dropped more than 30% 
(Peters 2011:44). 
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5.2.4 A predatory justice system 
Among other consequences of the reduction in patrimonial re-distribution were increasing 
problems in the justice system, where the lowest levels of administration in rural areas 
became more than usually strapped for cash. This resulted in village headmen and local 
court chairmen ‘paying themselves’ through arbitrary and excessive fines and exactions 
levied on young people (Richards 2005).  
Appeals of such fines – impossibly expensive for most villagers, in any case – could be 
made to the magistrate’s court and eventually to the High Court. However, at the national 
level, appeals are heard in a special section in which a judge is advised by special assessors 
deemed to be experts in customary law (i.e., by traditional elders). There was a strong 
feeling among young people in the villages that elders make up the law to suit their own 
purposes. 
The foundation and conception of what Reno (1995) refers to as the ‘shadow state’ is 
historically tied to colonial indirect rule that was a pragmatic response to the need of the 
colonial administration to govern the Sierra Leonean hinterland at a minimum cost. Post-
colonial leadership in Sierra Leone, first under Stevens and then under Momoh, adopted 
this system of governance, and had limited incentives to embark on developing a political 
entity that, to the outside observer, would be considered a ‘strong state’. Rather, Stevens 
had been preoccupied with preserving political security and with preventing competitors 
from accessing resources channeled through institutions tied to the state system. This was 
evident in how he dealt with the mining industry, the police and the military. 
 
5.2.5 Personalizing the state further – mining and security 
As part of Stevens’ attempt to build a bulwark against competitors, the mining industry 
was nationalized. Through the National Diamond Mining Company (NDMC) created in 
1971, Stevens came to control the mining and selling of diamonds. Chiefs, in exchange for 
a place on the board of the NDMC or access to its resources, co-operated with the 
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government (Reno 1995). Patrimonial economic politics also played out at the local level, 
where “strangers” – i.e., migrant laborers, not Lebanese businessmen57 – were involved in 
illicit diamond mining under the protection of the local landowner. Since these local 
landowners, who were often paramount and lesser chiefs, could always threaten illicit 
diamond miners with prosecution by state officials, the diamond-landowning class was 
able to exercise practically unlimited informal social control. 
Stevens not only nationalized mining, the most important source of income in Sierra 
Leone, but reformed the army and the police to ensure loyalty from both. Military officers 
with a Mende background were removed and replaced with northerners – Tens, Korankos 
or Yalunkas – the traditional supporters of Stevens’ the All People’s Congress (APC) 
party. In 1971, the army staged a coup led by Brigade Commander John Bangura, a 
Temne, but it failed. Stevens immediately received support from Guinea in the form of 200 
soldiers who served as personal bodyguards (see Reno 2003:325). After the Guinean 
soldiers left in 1973, Stevens asked the Cuban government to help train a special APC 
militia. This militia was named the Internal Security Unit (ISU) and was much feared by 
the people. 
 
5.2.6 From patrimonial failure to violent conflict 
By the 1980s, the political and economic condition of the patrimonial system had 
weakened considerably due to the lack of available resources. Yet, while war was not 
inevitable, it became the outcome.  
Eventually, sufficient pressure was put on Momoh to force a constitutional review in 
1991.58 However, in March of that year, the RUF entered Sierra Leone, seeking to 
overthrow the one-party APC regime under Momoh. In the following decade of war, Sierra 
Leone became known for the brutality shown by the warring factions towards the 
                                            
57 Lebanese traders achieved rapid prosperity in both small- and large-scale commerce in Sierra Leone from 
the end of the 19th century on (see Reno 1995). 
58 The constitutional review commission recommended the re-establishment of a multi-party state, which was 
approved by Parliament in July 1991. 
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population59 and military coups in 1992 and 1997.60 Furthermore, security assemblages of 
state-sanctioned soldiers, traditional hunters, rebel factions and dissidents from the security 
forces took form, sometimes fighting and sometimes colluding with each another (Richards 
1996; Keen 2005; Peters 2006; Jackson and Albrecht 2010). 
The stated aim of RUF was to fight government corruption and claim accountability for the 
country’s mineral resources (Peters 2006:4). On the ground, however, this agenda was 
quickly replaced by taking control of rich resource areas such as Kono and a revolt against 
social and political figures of authority, inter alia, police officers and chiefs (Richards 
2006; Fanthorpe 2006; Jackson 2007).  
In 1999, as the RUF entered Freetown, witnesses described “well-organized operations to 
round up civilians who were later executed, attacked with machetes” (HRW 1999). The 
violence perpetrated by the RUF was broadcast globally when a journalist in the city 
managed to film the rebels and then peacekeepers in action. He recorded the rebels’ 
burning to death a family that had refused to become human shields and paranoid Nigerian 
peacekeepers beating a mentally-disturbed child they had mistaken for a sniper. All of this 
is captured in the 2000 documentary Cry Freetown (Jackson and Albrecht 2010:7).  
                                            
59 A frequently cited Human Rights Watch report describes the approach adopted by the RUF as they entered 
Freetown in 1999: “The rebel occupation of Freetown was characterized by the systematic and widespread 
perpetration of all classes of gross human rights abuses against the civilian population. Civilians were gunned 
down within their houses, rounded up and massacred on the streets, thrown from the upper floors of 
buildings, used as human shields, and burnt alive in cars and houses. They had their limbs hacked off with 
machetes, eyes gouged out with knives, hands smashed with hammers, and bodies burned with boiling water. 
Women and girls were systematically sexually abused, and children and young people abducted by the 
hundreds. The rebels made little distinction between civilian and military targets. They repeatedly stated that 
they believed civilians should be punished for what they perceived to be their support for the existing 
government. Thus, the rebels waged war against the civilian population through human rights abuses. While 
there was some targeting of particular groups, such as Nigerians, police officers, journalists and church 
workers, the vast majority of atrocities were committed by rebels who chose their victims apparently at 
random…” (HRW 1999).  
60 In the first military coup in 1992 the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC), a group of young 
officers headed by Valentine Strasser, came to power. Strasser and his successors were ineffective to the 
extent that there was an increase in the RUF’s power until the involvement of the South African mercenary 
firm Executive Outcomes in 1995. Eventually, increasing demands in Freetown for elections, coupled with 
international pressure, persuaded the NPRC to hand over power to a civilian government. Following two 
conferences in the Bintumani Hotel in Freetown, elections were held in 1996; Ahmad Tejan Kabbah of the 
Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP) was elected president. Two months later, discussion between the SLPP 
and RUF eventually led to the Abidjan Peace Accords of November 1996. The unwillingness of either party 
to agree to disarmament led to a breakdown of peace by early 1997. This led to the second military coup in 
Freetown, staged by the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), and the democratically-elected SLPP 
government was subsequently exiled to Conakry, Guinea (Jackson and Albrecht 2010:9). 
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During the conflict, out of a total population of approximately 6 million, some 50,000 
people were estimated to have been killed, around 500,000 became refugees and another 
500,000 were classified as internally displaced (Horn et al. 2006). At the same time, the 
systems of governance and physical infrastructure of state institutions, symbols that clearly 
articulate the language and power of the state, had been destroyed by the RUF. Paramount 
and lesser chiefs had fled the countryside or been killed (Jackson 2007). 
The signing of the Lomé Peace Accord in July 1999 formalized a ceasefire between the 
Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF, and brought the civil war to a momentary end. 
However, the power-sharing agreements inherent in Lomé resulted in what Tull and 
Mehler (2005:395) have referred to as a “warlord’s peace.” Implementation of key areas of 
the agreement was painfully slow, and disarmament and demobilization deadlines were not 
met (CR 2000:83). By early 2000, the situation triggered further RUF violence and 
renewed conflict. 
Following the brutality of the violence visited on the civilian population and the failure of 
the Lomé Agreement, the international community, including the UK government, was 
spurred into action (Jackson and Albrecht 2011:5). A group of senior UK politicians 
decided that they could not allow Sierra Leone to fall apart; the UK eventually intervened 
in 2000 during a period when UN peacekeepers were threatened by the warring factions 
and when the UN commander in the field, General Jetley, openly accused the Nigerian 
troops within the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group 
(ECOMOG) of colluding with the RUF to profit from illicit diamond mining. One year 
after the signing of the Lomé Agreement, Sierra Leone was yet again on the brink of 
falling apart.61 
 
                                            
61 The UN intervention under the banner of the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) was 
plagued by a number of issues immediately after deployment. A chronic lack of resources was exacerbated 
by misplaced faith in the Lomé Agreement itself, but also by fundamental disagreements at the top-level 
between the civilian Nigerian Head of Mission on the one side and Deputy Force Commander and Indian 
Force Commander on the other. In April 2000 a hostage crisis arose when several UN peacekeeping units 
were surrounded by a re-animated RUF; several units managed to fight their way out and many held out until 
they were rescued by UNAMSIL and UK troops. By mid-2001 there were around 15-17,000 UNAMSIL 
troops on the ground along with the UK troop contingent. 
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5.3 Sierra Leone and the UK 
Given its historical colonial ties and for sheer humanitarian reasons, the UK was concerned 
with developments inside Sierra Leone. But UK interests in Sierra Leone had intensified 
due to other events as well. The so-called Sandline affair had occurred in 1998, which 
involved Tim Spicer, a former British officer in the UK army and owner of Sandline, a 
private military company that shipped arms illegally to Sierra Leone (see Abrahamsen and 
Williams 2011:154).62 Following this incident, there was widespread agreement at the 
highest levels of the UK government that a similar situation of diplomatic importance 
could not occur again (Clare Short, interview, 2008). Robin Cook, UK Secretary of State in 
the late 1990s, mentioned this concern to Colonel David Richards at a chance meeting 
between the two, immediately before the UK intervened militarily in Sierra Leone in 2000 
(Albrecht and Jackson 2009:170).  
Another story, based on hearsay, reports that Prime Minister Tony Blair had a predilection 
for Sierra Leone because his father had been a school teacher there (Jackson and Albrecht 
2010:7). Clare Short mentioned to me in my aforementioned interview with her that “the 
first black person he [i.e., Blair] ever met was a Sierra Leonean” (Clare Short, interview, 
2008, London). Ms Short also said:  
“…suddenly Blair said he was interested in Africa, which I am afraid is a piece of 
public relations; after Iraq he wanted to soften the image. Because it is remarkable, 
he really didn’t engage [in matters to do with Africa] at all in the first term, apart 
from that one Sierra Leone decision [i.e., to engage in Sierra Leone]” (Clare Short, 
interview, 2008, London). 
With Blair’s and Cook’s significant investments of authority, and a general sense, as Ms 
Short explained, that “we mustn’t do this to Sierra Leone” (Clare Short, interview, 2008, 
London), the UK eventually intervened militarily and went on to take a leading role in the 
state-building process that followed. Thus, the UK Government became part of a process 
that fundamentally altered how and by what means the stakes in the justice and security 
field were being fought over.  
                                            
62 The arms shipment had been sanctioned, in part, by the then British High Commissioner, Peter Penfold. 
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The next section provides detail on what the failure of the state of Sierra Leone looked like 
on the ground to some of the key external advisors who arrived in Sierra Leone to take part 
in the state-building efforts. Subsequently, I explore in some detail about what state-
building and re-composition of the justice and security field entailed, including not only an 
overhaul of the armed forces and establishment of an effective police force, but also a 
military operation and jailing of perceived war criminals.  
 
5.4 The chaos of the hybrid order 
It is difficult to articulate an order of hybridity that is forced upon you. It is a challenge to 
capture the logic in what appears to be a fundamentally disorganized justice and security 
field, when habits and dispositions to act in certain ways and schemes of perception are 
ordered according to and articulated in languages of stateness. Mike Dent, a retired UK 
Colonel, who arrived in Freetown in June 1999 as a member of a two-man advisory team 
to the Sierra Leone government’s newly-established Ministry of Defense, did not see any 
order in the failure of the state, only illegitimate, makeshift expressions of authority.  
Dent vividly described what he observed upon entering Sierra Leone. “You will 
appreciate,” he once wrote in an email, “that the situation when we arrived in Freetown in 
June 1999 was ‘fluid’ and close to anarchic, with little or no effective police force, a 
myriad of different armed groups ‘policing’ the city, [and] with ECOMOG63 providing 
security” (Mike Dent, email, 2008). He described the reality he had entered: 
We found Freetown in complete disarray and still in a state of virtual war. The 
functions of state had practically collapsed with ministries in confusion and 
officials lacking clear aims and direction. Most businesses and government offices 
had been looted and vandalized during the January 1999 AFRC/RUF [rebel] attack 
and had not been repaired and much of the city’s infrastructure had been destroyed 
                                            
63 It was the civil war in neighboring Liberia that prompted the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS), a 16-nation group formed in 1975, to set up an armed Monitoring Group – ECOMOG – in 
1990. A non-standing military force, ECOMOG was composed of soldiers from the national armies of 
member states. In practice, Nigeria contributed most troops, material and financial backing. ECOMOG was 
deployed to Sierra Leone after President Kabbah was overthrown in the second military coup in 1997; it re-
instated him in 1998. 
 125 
or badly damaged. We were taken by car to the Ministry of Defence in Freetown to 
meet the Deputy Minister of Defence. On the journey from our accommodation, we 
passed through seven checkpoints manned by various groups of armed persons. 
From their dress it was difficult to ascertain if they were military, civilian, police or 
all three! The rule of law and order appeared to have broken down completely 
(Mike Dent, notes, 2008).  
An order articulated by any standards other than stateness was not available to Dent. The 
symbolic appellation of stateness through law and legal discourse had vanished, and 
permanent signs and symbols such as buildings and uniformed personnel did not clearly 
express the stateness of the state. In the midst of conflict, the core language of governance, 
centering around territorial sovereignty and security forces, had morphed into indistinct 
assemblages. Dent continued: 
There was no water, electricity or other public services operating in the city. There 
were also large numbers of armed military, SLA [Sierra Leone Army] and 
ECOMOG, paramilitary Special Security Division (SSD) Police, civilians and CDF 
[Civil Defence Force], 64  roaming the city, occupying buildings, manning 
checkpoints throughout the town using threats of violence to extort money from the 
populace to permit free-passage. The SLP force was totally ineffective, untrusted 
(sic) and seemingly corrupt at every level. The SLA was commanded and 
controlled by Nigerian officers, who, it was alleged, were misappropriating cash, 
supplies and equipment for their own personal gain. There were no communication 
links to towns outside Freetown other than via radio and satellite telephone and no 
safe road access to other parts of the country beyond Masiaka (Mike Dent, notes, 
2008). 
From Dent’s perspective, from the perspective of someone who had come to lead a state-
building process, this was what failure looked like. 
 
                                            
64 The CDF was a group of local militias comprised of Kamajors, Donsos, Gbethis, Kapras, Tamaboros and 
from the Freetown peninsula, the Organized Body of Hunting Societies that used methods similar to the RUF 
to fight fire with fire. 
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5.4.1 The order of hybrid chaos 
In the context of the war, a fundamental overhaul of the distribution of power within the 
justice and security field had occurred. This did not mean that an order did not exist, but 
the order that Dent observed was the rule of anarchy. In Freetown, civilians organized 
neighborhood security organizations street-by-street, so-called Civil Defense Units (CDU), 
as explained by Papa Ali, who lived in Freetown during the war, and had come to mine in 
Peyima in the 2000s where I met him. Having been a CDU commander, Ali explained that 
this system of self-protection had been organized out of sheer necessity: “Just to defend 
our area and properties because the rebels, when they drove the rebels out of the city [in 
1999], they come and do some game, thief, and other things” (Papa Ali, interview, 
February 2009).  
While Dent saw hybridity as chaos represented by consecutive checkpoints manned by 
unidentifiable security actors, Papa Ali was engaged in establishing localized spaces of 
order. This order however, was not articulated in languages of stateness, but in a kind of 
public authority in which Dent was dyslexic. “So the soldier joined the rebels,” Papa Ali 
explained, “so we stole the security. You are a civilian; the army is there to secure the 
civilians, to secure the state. But if the army turns against the state, who is to be security?” 
To Papa Ali, security – and insecurity – was something tangible to be produced, and if he 
did not produce it himself, somebody else would, and perhaps use it against him. 
Keith Biddle, who in 1999 was head of UK-funded police programs in Sierra Leone and 
who would go on to become a central figure in re-establishing institutions to articulate an 
order of stateness as Inspector General of Police, regarded the CDUs as “extortion 
checkpoints.” The absence of what Biddle considered functioning state institutions led 
civilians to take the law into their own hands. Physical brutality was indeed reported at the 
checkpoints, as it was across the country, where forces wearing uniforms tying them to the 
state system and idea were in charge (Biddle, interview, June 2009).  
People – and guns – could and did move freely into Freetown; in fact, the checkpoints were 
so porous that they were said to facilitate the particularly brutal attacks on the city that 
occurred in 1999-2000. Kellie Conteh, who became National Security Coordinator after the 
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war had ended, explained this from his perspective as a young Colonel in the army in the 
mid-1990s: 
It came out clearly that we should begin to try and protect our towns by having task 
forces. They should be paying attention to attacks coming in and the size of the 
attack, the approach it is taking, and the kind of weapons they’re having. I prepared 
something like that for Freetown. I wrote a memo to the force commander to say 
through all my visitations upcountry I am concerned that Freetown, especially with 
the perennial darkness in Freetown [due to lack of electricity], we don’t seem to 
have any unit in place to counter attacks. I was even thinking of rebel attack in 
Freetown. You saw it everywhere they’ll just spring up and boom! You would hear 
they’ve attacked Bo, boom! You’ll hear they’ve attacked Kenema, boom! They’ve 
attacked another place.  
When I come back from the provinces in the night you find these big trucks coming 
into the Freetown dark. The police at the checkpoints are playing the same old 
game. They’ll just take from the driver whatever they can get and let him go (Kellie 
Conteh, interview, 2008). 
Conteh, a man whose authority was generated by his being an army officer, articulated 
what Dent observed: namely the inability of those individuals claiming to represent ‘the 
state’ to act accordingly. The order established in the dis-articulation of the ‘languages of 
stateness’ was recognized by external advisors as chaos, rather than as the articulation of 
the type of public authority that emerged in the absence of permanent and visible military 
and police forces. 
Biddle, Dent and Conteh all expressed what Andersen (2011:39) generally refers to as the 
“policy logic” of state failure: the state system within the internationally-defined territory 
of Sierra Leone had ceased to fulfill its functions, its institutions had collapsed. Sierra 
Leone had descended into chaos and anarchy. The aim of the external actors that came to 
Sierra Leone in support of President Kabbah and his government became one of detecting, 
isolating and working upon the armed forces, the police and intelligence services – all state 
organizations operating in the justice and security field.  
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However, re-composing the justice and security field was not only a matter of instituting a 
number of programs under the label of SSR. It also became a process of marginalizing, 
ignoring or eliminating the variety of hybrid organizational forms that were either 
criminalized or did not fit easily in the category of ‘state institutions and actors’.  
 
5.5 Attempts to purge hybridity from the justice and security field 
5.5.1 The power of the state idea 
Dent expressed in the languages of stateness what the breakdown of the patrimonially 
networked governed space of Sierra Leone had become. Sets of institutions that 
demonstrated stateness in the justice and security field – articulated in visible forms of 
clearly identifiable enforcement – had fragmented. Accordingly, the messy distribution of 
capital within the justice and security field had generated a plethora of security-enforcing 
organizations with a multiplicity of effects. Each of them constituted separately-organized 
assemblages, drawing authority from numerous sources and spaces, including individual 
streets in Freetown (CDUs) and global political arenas (UN). From de-centered positions 
of power, a number of actors were thus seeking to lay claim to the legitimate use of force, 
but were not in in a position to monopolize it. 
Even as the ‘functions of state’, i.e., the state system, had apparently collapsed, however, 
as Dent observed, these were the institutions that continued to be a core stake at stake and a 
vital source of symbolic and economic capital to be fought over. For instance, actors who 
built armies of local militias and hunters organized around secret society membership and 
village safety outside Freetown were simultaneously laying claim to ministerial positions 
within Government. As an all-important political idea to be fought over, the centrally-
governed state thus continued to manifest itself ideationally. However, a collapse in its 
systemic functions did not mean that the hybrid political formations that had come into 
existence were, or could be, under consideration as appropriate alternatives.  
On the contrary, drawing upon the authority of an explicitly hybrid order was considered 
incompatible with the concept of a centrally-governed political entity. It expressed an 
intolerable breakdown of order. Thus, purging the justice and security field through the 
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criminalization and elimination of hybridity became an important element of the state-
building effort. A state was to be built upon the rubble of the collapsed state; the languages 
of stateness were to mute the plurality of languages of authority that were being articulated. 
As an important part of detecting, isolating and working upon the state system, a number of 
hybrid actors considered criminals by external actors needed to be purged from the justice 
and security field. 
5.5.2 Hybridity personified: Norman, Sankoh and Koroma 
During the conflict of the 1990s, figures of power derived authority from sitting in 
government while also heading personalized security apparatuses. One of the central 
figures embodying that order was Samuel Hinga Norman, who led the mobilization and 
organization of the Civil Defence Force (CDF) on the national level. The CDF was widely 
perceived, most notably by the Sierra Leone Army, to be the SLPP government’s de facto 
security force. The CDF, “Norman’s militia” as Biddle called them, consisted of kamajors, 
a Mende term for traditional hunters (Keen 2005:90).  
Keen (2005:90) notes that the “failings of government troops meant that civilians 
increasingly looked to their own devices for protection – and specifically to civil defence 
units.”65 The term kamajors was soon applied to civil defense groups across the country, a 
collective term for the Kapras and Gbetes among the Temne, the Donsos of Kono District 
and the Tamaboras of Koinadugu District and so forth (Keen 2005:90; Hoffman 2007:642).  
Norman constituted the hybrid order brought to perfection, explicitly articulating stateness 
and public authority simultaneously. As the Regent Chief of Jiama-Bongor Chiefdom, he 
had built his power base as a key figure in the kamajor movement and was appointed 
SLPP’s Deputy Minister of Defence from 1998-2002, and subsequently Minister of 
Interior from 2002-2004 (Fanthorpe 2001:365; Hoffman 2007:642). Many stories 
                                            
65 Keen (2005:90) further explains: “As hunters, Sierra Leone’s kamajors were licensed to carry guns and 
knew the terrain near their home villages. Traditionally, kamajors had to be at least 30 years old, but as the 
war progressed, the term ‘kamajor’ was soon being used to describe more broadly-based civil defence 
organisations which included many younger people and relatively few professional hunters.” The original 
kamajors were recognized for their ability to enter the forest and confront natural and supernatural beings, 
including dangerous animals like elephants, leopards and chimpanzees (Leach 1992:40-42). Kamajor rituals 
have tended to emphasize discipline, loyalty and self-sacrifice – qualities seen as lacking in the rebels and the 
army (Fithen 1999:196). 
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circulated about the infighting between the kamajors (and other irregular forces) and the 
army, incited by events such as the military overthrow of the SLPP in May 1997. Norman, 
however, was appointed to manage both the kamajors and the armed forces. 
RUF leader Foday Sankoh, who was backed by Liberian President Charles Taylor, was not 
only pardoned of a treason conviction under the 1999 Lomé Peace Agreement, he was 
granted the status of Vice-President and given the coveted chairmanship of a Commission 
of Strategic Resources. At the same time, also after Lomé had been signed, the RUF 
behaved and considered themselves as the only legitimate governing body in the areas 
under their military control. (The particular way that the RUF was organized behind the 
frontline has been analyzed in great detail by Peters (2006)).  
In collaboration with Sankoh and the RUF, Johnny Paul Koroma led the AFRC coup 
against the democratically elected SLPP government in 1997. While the AFRC was 
‘kicked out’ of Freetown in 1998, as Peter Penfold noted (interview, March 2008), they, 
together with the RUF, invaded Freetown for the first time during the civil war in January 
1999. After Lomé, Koroma was still at large, and eventually fled the country. 
This list of actors is not exhaustive – it does not describe all the central actors in the war 
and their subsequent positions in the security and justice field. But these men, who were all 
indicted in 2003 by the Special Court, set up to try war criminals in Sierra Leone, are 
central to my discussion of hybrid orders. As Biddle noted, all three “were around. Don’t 
forget they were legitimate after Lomé” (Keith Biddle, interview, 2009, France). 
Thus, a peace agreement signed by Sankoh of the RUF and Sierra Leone President Kabbah 
in the capital of Togo on 7 July 1999 was inadvertently constitutive of an attempt to re-
establish the state-society split and to articulate figures such as Sankoh of the RUF in 
‘languages of stateness’. Through the authority that a peace agreement constitutes, the 
rebel leader was transformed into a legitimate, governing actor that projected stateness. 
Sankoh’s access to the state, however, rather than constituting ‘statification’ of the RUF, 
led to a process of consolidation and the deepening of the very hybridization that Lomé had 
sought to eradicate. 
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While Sankoh was now Vice-President of post-Lomé Sierra Leone and in control of the 
ministry running the diamond industry, he did not speak or act according to expectations. 
Eventually, the hybrid construction that Lomé had realized and consolidated fell apart and 
led to the UK military intervention in 2000. Only by military means did a purge of the 
justice and security field of hybridity seem possible to outside observers. Indeed, only after 
the UK intervened militarily was the stateness of the state buttressed to the degree where it 
appeared to gain ground, both in legitimacy and certainly in the capacity to fight a war 
against the RUF. 
In the late 1990s, however, the explicit (and to outsiders, intolerable) hybrid order 
articulated by actors such as Norman/CDF, Sankoh/RUF and Koroma/AFRC remained. 
Constitutive of the justice and security field, these three figures did not stand alone. 
ECOMOG was an active security organization at the time and intended to be a regional 
peacekeeping force. Primarily Nigerian in its composition, ECOMOG was seen as serving 
both the self-interest of its individual soldiers (who were allegedly involved in trading 
diamonds) and the wishes and policies of the Nigerian Government.  
All of the armed groups “were running checkpoints and taking money off people”, Biddle 
recalls, “including the ECOMOG soldiers” (Keith Biddle, interview June 2009). In short, 
as one internal UK assessment noted in the late 1990s: “The armed forces have virtually 
ceased to exist.” Indeed, it was suggested that “the power held by the CDF extends in 
effect to a virtual monopoly of force in rural areas, which would be unchallenged if the 
ECOMOG force were to withdraw” (UK Government 1999). Norman, Sankoh and 
Koroma all claimed a significant share of the monopoly over the use of force, drawing on 
numerous sources of authority to make this claim. Indeed, the ‘war state’ that Sierra Leone 
had effectively become by the end of the 1990s was very much defined by these figures, 
certainly not by Kabbah, the democratically elected leader of the state, who was in exile in 
Conakry, Guinea, until 1998. With the support of the UK, however, this was about to 
change. 
By this time, re-composing the justice and security field through state-building became 
about purging it of the kind of hybridity represented by these men. State-building standards 
required that no hybrid authority would be included in the centrally-governed set of 
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institutions that would constitute the justice and security field. The UK would only act in 
the name of such a state.  
When Biddle became the Inspector-General of Police in Sierra Leone in November 1999, 
he was personally involved in coordinating the arrests of Norman, Sankoh and Koroma 
(the latter of whom escaped and was never found). In essence, these arrests continued the 
process of re-composing the hybrid order and re-establishing symbolic and physical space 
as the monopoly of state institutions. Thus, a state system was to be put in place that could 
determine the enforcement of security through the legitimate and capable use of ‘languages 
of stateness’.  
Clare Short articulated the sentiment that hybridity was equal to collapse, anarchy and 
chaos: “We could not – we, being the British – could not let this fragile, but 
democratically-elected Government collapse. Now, I don’t think there was much theory 
behind that” (Clare Short, interview, June 2008). There was, of course, nothing but theory 
of stateness inherent in how UK actors perceived and acted upon what they experienced in 
Sierra Leone. For Short and other external actors, state-building was their conceptual 
articulation of relatively stable orientations and ways of acting. State-building might have 
appeared ‘un-theoretical’, but it carried with it a strong epistemological outlook on the 
world, what order looks like and by whom and what it is constituted. 
And so, it is doubtful if the UK and other external actors, arriving in Sierra Leone where 
conflict determined the distribution of capital in the justice and security field, could have 
articulated what they observed as anything but chaotic, a state of emergency, illegitimate. 
Indeed, these actors coming in would have had to wage a war with their own 
epistemologies to accept the hybrid order as legitimate and work with it. Moreover, such 
an approach would preclude the possibility of establishing a coherent system of regulation, 
accountability and democratic governance articulated through ‘languages of stateness’. 
In early 2000, the opportunity for a military intervention arose for the UK. While the Lomé 
Peace Agreement might have been a milestone in the attempt to make peace in Sierra 
Leone, the fundamentally hybrid nature of the governing structures, encompassing RUF 
and AFRC on the one hand and the Kabbah Government on the other, was evident. 
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Attempts to re-articulate the RUF and the AFRC in languages of stateness had failed. 
The turning point, and one of the terminal blows to stability, came in early 2000, when 
people marched to Sankoh’s house to protest RUF activities and approximately 20 
demonstrators were shot by RUF supporters. The SLP, led by Biddle at the time, captured 
Sankoh; he was subsequently handed over to Government Forces and together with several 
senior RUF commanders taken into custody. The RUF were expelled from Government, 
which led to a stalemate. It was in this context that the UK intervened militarily. 
 
5.6 Operation Palliser – the groundwork of a hybrid army 
Operation Palliser was the UK’s attempt to re-compose the justice and security field by 
military means. The following overview of the military intervention is provided from the 
perspective of the head of the mission, then Colonel – and now General – David Richards. 
This narrative demonstrates not only the coincidental nature of the intervention, but also 
that a hybrid order constituted by numerous forces lay at its very base, and thus was the 
point of departure of state-building. It could not be any different. And yet, simultaneously, 
it is evident that the intervention occurred in the name and on behalf of the state. 
In early May 2000, the RUF was on the offensive. ECOMOG, the Nigerian-dominated 
regional force, had left Sierra Leone a few weeks earlier, and UN forces were under 
considerable pressure with hundreds of peacekeepers detained by the RUF. Richards 
recalls: 
The SLA was very weak, having mostly disarmed and begun disbandment under the 
terms of the Lomé Peace Accord. As the situation deteriorated, I found myself bound 
for SL within 24 hours, on orders to find out what was happening and to prepare to 
conduct a NEO [non-combatant evacuation operation] should it be necessary (David 
Richards, original not dated). 
However, what started as a NEO developed into a small- to medium-sized war operation. 
These developments were not directed by London. In fact, the order had been to conduct an 
NEO, and to then ‘get out’. It was individuals on the ground who transformed the rules of 
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engagement, and gained support from political leaders back in London, “cutting out all the 
layers in between,” as Richards put it (David Richards, interview, 2008). 
UK forces coordinated and sustained the efforts of the disparate groupings of Sierra 
Leoneans loyal to the state, because neither the Government of Sierra Leone nor 
UNAMSIL were able to. This group of Government Forces included the Sierra Leone 
Army and what came to be known as the ‘Unholy Alliance’, which began to form after the 
arrival of Richards in May 2000.  
This had initially been in response to a call to arms by Johnny Paul Koroma, who led the 
remnants of the AFRC. Scaled down and disarmed under the Lomé Accord, the SLA 
numbered 2-3,000 personnel with a further 3,000 being trained at the time by a UK Short 
Term Training Team. The ‘Unholy Alliance’ consisted of a loose coalition of SLA, ex-
SLA, AFRC and CDF combatants, but also elements of the West Side Boys (a splinter 
faction of the AFRC). Together, these different force units were directed by a Committee 
chaired by British Officers. Richards continued: 
Unholy they may have been but, guided as they were at every level by British 
officers over the next few weeks, they succeeded in securing much of the inland road 
route between Freetown and Lungi, relieving the military and, of course, putting 
political pressure on Freetown and its beleaguered government. This at first ad hoc 
twin track operation, support to the UN on the one hand and assistance to the 
Government and its loyal armed groupings on the other, rapidly supplanted the NEO 
and soon became official HMG [Her Majesty’s Government] strategy (Richards, 
original not dated). 
The UK’s intervention acted as the catalyst for a ceasefire, officially brokered on 10 
November 2000 and signed in Abuja. By January 2002, the war was declared officially 
over. State House on Tower Hill was yet again to symbolize the state idea, make rules, 
exercise control over territory and people and plan and implement official goals. 
Significantly, however, the military force initially constructed and worked on to fight the 
enemy, the RUF, the so-called ‘Unholy Alliance’, was itself a security assemblage 
constituted by numerous, inter-related force elements. Hybridity was thus embedded in the 
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very foundation of re-composing the justice and security field through military force. But it 
was, of course, the ‘stateness of the state’ that was focused and worked upon in the 
process, and the reason why an external actor such as the UK considered intervening in the 
first place.  
In the process of ‘statification’, the ordering effects of hybrids may not have been 
eliminated altogether. However, SSR as state-building, as it took place, certainly appeared 
to be a purposeful attempt to do exactly that, even if it was not necessarily successful. This 
was not so much because some actors and not others were actively marginalized; but rather 
the consequence of how support was targeted at those institutions symbolically 
demonstrating stateness, including the armed forces, the police and intelligence services. 
 
5.7 SSR as state-building: embedding hybrid reproduction 
SSR as state-building came to mean the long-term continuation of the processes that I have 
described so far, namely a re-composition of the justice and security field in such a way 
that would project the imagery of order to external observers, as made by a centrally-
governed political entity. The UK was integrally linked to and part of the driving force 
behind these processes, providing financial support and technical expertise. Elsewhere, 
comprehensive analyses have discussed what SSR in Sierra Leone entailed and described 
its different elements (e.g. Jackson and Albrecht 2008; Albrecht and Jackson 2009; 
Albrecht and Jackson 2010; Jackson and Albrecht 2011; Albrecht and Jackson 2012). The 
following is a summary of some of the elements of this process.  
As state-building, the three main components of SSR included attempts to build a Ministry 
of Defence and an army, an Office of National Security and an intelligence branch and a 
police force. The initial focus was on containing and overhauling the armed forces, which 
had staged two coups in 1992 and 1997. President Kabbah considered disbanding the army 
altogether, and in fact did so for a short while in 1999 (Albrecht and Jackson 2009:23). An 
army was founded, however, which, as a continuation of the ‘Unholy Alliance’, became a 
security assemblage of numerous, inter-related force elements.  
The planned military re-integration program assumed that 3000 fighters from the RUF, 
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CDF and AFRC would enter the post-war army. Thus, the foundation of a hybrid army, as 
it were, was established at the onset of SSR. A total of 2,091 former fighters from different 
factions ended up being absorbed by the state-sanctioned army of 12,000 personnel that 
was being built (Albrecht and Jackson 2009:64). 
After July 1999, military support was provided by the International Military Assistance 
Training Team (IMATT), paid for by the UK and dominated by UK personnel. In addition 
to setting up training facilities, IMATT started a comprehensive military training scheme 
and mentored RSLAF members located in the newly-established Ministry of Defence. 
Support to the Ministry of Defence was prioritized as an exercise of institution-building in 
an attempt to concentrate control and management of Sierra Leone’s security in an 
organization tied into the state system. 
Establishing the ability to make order and in order to move beyond war-fighting was 
prioritized through establishment of the SLP. As early as 1996, President Kabbah had 
requested support from the UK to resurrect the central government’s ability to make order 
within the borders of the country (Albrecht 2009:4; 2010:17). This exercise became known 
as Operation Phoenix, and was approached on the assumption that the SLP was recovering 
from crisis. It would now have to “reclaim its rightful primacy in the maintenance of public 
tranquility and law enforcement [...]. There is a need for visible targeted policing to be 
introduced on a twenty-four hour basis every day of the year” (CPDTF 1999). 
Finally, SSR as state building included establishing the Office of National Security (ONS), 
which was another organization that could project languages of stateness. Headed by a 
National Security Coordinator, it was established under pressure from a number of external 
advisers to ensure that advice intended for the President was properly coordinated and 
assessed. As such, the ONS became a prime example of the vision of separating 
organizations that collect from those that assess intelligence, and of creating an 
organization aimed at establishing an autonomous space of operation for the state.  
Establishing the ONS was an attempt to vest one organization with the authority to force a 
process of differentiation and concomitant subordination of alternative actors, including 
figures such as Norman and Koroma, and also paramount and lesser chiefs. Establishing 
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the ONS also constituted an attempt to ensure that activities within the justice and security 
field were properly overseen and that the different security actors involved were properly 
coordinated in the face of crisis. 
These re-composition efforts of took place initially in a context where neither Sierra 
Leonean officials nor international donors and advisers were clear on what SSR would 
entail. According to one definition circulating in Sierra Leone in the late 1990s, SSR would 
deal with security and defense management, specifically institutions such as the ONS.66 An 
alternative definition discussed at the time included the intelligence services (Albrecht and 
Jackson 2009:26-27). It was thus unclear which institutions to include and articulate 
through activities that were given the SSR label, and more importantly, how they were to 
morph into effective and legitimate organizations that would project and could be 
articulated in languages of stateness.  
While these discussions reflected contemporary international debates on SSR, they 
fundamentally ignored how authority was distributed in Sierra Leone, neglecting the fact 
that figures of authority such as the chiefs had quickly resumed their positions in the rural 
areas of the country after the war ended. In no documentation, regardless of the state of the 
police, was the appropriateness of what was referred to as ‘SLP primacy’ questioned - not 
by international experts and not by Kabbah. This was the case even though in 1998, police 
headquarters were able to communicate with only three of the 38 police stations outside 
Freetown before the war and 8 vehicles were in use for a police force of an estimated 9,000 
personnel.  
In sum, SSR involved an attempt to project the image of a state standing above, while at 
the same time encompassing, controlling and regulating society. Yet, as the next chapters 
demonstrate, the SSR process reproduced the foundational hybrid order that has 
historically been part of how authority has been constituted in Sierra Leone. 
 
                                            
66 The ONS, located in the Office of the President, is the Secretariat of the National Security Council, 
providing advice and guidance on security matters to the Head of State. ONS was a response to what one 
observer plainly noted in September 1999: “Sierra Leone does not have a Security or Intelligence Service. 
Responsibility for security (counter-espionage, counter-terrorism and counter-subversion) and public order 
rests with the Special Branch (SB) of the Sierra Leone Police Service” (see UK Government 1999). 
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5.8 Conclusion 
Re-composing a chaotic and anarchic security and justice field in Sierra Leone in the 
image of a centrally-governed political entity was attempted by military means, by seeking 
to eradicate hybrids that occupied central positions of authority and by initiating a set of 
programs under the label of SSR. However, purging the justice and security field of 
hybridity so as to constitute a clean justice and security field in which to articulate 
languages of stateness was never a realistic outcome. Criminalizing and removing figure 
heads such as Norman and Sankoh might have been a way of decapitating hybrid 
organizations, but ultimately it did not remove the hybrid order that they personified. 
SSR as state-building constituting a reorganization of the justice and security field was 
seamlessly inter-twined with the criminalization of certain actors and intervening 
militarily. The institutions and practices commonly tied to the state as an idea and as a 
system had collapsed or withered away. This was the case to a degree where fragmentation 
had left the justice and security field open for numerous actors to engage in a fight over the 
stake at stake, i.e., to control the territory of the country and its resources.  
Certainly, in Sierra Leone, the double pull of capital concentration on the one hand, and a 
parallel process of differentiation on the other, which would lead to the establishment of 
separate juridical, legislative and other fields, did not take place. However, this process of 
‘statification’ was precisely what was supported habitually by the UK: state-building as the 
incorporation of ‘languages of stateness’ into and re-configuration of the justice and 
security field. Accordingly, the building of organizations began that could figure as centers 
of capital concentration and allocation of roles and responsibilities among clearly defined 
symbolic and physical spaces, e.g., internal and external security, information collection 
and assessment, the Office of National Security, the armed forces and the police. When the 
correct organization did not exist, it was created, which was the case with respect to the 
Office of National Security, for instance.  
After January 2002, when conflict was officially declared over, SSR activities began to be 
established across the country. Yet, despite the insistence on the part of SSR policy-makers 
that the state-to-be-built would express only languages of stateness, a hybrid order was 
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reproduced. The following chapter analyzes how hybridity was produced in the long-term 
through state formation processes in Sierra Leone on the national level and in Peyima in 
Kono District on the local level. 
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6 The making of hybridity: the history of chiefs in Sierra Leone 
6.1 Introduction 
So far, this thesis has pursued two objectives. First, it has explored how the global policy 
debate on SSR developed in support of state-building and how it is articulated in languages 
of stateness. It has also analysed how re-composing the justice and security field in Sierra 
Leone attempted to eradicate hybrid organizational formations and actors. In this chapter, I 
argue that hybrid orders that simultaneously articulate languages of stateness and public 
authority are integral to and lie at the very base of state formation in Sierra Leone. Thus, it 
was inevitable that SSR as state-building would reproduce rather than fundamentally alter 
the order of hybrid organizational forms embodied by paramount and lesser chiefs in Sierra 
Leone. 
The conflict in Sierra Leone during the 1990s fortified the breakdown of the country’s 
patrimonially networked governed space. Assemblages formed within the justice and 
security field that were represented as chaotic and anarchic by external actors. These 
assemblages were the result of a state that had collapsed as a system, if not as an idea. The 
state, certainly as perceived by external observers, lacked both capacity and legitimacy. 
War leaders such as Koroma, Norman and Sankoh were arrested and jailed as criminals in 
the late 1990s and early 2000s, but the hybrid order that these men were constitutive of and 
emerging from could not simply be eradicated. 
While ‘war’ and ‘hybridity’ might be mutually reinforcing, hybridity is not a function of 
war. Statutory techniques and practices of the colonial and post-colonial state in Sierra 
Leone were always already not so much challenged by as integrated with alternative logics, 
sets of knowledges, practices and forms of power that cannot be articulated solely through 
languages of stateness. Therefore, how vertical encompassment takes place must be 
explored within an analytical framework that is inclusive of the kinds of actors, processes 
and practices that constitute hybridity in the justice and security field.67 
                                            
67 Buur and Kyed (2007:xii) argue that “recognition of traditional authority” should not be seen as resulting 
from state fragility or failure. They should at least be seen in equal measure as the product of “contemporary 
global discourses on cultural diversity, pluralism, democracy, and community participation.” As such, these 
processes fit democratic transitions, including SSR processes in sub-Saharan Africa. For the purpose of this 
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This chapter explores how hybrid orders of authority developed in Sierra Leone and the 
role that paramount and lesser chiefs, in particular have played in the country’s colonial 
and post-colonial eras. Understanding how assemblages of actors, discourses and things 
take shape in the security and justice field is inter-twined with colonial and post-colonial 
state formation and the hybrid articulation of various languages of authority. In Sierra 
Leone, this process of hybridification was shaped around the colonial policy of indirect 
rule, a rule that refracted, in part, through traditional authorities and came to resemble what 
Mamdani (1996) refers to as ‘decentralized despotism’ (Keen 2005:10; Ferme 2004:85).68 
Even though the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) targeted them as figures of authority, 
chiefs returned to the localities from where they originated after the war ended in 2002, 
and continue to hold a crucial governing role in rural Sierra Leone to this day. The chapter 
explains why this was possible by exploring how Sierra Leone as a hybridly-governed state 
space came into being and how a hybrid order continues to constitute how authority is 
distributed locally in the township of Peyima. 
The chapter concludes by outlining what I refer to as ‘foundational hybridity’. It is the 
ability of chiefs to draw authority from a multitude of sources, both statutory and locally 
embedded that fuelled violence across Sierra Leone during the 1990s. At the same time, it 
was the foundational hybrid order that enabled chiefs to recapture their central role of 
authority after the war ended in the early 2000s. 
 
6.2 Indirect rule = warriors   paramount chiefs  
A turbulent late 19th and early 20th century in the Kono District saw local warriors, also 
referred to as warlords in Peyima during my fieldwork, who fought over trade routes, 
                                                                                                                                             
thesis, however, the central role of paramount and lesser chiefs is not so much that they are an instrument of 
the state, but that they are constitutive of the political entity of Sierra Leone, and therefore inseparable from 
‘the state’.  
68 According to Mamdani (1996), “conservative regimes” – a category that includes Sierra Leone – preserved 
the rule of the chief and customary authority over ethnically-delineated realms. In these cases, the 
authoritarian nature of state power persisted because rule continued to be based on the customary and 
despotic power of the chief. Mamdani refers to the resulting post-independence constellation as 
“decentralized despotism.” 
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control of land and the accumulation of dependent populations of clients and slaves.69 The 
power of pre-colonial authorities in rural Sierra Leone was predicated on a mix of 
biological legitimacy, patrimonial largesse and military strength. In turn, popular 
allegiance was tempered by tensions between ruling and non-ruling houses of powerful 
lineages, between free men and slaves and between the potential advantages of ‘going it 
alone’ and forming alliances with rival strongmen (Abraham 1978; Kup 1962).70 
The epitome of a powerful Kono man was a successful warrior, a man capable of 
controlling people and resources and of clearing space and establishing new settlements. 
Such men achieved their positions of power and leadership by manipulating patron-client 
relationships, often along kinship lines, in which clients exchanged allegiance for resources 
and privileges (Hardin 1993:45). These warrior chiefs became integral to the colonial 
policy of indirect rule and are thus vital in understanding the foundation from which 
contemporary hybridity of paramount and lesser chiefs has emerged. 
During the 19th century, warrior chiefs were furnished with the opportunity to re-invent 
themselves as a chiefly land-owning class and to maintain hegemony over the descendants 
of their former slaves and subordinates through tributary demands, agricultural corveés, 
polygyny and other ‘customary’ claims upon their labor and resources. In short, the type of 
authority that in the early 1990s made them a target of the RUF, lies at the heart of how 
state formation evolved in Sierra Leone. The British, like other empires, relied heavily, 
indeed primarily, on these chiefly forces that were neither ‘national’ nor ‘public’ but 
nonetheless central to the wielding of force and the maintenance of imperial authority (see 
Abrahamsen and Williams 2011:11). As such, the Freetown-based administration pursued 
                                            
69 The significance of the warrior has survived to this day, and was explained to me during my fieldwork in 
the village of Peyima as hierarchically above and separate from the chiefs. He is tied to the strength of ‘black 
magic’, which during the conflict in the 1990s was used as a defense against bullets. One informant in 
Peyima explained: “The Kamajors, how they got the power from the descendants of the warriors before, they 
left some medicine, some black magic that stayed for quite a long time and they used it on people to wash 
them. We have some laws that guide you. You should follow a female. You should not rape. You should not 
eat some types of food. If you do that, you’ve spoilt the medicine, the black magic. But if you keep to the 
rules, you will be protected from gun, knife, whatever instrument. You’ll be protected from that” (Taylor 
Kondeh, interview, February 2009). 
70 Relatively little is known about the early history of Sierra Leone. According to Opala (1996) its early 
history can best be understood in terms of waves of in-migration. Before the Portuguese ‘discovered’ Sierra 
Leone in 1462, the indigenous people on the coast of Sierra Leone already had important trade links with the 
inland people, and through them with the peoples of early empires of the Western Sudan, Ghana and Mali 
(Buah 1986). 
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stability in order to minimize the risk of disorder that could bring unpleasant enquiries 
from the Colonial Office back in London. 
Minimal efforts were made to establish bureaucratic practices outside Freetown and the 
Western Area. The colonists did not attempt to build a democratic political culture or a 
central political entity through the expropriation of alternative deliberative assemblies.71 It 
was colonialism-on-the-cheap and in this regard, Sierra Leone was not an exception to 
British practices elsewhere in Africa. Between 1896 and 1921, Sierra Leone’s population 
of 1.2 million people was governed by only five District Commissioners and one circuit 
court (Kilson 1966:25).72 Throughout the 19th century, paramount chiefs in rural Sierra 
Leone were managed by colonial officers; British administration was primarily confined to 
Freetown and its environs, known as the Colony, which governed rural Sierra Leone, 
known as the Protectorate (Sesay 1995:166; Hirsch 2001:23).73 
The development of indirect rule by the colonists was an attempt to identify and fixate 
interlocutors between colonial administrators and the population in the hinterland, in part 
to facilitate tax collection (Fanthorpe 1998:116; van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal 1996:42). 
The process led to the emergence of semi-autonomous administrative units, chieftaincies, 
which became and have remained the historic focus of the struggle for political control 
over Sierra Leone’s countryside (Tangri 1978; Allen 1968; see van Rouveroy van 
Nieuwaal 1996:42). 
                                            
71 Since, as Reno notes (1995:30), “the colony’s reputation as the “Whiteman’s Grave” did not enhance its 
attraction to able colonial officers,” Sierra Leone became a training ground for young civil servants. The risk 
of dying, and being “the dumping-ground for freed slaves,” the “Land of Freedom” (Hayward and Dumbuya 
1985:63), were the two best known characteristics of Sierra Leone in the early 20th century (Anwyl 1916:36; 
Hirsch 2001:23). 
72 According to Kilson (1966:24), in the 1920s, for example, the average British colony in Africa used one 
administrator to every three used in a French colony. In 1926, Nigeria had one British administrator for every 
100,000 persons in the Northern Province and one for every 70,000 in the Southern Province. 
73 In August 1895 an Order-in-Council was issued in Britain, authorizing the Colony to make laws for the 
territory around it, extending out to the agreed-upon boundary, which corresponds closely to that of present-
day Sierra Leone. On 3 August 1896, a Proclamation was issued in the Colony declaring that territory to be a 
British ‘Protectorate’. The Colony remained a distinct political entity and the Protectorate was governed from 
it. Most of the Chiefs whose territories the Protectorate subsumed did not enter into it voluntarily. Many had 
signed treaties of friendship with Britain, but these were expressed as between sovereign powers contracting 
with each other, i.e., chiefs were not subordinate to colonialists. Only a handful of Chiefs had signed treaties 
of cession and in remote areas no treaties had been obtained at all. Strictly speaking, a protectorate does not 
exist unless the people in it have agreed be protected. The Sierra Leone Protectorate was more in the nature 
of a unilateral acquisition of territory by Britain (Fyfe 1962:541). 
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6.2.1 The chiefdom and the consolidation of hybridity 
Even with their light administrative presence in Sierra Leone’s hinterland, the British were 
instrumental in making the chieftaincy a lifetime and inheritable position. They assisted in 
suppressing local rivals to incumbent chiefs, reduced the option of seceding from a 
chiefdom and prohibited withholding payments or compulsory labor from a chief. While 
Anwyl (1916:37) noted in the early 20th century that “the office of the paramount chief 
seems to be of recent origin,” their emergence is not explained by reference to colonial 
bureaucratic practices alone. They are also considered the product of “the wealthy status” 
of the person who became the chief, “a man who was rich enough to stop the contentions 
of opponents by gifts” (ibid.).  
There is little doubt, however, that chiefs consolidated their authority with British aid and 
through colonial bureaucratic means. However, they were not simply incorporated as an 
extension of colonial regimes, as is suggested by some authors, including Mamdani (1996) 
and Mbembe (2001). First, the metamorphosis of warriors into chiefs strengthened the role 
of chiefs by expanding the register of sources of authority that could be drawn upon. 
Indeed, as Keen (2005:10) notes of Sierra Leone in the 1930s, “Development programs 
were a threat to chiefs if they offered new choices and new sources of loans and 
patronage.” Chiefs made considerable efforts to capture such programs, and largely 
“undermined the capacity of Native Administrations to undertake modern social services 
for the local populace” (Kilson 1966:26). Establishment and recognition of the institution 
of the chief occurred in a manner that denied colonial rulers direct control over them; in 
turn, colonial rulers were never willing to pursue alternatives to the authority of chiefs, for 
instance by expanding the colonial administration.  
The hybridity of paramount and lesser chiefs thus stems from the assembling of different 
sources of authority. On the one hand, as Trotha (1995) argues, diversity that marked 
political orders across Africa was transformed and subsumed into a unifying administrative 
structure set up by the colonial rulers as part of state formation in the long-term. On the 
other hand, chiefs also drew authority first, from their autochthon status, and second, from 
their role as intermediaries against alien rulers, including colonial and post-colonial 
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imposition. 74  These different forms of authority assembled different logics, sets of 
knowledges, practices and forms of power to form hybrid orders that were embedded into 
the foundation of the political entity of Sierra Leone. 
The institutions of paramount and lesser chiefs fundamentally shaped how colonial 
administrators could exercise and extend British authority. The administrative and financial 
advantages that indirect rule afforded the colonial administration were offset, however, by 
the rather large claims that chiefs were permitted to make upon local resources. These 
claims were instituted at the foundation of the Sierra Leone Protectorate and were carried 
forward under the 1937 Native Administration Scheme established in the 1930s in the 
colony’s first concerted attempt at local government reform (Fanthorpe 2001:380). 
The main objective of the Scheme was to devolve the considerable economic and juridical 
powers formerly invested in paramount chiefs to a local assembly called the Tribal 
Authority (later called Chiefdom Council) directly represented and funded by local 
taxpayers. Yet, while the chiefs strongly criticized the scheme when it was introduced, 
little was done in practice to prevent paramount and lesser chiefs from continuing to collect 
payments for political and juridical services and appropriating tax revenue for private use.  
When separation of the Protectorate from the Colony was announced in 1898, British 
colonial authorities had granted chiefs a variety of financial incentives to participate in the 
administration of their subjects, including permission to accrue personal fees and fines 
from Native Courts. The approach of the Native Administration Scheme thus became an 
inherently contradictory one of seeking to fit administration through chiefs to new state-
sanctioned tasks, but without causing any significant diminution of chiefly authority 
(Kilson 1966:26-27). This approach is indicative of the entire colonial and post-colonial 
era, in which successive governments have continued to recognize the authority and central 
role of chiefdoms.75 Indeed, attempts to closely supervise the administration of chieftaincy 
                                            
74 This double role of chiefs is suggested by many, including Reno (1995:38), who notes that “chiefs became 
agents of colonial rule while exercising a parallel authority.” 
75 To date, while all adult citizens are entitled to vote in parliamentary elections, many rural people remain 
unknown to the state except as chiefdom taxpayers and their dependants. Accordingly, government officials 
must rely upon the chiefdom Councils to supply them with the information necessary to compile the electoral 
register. Parliamentary candidates are obliged to ally with local political factions in order to win votes. 
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waned in the late 1940s, which in turn contributed to and solidified their position of 
power.76  
 
6.3 Post-colonial Sierra Leone 
As was common in many British colonies in Africa, the transition in 1961 of Sierra Leone 
from a colony to an independent state was effectively an elite affair led by Sir Milton 
Margai of the Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP), the party that won the first general 
elections held in 1962 (Barrows 1976:98; Sesay 1995:167). The new Sierra Leonean rulers 
could have chosen the approach of post-colonial governments in other African countries, 
where traditional leaders were considered to be “repressive collaborators of the colonial 
masters” (Kyed and Buur 2007:1). This would have constituted an important break, at least 
symbolically, from the principles of indirect rule that were part and parcel of the 
emergence, preservation, and perceived corruption of the chiefdom.  
However, the newly independent state did not attempt to curtail the legal powers of chiefs 
in local governance. On the contrary, administration assembled in a way that increased the 
hybrid nature of the chiefs’ authority. They became part of political party formation 
processes, while simultaneously remaining the primary gatekeepers to external pressures 
on the locality over which they ruled. Indeed, in the first decade after independence, 
national politicians often found it necessary to involve themselves in factional rivalries at 
the chiefdom level in order to obtain electoral support. 
As the SLPP assumed power in post-colonial Sierra Leone, the party emerged as a mix of 
“chiefs and educated protectorate Africans”; the former played a crucial role in 
strengthening the party in the 1962 general elections (Hayward and Dumbuya 1985:64). 
Given the initial lack of independent organizational party structures, political parties relied 
on chieftaincies to solidify their power base throughout the country (Minikin 1973:130). 
Party policy in general sought to increase the power and wealth of chiefs, while seeking to 
                                            
76 The consequence of this was that leading chiefdom officers were in a position to pursue their own private 
or sectional goals rather than the broader public interest. However, insurrections in the countryside 
immediately after World War II and into the 1950s as well as the conflict of the 1990s were not about 
eliminating the existing establishment or the wholesale change of the structure of chiefdom authority (Hardin 
1993:76). 
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subordinate them nationally. This simultaneous – and contradictory – approach of 
subordination and fortification accounts to a large extent for the continued localism of 
politics in Sierra Leone (Allen 1968:306). 
Irrespective of which political party has held power at the center, a majority of party 
politicians who were elected to the new state’s central legislature were members of chiefly 
families. By 1967, when the All Peoples’ Congress (APC) came to power, the party was 
confronted with a relatively autonomous local political network of chiefs in the Kono 
District where 75% of the district’s parliamentarians claimed chiefly lineages (Reno 
1995:80). Siaka Stevens, the APC leader and President from 1968-1985, concluded that if 
interests of the state that fuelled his authority were not to bend before challenges from 
strong chiefly interests, he had to either banish or co-opt the chiefs in a drive to assert his 
position as a pre-eminent political force. He pursued the latter strategy by deepening 
patrimonial networks, which, rather than strengthening state power, consolidated the 
hybrid order and corroborated the role of paramount and lesser chiefs.  
The state of Sierra Leone did not materialize along the lines of a western universalist state, 
i.e., through a long-term and violent process of political expropriation of deliberative 
assemblies that already existed (see Merkl 1977:464; Clapham 2000:6-7). On the contrary, 
the ‘deliberative assemblies that already existed’, i.e., the warriors-turned-chiefs, 
personified the foundational hybridification of the state, including within the justice and 
security field. 77  A state formation process developed in Sierra Leone that created 
assemblages of connections, interdependencies and mutual influences between colonial 
and post-colonial government agents who were tangled up with local leaders, neither of 
whom drew exclusively on one language of authority.  
There is no clear line of separation between chiefs and government institutions in the 
political structure of the post-colonial state of Sierra Leone. They are mutually constitutive 
and interdependent. Fanthorpe (1998:116) argues that paramount chiefs continue to have 
the somewhat “paradoxical role” of being “state agents commissioned to exercise 
‘traditional’ authority.” I would argue, however, that paramount and lesser chiefs continue 
                                            
77 For instance, of the parliamentarians from the chiefdoms since independence, almost two-thirds of them 
have been connected either directly or indirectly to ‘ruling’ houses of chiefly families. 
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to articulate a hybrid order, and that the state is but one source – and outcome – of that 
order. 
 
6.4 Chiefs of the present and their articulation in ‘languages of stateness’ 
Sierra Leone’s 149 chiefdoms, each of which is subdivided into a number of sections, are 
established in a series of documents, including the Local Government Act (GOSL 2004a) 
and the Chieftaincy Act (GOSL 2009). The 1991 Constitution of Sierra Leone ratifies the 
official position of paramount chiefs by stating that “the institution of the Chieftaincy, as 
established by customary law and usage” and “its non-abolition by law” are to be 
“guaranteed and preserved” (The Constitution of Sierra Leone 1991:72(1)). By law, the 
government thus has an obligation to restore the ‘traditional role’ of paramount chiefs, 
including their administrative and customary judicial responsibilities. With reference to the 
colonial era, this is done on the basis of the Ruling Houses that existed at independence in 
1961. (One to three Ruling Houses exist in each chiefdom; paramount chiefs can only be 
drawn these families).78  
That chiefs in Sierra Leone continue to be articulated in ‘languages of stateness’ and that 
they are partly the expression of a state effect, to borrow a term from Mitchell (2006 
[1999]), is thus undeniable. In this regard, boundaries are drawn between state and society, 
which makes the former appear as an “inert ‘structure’” (ibid.) that somehow stands apart 
from individuals (including chiefs), precedes them, contains them and give a framework to 
their lives and authority. It is in this way that the authority of chiefs continues to be based 
around their symbolic representations in state legislation, which projects the impression 
                                            
78 The concept of a ‘ruling house’, specifically related to northern Sierra Leone, passed into professional 
ethnography as a result of the work of the colonial administrator and Africanist scholar E. F. Sayers. It was 
Sayers who discovered that the principles of Manding clanship are general to this area (Sayers 1927; 
McCulloch 1950: 54-65; Parsons 1964:125-9; Jackson 1974). Only Ruling Houses established prior to 1961 
can formally run for chiefdom elections, but during my fieldwork rumors were rife that the paramount chiefs 
in both Sandor and Nimikoro had come to power through political manipulation by Kabbah’s government. In 
Sandor specifically, there were continuous violent clashes over the issue.  
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that they are produced and given authority by, rather than being co-constitutive of the 
state.79 
Indeed, the chiefdom constitutes the basic unit of local government, and paramount chiefs 
sit on District and Town Councils across the country. The 2004 Local Government Act 
stipulates that the paramount chiefs have a ‘traditional function’, for instance, in preventing 
offences in their area; prohibiting illegal gambling; making and enforcing by-laws, and so 
forth (GOSL 2004a:28).80 At the core of their state-sanctioned power lies their legal 
mandate to hold the land in trust for the people of the chiefdom (ibid.), which in a place 
such as Peyima means that they hold almost exclusive powers over the distribution of the 
most important source of income generation. Nationally, paramount chiefs are members of 
parliament and advisers through the National Council of Paramount Chiefs.  
In principle, the Minister of Internal Affairs has the legal authority to recommend the 
suspension of chiefs. However, a ministry official once told me, and this may be 
considered of general validity, the Minister does not have “much by way of a structural 
thing that will link him to the chiefs. Except if he decides to visit some place; but there is 
nothing there really [by way of representing him]. There is no requirement for the chief to 
communicate with him. Now, there is no real requirement for the chief to communicate 
with anybody” (interview, ministry official, 29 November 2008). This indicates the 
obvious point that there is a basic disconnect between state legislation and state practices. 
                                            
79 Indeed, the 2009 Chieftaincy Act attempted to institutionalize the status quo of chiefly power, and even 
more recently the paramount chiefs’ role as the highest political authority in rural areas has been reconfirmed 
by the government (by amending the 2004 Local Government Act). 
80 According to the Local Government Act (GOSL 2004a:90), a bye-law may “not [be] inconsistent with the 
Constitution or this Act [i.e., Local Government Act] or any other enactment for the purpose of any function 
conferred on it by or under this Act or any other enactment.” In Peyima, however, and Kamara Chiefdom, it 
was within the remit of the of the paramount and lesser chiefs to develop bye-laws prohibiting ‘abusive 
language’, ‘fighting’, ‘trespassing’, ‘stealing’, ‘passing through the town with a fishing net’, ‘passing through 
the town with palm kernel on the head’, ‘women quarrelling in public’, ‘interference of non-members into 
secret society activities’, and so forth (these different bye-laws are taken from the 90 questionnaires that were 
completed in Kamara Chiefdom, Nimikoro Chiefdom and Nimiyama Chiefdom). Bye-laws can differ from 
village to village. Bye-law violations are decided by the chief of Peyima, and can lead the accused being 
fined as the following example suggests. I witnessed the hearing of the case by the town chief in Peyima, 
Gborie. A man had been in a fight with his wife, and told her that he had initiated her mother in the secret 
society. This was considered a severe crime, and the ‘Mammy Queen’, the women’s leader, had taken the 
matter to Gborie. The man had tried to pay off the women with Le20,000, but they did not accept the offer – 
they wanted him to be severely punished, both in monetary and material terms. Indeed, Gborie allowed the 
women to decide what the fine should be, and he was forced to pay Le50,000, the highest that a local court 
can demand, a goat, a bag of rice and 5 gallons of oil. The accused grudgingly accepted. 
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The next section of the chapter provides insight into how authority is sourced in local space 
to co-constitute a hybrid order, and why it would seem inevitable that state-building 
reproduces this order. It is the simultaneity of languages that the chief is articulate in that 
fortifies this order. In the following, I provide insight into how hybridity is sourced locally 
in Peyima. While making a split between state and society may have an analytically 
clarifying effect, it inevitably obscures our understanding of how hybrid authority is 
articulated. 
Understanding the dynamics of how a large-scale political entity such as Sierra Leone 
developed and was recognized internationally as a sovereign state in 1961 is fundamental 
to how the production of hybridity has occurred in Sierra Leone, but so is the way in which 
authority is produced, reproduced and manifested in localities across Sierra Leone. This is 
not to imply that the analysis now enters an untouched ‘anthropological place’ (Augé 
1995), but to bring out in the analysis some of the local sources of authority that enter into 
making the foundational hybrid order, and to de-emphasize the productivity of the state in 
this regard. 
 
6.5 Hybridity and origin 
Fanthorpe (2001:372) uses the concept of “extreme localization” to denote criteria of 
identity and belonging in rural areas of Sierra Leone (see also Allen 1968:306). This 
concept helps explain the implications of how authority is currently distributed in 
communities such as Peyima in the Kono District of northeastern Sierra Leone. The crucial 
role of chiefs in Sierra Leone has at times been explained by ‘lack of state’ (see Sesay 
1995; see Chaves and Robinson 2011), rather than by the types of capital that these hybrid 
organizational formations can draw upon to make order. Among those who do not interpret 
‘localization’ as ‘lack of state’ per se are Hardin (1993) and Fanthorpe (2001; 2005).81 In 
her study of Kainkordu, a small town in Kono District, Hardin (1993) makes an important 
articulation of what ‘localization’ implies. She demonstrates how identity relies on ritual 
                                            
81 Even Fanthorpe (2001:282) does argue, while emphasizing the notion of “extreme localization,” that the 
reason why chiefdom administration reform had not been undertaken “reflects the fundamental weakness of 
the Sierra Leonean state.” 
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actions that “locate individuals in particular spaces by giving them rights, as well as 
obligations, to others who share those spaces” (ibid.:93). 
 
6.5.1 Owning the authority in Peyima 
In a town such as Peyima, articulations of localization express important distinctions, for 
example, between ‘natives’ and ‘strangers’ of a locality.82 The distinction made between 
these two categories of people allows a local community to make boundaries, draw on 
sources of authority that have a local origin, undergo and undertake the same rites of 
passage in the same locale and defend whatever stake is at stake in the locality. In fact, 
application of these localizations defines and defends the very existence of a locality as a 
habitable space against challenges from external impositions, be they from ‘the state’ 
(system) or other tribes. A stranger, an allochthon, will, according to natives of Peyima, 
merely seek personal gain, because he is not tied to the locale by being a son of the soil; he 
will exhaust the locale of its riches and then leave. 
The locality of Peyima demonstrates how authority is mobilized to enforce a particular 
order in the justice and security field, and how, more specifically, the articulation of 
authority occurs in individual localities. At a very basic level, originating from one 
particular location, being a ‘son of the soil’ rather than a ‘stranger’, generates immediate 
authority in Peyima. Those who can render probable that they descend directly from 
individuals who established the town as a habitable space are considered to have a 
proportionally greater interest in its survival, channeling earnings from diamond finds, for 
instance, towards upholding it.  
A stark example from the war contrasts RUF fighters who captured Peyima in the late 
1990s with donsos, the local CDF (see Ferme and Hoffman 2004:75; Hoffman 2007:647). 
“The level of destruction done to this town, the way I saw the town cannot be compared to 
anywhere,” Ibrahim ‘Kalilu’ Kamara, a close ally of Peyima’s Chief Gborie told me. “It 
                                            
82 In theory, the bureaucratic apparatus has long existed for the registration of births and deaths, the issue of 
marriage and initiation licenses, and so forth. The vast majority of rural Sierra Leoneans, however, continue 
to rely on chiefs to authorize and guarantee ‘native’ identities that confer rights to land, legal protection and 
political representation. 
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was a ghost town, everything completely destroyed.” As strangers, the RUF were standing 
against the CDF, the ‘sons of the soil’:  
The town mining [of the RUF] according to the CDF who were believed to be the 
sons of the soil, they said: “This is our land. We can’t sit and watch a stranger 
destroying our land in the town. So what we will do is we have to stop them. If the 
government cannot stop them then we have to forcefully stop them. That was their 
aim. And then secondly, our brothers, our grandfathers, our fathers, our siblings; 
they own the authority here. So we should start collecting now that we have 
disarmed, now that they are encouraging people to go back to their various homes; 
we should take care of our own affairs by collecting our own dues and then seeing 
what we can make out of that for development. And then the issue of the caretaker 
chiefs;83 since our brothers are coming they should take over again. So the RUF 
was very furious with that (Kalilu, interview, March 2009). 
Kamara’s statement describes in a literal sense how ‘strangers’ are perceived in Sierra 
Leone: By definition, they are considered to “neither understand nor respect local 
precedents” and to “represent a threat to the right and properties of all” (Fanthorpe 
2001:383). 
A successful claim to ‘own the authority’ is not a fixed status, but must be reproduced 
continuously. In a different way than in the case of paramount chiefs – whose names are 
recorded in the government gazette – the fact of being a ‘son of the soil’ in Peyima, and 
articulating a forceful reference to this claim is open to manipulation.84 It is a status that is 
constantly challenged and invoked in symbolic and physical struggles, and is thus deeply 
                                            
83 ‘Caretaker chiefs’, to which I return later in this chapter, is the terminology used to describe how the RUF 
replaced town authorities with their own leaders, ‘chiefs’, a replication of the chiefly system that had existed 
before RUF take-over. 
84 A person who aspires to become a chief must be a member of a Ruling House, a secret society initiate, and 
declare his intent to run for elections. Subsequently, a council of elders will, as a way of endorsing the 
candidate, tell the story of how that particular individual fits into the Ruling House. As I wrote in my 
notebook during observations at the Nimikoro section chief elections, “this is really where a person is made 
or broken; there are stories of how certain individuals have been denied the right to run for election because 
of the way that the ‘defence’ is made.” The process is oral, and while no chief of any rank is secure in his 
appointment until their name appears in the government gazette (Fanthorpe et al. 2011:56), it is the hybrid 
source of his authority that makes it foundational. Rather than violent processes of political expropriation, 
state formation in Sierra Leone was thus the result of a loose but decisive integration of different systems of 
authority. 
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political with respect to who occupies what positions vis-à-vis other contenders at any one 
given time. It is a position that cannot be fixed, it cannot be fetishized through written text, 
and thus appear with the quality of being both detached from its producers and from any 
specific addressees (Connerton 1989:7; Herzfeld 1992:118). Being a ‘son of the soil’ is not 
represented in bald, de-contextualized, legal prose.  
As an authoritative language of autochthony it is being struggled over, including the 
economic forms of capital and livelihood that the claim can be translated into such as land 
for mining and farming. Numerous cases occurred during my fieldwork in Peyima that 
animated the hierarchy between ‘sons of the soil’ and ‘strangers’. For example, when Kofi, 
a Ghanaian national who had lived in Peyima for the past 40 years, made a significant 
diamond find in his pit in Peyima, the land, which he had inherited the right to use, was 
taken away from him and given to Makumba, one of Peyima’s elders, who held a central 
position of authority in the township.85 
 
6.5.2 Challenging the chief and the origin of Peyima 
Not only ‘strangers’, but the authority of figures at the very center of localized expressions 
of power could be challenged through authoritative languages of origin, family history and 
belonging in Peyima. The case of the current town chief, Gborie, was no exception, as he 
was regarded by the Tankos – the other chiefly family in town – as having had 
illegitimately taken over the position. Pa Kongue, the head of the Tankos, claimed that 
Gborie had come to power “only by politics,” by external interference and by the 
mobilization of his family’s networks of patronage.86  
                                            
85 Meillassoux (1960) has outlined the power of elders based on work among the Gouro in central Cote 
d’Ivoire, centering on three factors: their knowledge of social processes, their control of marriageable women 
(i.e., power over the means of reproduction rather than power over the means of production), and on 
economic principles (i.e., young people who work for the elders).  
86 Ferme’s (2001:106) discussion of how patronage works with respect to Mende social practices is relevant 
in the case of Kono as well: “The crucial point, then, was that everyone must be accounted for by someone 
else – that everyone must be linked in a relationship of patronage or clientship.” The person who stands for 
someone else is responsible for overseeing his or her behavior within a community and providing for his or 
her basic needs. In other words, for acting as a patron. In return, the patron can expect the performance of 
favors, a share of any wealth that the dependent or client might accumulate, and a level of respect, support, 
and privilege. 
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Through external pressure from the APC in 1985, Gborie took over leadership of the town 
at a young age. Gborie was now supportive of the SLPP, not the APC, but once installed as 
a chief, very few measures could be taken against him. It seemed that there was nothing 
that the Tankos could do. Gborie was a close ally of Kamara Chiefdom’s Paramount Chief 
Melvin Ngekia, whom he had supported when he ran to become the paramount chief in 
Kamara Chiefdom a few years earlier. Through this relationship Gborie had become the 
Mining Chairman, a lucrative position within the state system that signs off on all mining 
licenses in the chiefdom. In other words, the Tankos had to wait until Gborie either died or 
stepped down, and then “replace him with the correct person that is entitled,” as Pa Kongue 
put it. 
The basis for challenging Gborie was historical. It was not articulated in a symbolic 
language of the state, i.e., a legal document stamped by the government for approval. 
Gborie had not been elected. If anything, party politics and ‘the state’ had corrupted the 
patrilineal line of descent, as Pa Kongue explained. ‘The state’ was closely linked into 
these events, because it had delineated the chiefdom geographically, i.e., the physical space 
that was being fought over, and ‘owned’ the title of Mining Chairman that had been given 
to Gborie. But Pa Kongue demarcated the symbolic boundaries between state and locality, 
and explained that his rightful claim to power was based on being able to make the case 
persuasively that the Tankos, rather than the Gbories, had founded the town. He told the 
following piece of local history of Peyima, set in an unspecified time and yet pointing to a 
specific set of events in the distant past when Peyima was founded: 
People lived here long before, and there was a war between them. Warriors were 
fighting to capture land by then, and drove the people that first lived here away. 
After the warriors drove those people, people started to come back to resettle. The 
entire area was bushy. The first settlers to come into Peyima settled in Tombodu, a 
village about four miles from here. There was no road for them to come here. They 
followed the river, Peyi, where they got the name from, Peyima. They were three 
persons: Kombo, Soema and Pardomba. When they came, they met a place where 
formerly people were settled; just a round house was there, but it was destroyed. 
They had all gone. They had a youth with them who was called Chief Jimmy, and 
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said: “Well, now we are going to initiate that of our son, that youth named Jimmy, 
we are going to initiate him here now for us to settle.” They had one female behind 
them called Daiya who was there when they brushed the area to get out the dirt and 
throw it away, and they decided to stay there. Some of their friends and relatives 
followed to come and know the new area, and settled there as well. The first man 
that came was called Bebinyi, then followed by Kamakwami – he came also. They 
were only three family houses here; three dwelling houses. There were three sets of 
families. 
Later people began to come bit by bit. So, when people settled, they discovered an 
area about three miles from here, called Mwendima. There lived the greatest 
warrior of this entire area. He was responsible for the whole area, like a district 
officer. Mwendima was a mountainous area, lying right at the top of the hill. So the 
warrior lived there and the people took the boys there. They carry them there to 
initiate them by the warrior. The person that was governing here, they elected the 
person to govern Peyima, while the greatest warrior was living in Mwendima. His 
name was Kumbu (Pa Kongue, interview, February 2009). 
Thus did Pa Kongue explain to me who had founded Peyima, and who could legitimately 
count himself among its leaders. Evidently, the Gborie family was not among them. In 
turn, when we spoke about the point in time when the town was established, Gborie 
argued, not surprisingly, that he was the rightful town leader. 
When Gborie’s position is analyzed within the context of authority, however, it becomes 
evident that the basis of his power was drawn from numerous sources simultaneously. He 
embodied authority that emanated from the physical space of Peyima, from political 
pressure to assume the position of town chief and from his position as Mining Chairman, a 
position within the state system to which he had been appointed by the paramount chief. 
His position did indeed seem unassailable. And yet, he and his family were being 
challenged, in words, if not in practice by the Tankos and others who did not stand to profit 
from relations of patronage to the Gbories. They were waiting until such a time when they 
could reclaim a formal position of authority in the township. That time had not yet come. 
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6.6 Ritualizing localization 
Legitimate claims to being a chief are derived from the oral history of Peyima’s 
foundation, and the ability to manipulate it. The only way to lay claim on a chiefly position 
or another position of community representation and authority is by successfully rendering 
a probable ancestral link to the founders of the town. A lot is at stake, specifically claims to 
the most important sources of income generation: land. 
 ‘Localization’ is, in turn, confirmed by the repetition of a number of ritual processes and 
procedures for clearing and enclosing the locality. Bodies, domestic artifacts, rooms, 
houses, settlements and mining areas are purged of potentially harmful spirits and devils, 
while their socially useful forces are exposed, subordinated and contained. This was 
evident in the mining pits encircling Peyima. A bamboo stick with a piece of white cloth 
tied at the end was planted in the piles of gravel next to the pits from which the gravel had 
been dug. The piles of gravel had been covered with oil palm leaves. Two white chickens 
were living by the pit. Numerous, hardly noticeable signs suggested that sacrifices had 
been made to the spirits of the land to ensure that diamonds would be found and that they 
would not be stolen by witches taking animal forms from the piles of gravel that had not 
yet been washed and siphoned for diamonds. 
It is part of the belief system among people in Peyima that the spirits of ancestors and 
devils zealously guard their land and that they demand attention and sacrifice from their 
descendants. They have the power to both give and take, so sacrifices, Kwaebonda, which 
means to ‘pour liberation for your forefathers’, must be made. Peyima’s prosperity depends 
on these ritual acts of offering, and the signs of the need to do so are everywhere, in 
inexplicable events or tragic accidents, such as a decrease in diamond finds or a sudden 
death.  
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6.6.1 The death of a boy, the lack of diamonds and ‘the dark world’ 
One day during my fieldwork in Peyima, an epileptic boy had a seizure while he was 
crossing a narrow path through the swamp to reach his father’s farm. He fell into the water 
and drowned. Nobody saw the accident, but the scene was quite dramatic as the news of 
his death spread across town. Everyone was drawn to the place, women yelling and 
screaming, shocked and in mourning for the boy and his family, running back and forth 
between the edge of the town and where the boy had been found in the swamp.  
It was the second child in two months who had drowned. The devil had taken him and 
lured him down to the river and into the water. “We cannot see him,” one of the spectators 
noted about the devil, “but he looks like you and me and is hungry for small children.” 
Suddenly a whirlwind, quite small, but strong, appears through the banana trees, stirring up 
plastic bags, leaves, dirt. The devil, which had taken the child, went through the place, 
attracted by the women yelling and crying. That night a massive thunderstorm breaks out. 
A few days later, a woman has a seizure, while doing laundry by the river. She collapses 
and dies in the water.  
While these events and accidents may seem coincidental to an outsider, the people of 
Peyima did not recognize coincidence; moreover, they connect such events to other 
occurrences. Diamonds are scarce, and investors that inject cash and prosperity into the 
town from outside are not forthcoming. The town’s ancestors are punishing their 
descendants for not paying appropriate attention, and offerings must be made. A woman 
dreams that a rope must be tied from one end of the town to the other. No reason for why 
this must be done is provided, other than to please the ancestors. A small hut is built down 
by the water where the epileptic boy died. Rice is boiled and fowl are killed, blood is 
dripped, food is prepared and the spirits of the ancestors are invoked. Some of the food is 
left in the hut by the water for the ancestors; the rest is eaten by those who conduct the 
ritual.  
The deaths, the lack of diamonds. Dangers and harmful forces are ubiquitous, as one miner 
explained to me, and authority stems from relations to these forces and holding them in 
check. The miner had told me a couple of days earlier that he wanted to tell me about the 
reality of life in Peyima and other villages across Sierra Leone. One night he came to my 
 158 
house and gave me four neatly written pages with a number of narratives, one of them 
titled: ‘The Dark World in the Villages and Towns’. It describes the direct impact of the 
otherworldly on people’s lives, and the potential harm that these powers could trigger, 
often referred to as ‘black magic’:  
The dark world consists of evil spirits, good spirits and wizards. The wizard in the 
village is dangerous and evil, children die rapidly, and even miners suffer a lot. 
Whenever miners extract gravel in the mining, some evil elements that do not like 
your prosperity play a great role in destroying you through their fetish power, 
washing your gravel at night and taking your diamonds to the dark world. Then you 
become zero after a lot of expenditure. Even business people, whenever your 
business starts to rise, some of your neighbors become annoyed, they don’t want 
you to prosper more than they do. They will start fetish practices in your shop or 
business. They will come with a big note of money to purchase articles in your 
shop and then ask for change. When given the change they take it to the dark world 
and you will see a rapid fall in your business until you collapse.  
Whenever the land has been polluted with bad malpractices and dubious acts like 
starvation, a witch doctor is invited in the town or village to come and show the 
reasons why children are dying and production of diamonds has become less.  
The witch doctor is a powerful resigned wizard who knows the secret of the 
society. Whenever the witch doctor starts to play, you will see some people you 
don’t expect coming in the Court Barry in front of the community and confess their 
evil deeds, how many children they have killed, diamonds stolen, and shops 
destroyed. They are so blessed and lucky that no court or law will convict them. 
When a witch doctor destroys you only the lord will fight for you. Some of them, 
when they are at the point of death, confess about their evil deeds (miner, notes, 
April 2009). 
The nature of authority articulated by referring to the powers of ancestors and devils and 
their respective powers to give and take life and prosperity has generated numerous rituals 
in Peyima. Authority emanates directly from such processes of inclusion and exclusion and 
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is part and parcel of the patronage networks that define a particular person’s social position 
and authority. These networks define links in and relations to the locality, and thus the 
right to govern it; they have a say in how resources are distributed as well as how order is 
made. 
Peyima, within the broader sphere of Kamara Chiefdom, remains the primary social matrix 
for those people who live in it. Thus, it becomes a clearing in both literal and metaphorical 
sense of the term – it is a space authorized and made fit for the proper ‘foundation’ of 
society (see Fanthorpe 2001:375). The patrilineal descendants of the putative founders of 
the village claim prerogatives with respect to land use, decision-making and political 
representation. Family relations, town history and ownership of property are not recorded; 
because each of them generates authority to claim land and access to resources, they are 
constantly being interpreted and struggled over. 
These struggles are integrated with the ordering effects of enforcing security and justice in 
the locality, because doing so requires the authority that emanates from being an 
autochthon. They are, however, micro-struggles, which are rarely taken into account by 
state-building experts, and international donors who seek to re-compose the justice and 
security field. State building does not eliminate the hybrid order that governs Peyima. On 
the contrary, the hybrid order expressed in Peyima inevitably shapes the components of 
police reform, for example, that are translated into the township. In turn, this order 
constitutes dynamics that are not well understood by advisers coming from abroad, who 
speak and operate in languages of stateness and from the point of view of policy discourse. 
I return to these reflections in the next chapter. 
 
6.7 Foundational hybridity 
Scholars who study Sierra Leone commonly accept that the position of paramount chiefs is 
the definitive figure of authority outside Freetown and the Western Area (Fanthorpe 1998; 
Richards 1996; Reno 1995; Peters 2006; Jackson 2007). This is the consequence of a 
legacy of colonial indirect rule that is “particularly strong in Sierra Leone,” according to 
Fanthorpe (2005:28). The involvement of chiefs and their relatives in governing Sierra 
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Leone since independence in 1961 means that they have continued to be closely involved 
in almost all aspects of everyday governance in rural areas of the country (Minikin 
1973:130; Wyse 1977; Wylie 1969; Fanthorpe 2006:28). 
Hybridity denotes the fact that authority always already emanates simultaneously from 
multiple sources, including sacred and other customary powers, kinship and secret society 
membership, as well as from an operative decision-making center of government, 
bureaucracy and legislation. The ‘liberal state’ and ‘tradition’ do not exist independent of 
one another in a dichotomous, at times antagonistic relationship. It is the simultaneity and 
mutuality of this relationship and the fact that they cannot be divided into two (or more) 
pure forms, which constitutes the foundational hybrid order. 
Therefore, paramount and lesser chiefs in Kamara Chiefdom, for instance, cannot simply 
be characterized as institutions that assert authority because they are formally recognized 
in legislation and decrees. The assertion of authority is inevitably inter-twined with notions 
of locally-embedded autochthony. In the long term, assemblages fuelled by numerous 
sources of authority drew in a variety of actors that took historically specific forms of a 
hybrid order.  
While it is important to acknowledge hybridity and the non-existence of a straightforward 
state-society split, it is also the case that the government of Sierra Leone continues to be 
supportive of the central position of the chieftaincy. (Donor agencies have been more 
critical of what they consider to be an oppressive institution (Fanthorpe 2006:28)87). In 
order to govern rural Sierra Leone, both colonial and post-colonial governments have been 
dependent upon and integral to the paramount chiefs. Therefore, ‘the state’ did not create 
the chiefs, and the chiefs did not create ‘the state’. They were and are mutually constitutive 
of one another, shaped by and shaping each other’s acts of authority. They are co-
constitutive, even if we tend to separate them analytically. 
                                            
87 One of the reasons for this is, as Fanthorpe (2006:30) argues, that relief agencies operating in the closing 
stages of the war encountered a host of local grievances against chiefs and local elders that had not featured 
in international understandings of the conflict up to that point. Fanthorpe mentions as foremost among those 
grievances the chiefs’ control of local judicial systems, their regularly handing down fines that were grossly 
incommensurate with the offences committed and that they were in the habit of compelling their subjects to 
work for them without payment. 
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‘Politics’ and ‘tradition’ are thus inextricably linked, even though much effort is made, 
including by the chiefs themselves, to draw a boundary between the two. At chiefdom 
section elections, held in Nimikoro Chiefdom in Kono District in late 2008, the paramount 
chief noted that ‘party politics is just for five years, chief is for life’. This distinction was 
made to substantiate a separation between authority in the chiefdom and Freetown, 
between languages of public authority and stateness. The former was being accentuated, 
but could of course never be articulated independent of the latter, as the history of hybrid 
formation in Sierra Leone indicates. 
Before concluding this chapter, I provide an overview of the role and position of chiefs 
during and after the war. Perhaps inevitably, the hybrid power that paramount and lesser 
chiefs wield as central figures of authority in rural Sierra Leone played an important part in 
creating the animosities that led to war in the first place. And yet, precisely because of the 
foundational hybrid order that lies at the basis of authority in Sierra Leone, paramount and 
lesser chiefs re-established themselves after the conflict in positions similar to those that 
they held before the RUF invasion. Indeed, during the war the RUF established their own 
system of so-called ‘caretaker chiefs.’ 
 
6.8 Chiefs and conflict 
Analyses that emerged in the early 2000s – buttressed by the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission established in the aftermath of the war and reflected in numerous academic 
works – centered on the role of ‘custom’ and its function as an instrument of oppression 
(Sawyer 2008:389; Fanthorpe and Maconachie 2010:253). “Customary rule, in varying 
degrees, was simply a dictatorship of rural gerontocrats,” Sesay and Hughes (2005:55) 
state, “forced labour, arbitrary fines, banishments, and discrimination against women and 
young people were part of everyday life” (see also Sawyer 2008:389; Richards 2005:577-
578).88  
                                            
88 Fanthorpe (2001) takes his point of departure from Mamdani’s (1996) concept of the post-colonial split 
between citizens and subjects and suggests that young Sierra Leoneans before the war fit neither of these two 
categories. The fact that they experienced both political and moral exclusion started before the conflict, when 
the ‘extreme localization of criteria of identity and belonging’ was confronted with the native administration 
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Richards (2005:580) explores how the war was bound up with abuses associated with rural 
custom. Peters (2006:71), who conducted extensive fieldwork among former combatants, 
concludes that “traditional gerontocratic and patriarchal principles were despised.” In their 
line of argument, the motivation of the RUF was grievance rather than greed. 89 
“Chieftaincy, ‘customary’ courts and traditional bride service” bore down unfairly upon 
impoverished youth who could not control the fruits of their own labor because of chiefly 
levies and arbitrary fines (Richards 2005:580). Richards remarks that the civil war is thus 
best understood as an ongoing rural ‘class’ conflict, a revolt of former slaves and 
subordinate classes against customary authority.90 
Targeted by the RUF as figures of authority emanating from their customary position and 
ties to the state, the formal chiefdom administration collapsed during the war. As Jimmy 
Sahr, an elder of Peyima put it: 
The chief [Gborie] went away. He went inside the bush, because he was prominent, 
and if they know that you are a prominent somebody, like us, we had money that 
hour, I was having a car, you see, I was having a very comfortable house, so when 
they see you that way, they will chase you in the bush for money. They will 
demand money from you, or when they hear that you were a miner, mining 
diamond, they will request diamond from you. If you don’t give them diamond, 
they will either amputate you or kill you or tell you that you are a follower of 
                                                                                                                                             
of the British, resulting in exclusionary tendencies through which people were denied ‘de facto citizenship’. 
According to Peters’ (2006:37) reading of Fanthorpe, British administration thus changed the functional 
“logic of clearing,” that is, the process of slow incorporation of new settlers through marriage and community 
contribution. 
89 Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler (2005), for instance, have argued that internal conflicts should not be 
understood in terms of grievance, but rather as brought about by greed. They suggest that the relationship 
between natural resources and conflict is best viewed in terms of the benefits that resources provide to rebel 
fighters. In some early versions, “greed” is meant literally and refers to rapacity, profiteering, and self-
enrichment on the part of rebel groups (Collier 2000). The later and more influential version of the greed 
argument is that what counts is not rebel motivations (grievance) but feasibility or opportunity (Collier and 
Hoeffler 2005:629), insofar that insurgent movements can only emerge and be sustained when resources are 
available to finance them. 
90 Although the Atlantic slave trade ceased to exist from the middle of the 19th century, slavery did not end. 
At first people were sold as ‘emigrants’ to work on the plantations of the Americans now deprived of slaves 
(Jones 1983:86). In addition, domestic slavery continued to be widespread until as late as 1928 (Peters 
2006:35). According to Peters (2006:38), the categories of free people and slaves were then substituted by the 
categories of natives and strangers. 
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Kabbah’s government, so you have to go and report to Kabbah, let Kabbah come 
and take care of you (Jimmy Sahr, interview, March 2009). 
Grievances against the chiefs that were brought to the attention of aid agencies might 
appear to suggest that chieftaincy had been in terminal decline before the conflict started in 
the early 1990s. However, in Peyima and across Kono District, many continue to find 
chiefs preferable to elected politicians and bureaucrats because they think that chiefs 
defend the customary property regime that is constitutive of the authority that they hold.  
  
6.8.1 ‘Caretaker chiefs’ and return of the old guard 
The Kono District was a stronghold of the RUF from 1996 to 2001 (Peters 2006:55). From 
the beginning of the war, most paramount and lesser chiefs were either killed or fled in 
exile to Guinea and Freetown. The RUF replaced the chiefdom authorities with their own 
leaders, so-called ‘caretaker chiefs’, thus replicating the governance system of paramount 
and lesser chiefs.91 “Everybody that was in authority,” Benjamin Kamara told me, “had to 
run away. Otherwise they [the RUF] will see you as an element of the old regime that 
destroyed the land.” 
Benjamin, now a resident of Koidu, was originally from Kailahun District; he came to 
Kono District in 2001 in the immediate aftermath of the conflict to work for the UN 
Refugee Agency (UNHCR). ‘Caretaker chiefs’, he explained, had often been fighters 
themselves: 
They will say: ‘Okay, you are the town chief’, for example, but the town chief is a 
fighter. You know, so there was no time for him to sit down and then decide cases. 
They will just say: ‘Okay, you are a strong man, you are the town chief here as 
from today because you are a very strong man’. But then you are a fighter, so you 
have no time to appoint your council of elders. When cases come to these caretaker 
chiefs, they will just listen a few minutes and then they say you are wrong or you 
                                            
91 In terms of tax collection, for instance, because of their long hold on Kono District, the RUF had collected 
taxes from diamond trade and from market dues. This was also the main source of revenue for the local 
authorities before the war. 
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are right, you are to be killed or you are to… so it was like that, jungle justice, 
yeah, kangaroo courts (Benjamin Kamara, interview, March 2009).  
To the RUF, pre-war chiefs had come to symbolize a land-owning elite that, as the central 
government in the countryside, was considered corrupt and unaccountable and therefore a 
legitimate target.92 In Peyima, a ‘caretaker chief’ was selected among the villagers who did 
not flee the township; while Peyima’s ‘caretaker chief’ was not a fighter himself, he came 
under RUF command. Chosen because of his knowledge of the area around the town, and 
therefore where diamond deposits might be found, he was beaten half to death, and then 
given the choice between being killed and taking the caretaker position. He chose the 
latter.  
When the war ended, the Government of Sierra Leone, with support from the UK, 
recreated the administrative system of paramount chiefs through the 2000-2002 Chiefdom 
Governance Reform Programme (Albrecht 2005:16). This re-constituting of the paramount 
chiefs system has by some academics been considered a recreation of the conditions that 
led to war in the first place, allowing a rural elite to recapture a position from which to use 
local resources and tax for personal enrichment (Jackson 2007; Sawyer 2008). 
Nevertheless, consultations carried out by the NGO Conciliation Resources (CR) just prior 
to the official end of the conflict reported that “chiefs have a vital role to play in restoring 
stability; there is no other institution capable of replacing them at this stage in the Sierra 
Leone polity” (cited in Fanthorpe 2006:31)). A “breakdown in traditional order” had 
admittedly occurred, according to President Kabbah (2003), but the Government of Sierra 
Leone pledged to restore dignity to the chiefdoms of the country. 
Benjamin explained the rationale of why this was the case. In a discussion about the 
current importance of paramount and lesser chiefs and why they had been able to recapture 
                                            
92 These animosities are historically grounded. Threatened by a revolt of the chiefs in 1898, the Colony 
sought to appease them by implementing an unpaid labor mechanism, providing them with a right to demand 
community labor. Such rights, argues Richards, continue to be exploited today, which explains why so many 
of the RUF recruits were from these rural farming areas. Enabled further by colonial indirect rule, “this froze 
in place the practices and privileges of the nineteenth century forest warrior chiefs, including large-scale 
polygamy and control over indentured labourers and domestic slaves” (Richards 2005:582; see also Richards, 
Khadija and Vincent 2004).  
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a position of power after the war, he talked about ‘tradition’, a source of authority that is 
different from, and therefore cannot be reduced to, references to the state:  
Because no matter how you look at things, people have to preserve tradition. They 
will tell you: ‘we have had these structures for decades’. They will tell you: ‘these 
are our ancestors’. The ancestral lineage is there. They will tell you: ‘these are our 
protectors’. They will tell you: ‘these are our advocates’. The structures should 
remain in place, but they have to be reformed. In a way what should go to the 
central government – that’s the police – in terms of cases should be reported 
immediately instead of being kept in the community. They should not impose on 
the people, because in some areas the people are so afraid of especially the 
paramount chiefs that anything they say, whether wrong or right, is final. And 
people still hold this opinion: whatever the chief says, you can bring your 
suggestion, he can listen to your views and comments and everything. But if he 
says anything, that’s the gospel truth, and that’s the final judgment (Benjamin 
Kamara, interview, March 2009). 
The foundational hybrid order of which paramount and lesser chiefs are the product and 
which they continue to reproduce makes them an indispensable and undeniable figure of 
authority in the Sierra Leone countryside. In turn, as the next chapter suggests with respect 
to police reform, the chiefdom institution is one which external actors have found very 
difficult to deal with, precisely because of the sources from which the chiefs draw their 
authority. 
 
6.9 Conclusion 
Sierra Leone’s paramount and lesser chiefs are central figures in Sesay’s (1995:166) 
argument that “Sierra Leone offers a classic example of a country with a ‘strong society’ 
and ‘weak state’.” The role of chiefs was “frozen in place,” Richards (2005:582) argues, 
through policies of indirect rule, and because “a strong state” with “rigid bureaucratic lines 
of command” did not emerge before or after independence in 1961. Indeed, as this chapter 
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suggests, emergence of a ‘strong state’ was never the intention behind colonial and post-
colonial policies and practices. 
However, as this chapter also shows, viewing Sierra Leone through the lens of ‘strong 
society’ vs. ‘weak state’ amounts to a reductionist reading of how the authority to make 
order has been expressed in Sierra Leone. It does not accurately reflect the process of state 
formation through indirect rule and the authority that chiefs thus have come to hold in 
Sierra Leone. ‘War’ and ‘hybridification’ became mutually reinforcing processes during 
the conflict of the 1990s. This, however, does not mean that the latter is a function of the 
former or that the elimination of hybrid organizational forms through criminalization led to 
a field of power that could be articulated squarely in ‘languages of stateness’. Hybridity 
lies at the very foundation of how Sierra Leone emerged as the political entity that by 1961 
was “forced to behave (externally) as if it was a Weberian (territorial) state,” as Peters 
(2006:44) puts it.  
Rather than constituting a centrally governed state, throughout the colonial and post-
colonial eras Sierra Leone was a multi-centered system of governance in which power 
assemblages clustered around and were expressed through figures of paramount and lesser 
chiefs. The colonial policy of indirect rule is central to this narrative. It led to the 
emergence of chieftaincies as semi-autonomous administrative units, which became and 
have remained a historic focus of struggles over authority in rural Sierra Leone. 
At the same time it is evident that paramount and lesser chiefs remain a paradox of 
hybridity. They draw significant authority to act from symbolic languages of stateness such 
as legislation, and have played a central role in how the state system emerged (and 
collapsed) in Sierra Leone. At the same time, however, they are important protagonists of 
what Fanthorpe (2001:372) refers to as “extreme localism,” and thus the articulation of 
authoritative languages and practices that establish categorical distinctions between 
‘natives’ and ‘strangers’ of a locality, for instance. The foundational hybrid order is 
constituted by an ability to draw on both these sources of authority. It is the ability to draw 
on state legislation, local history, to undergo and undertake the same rituals in the same 
locale, and thereby defend and reproduce a particular organization of what making order 
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means from extra-local challenges, be they from ‘the state’, other tribes – or SSR 
programs. 
The next chapter tracks a decade of police reform that began as part of SSR in the late 
1990s. It demonstrates that rather than leading to the marginalization or elimination of 
hybrid organizational forms, police reform has reproduced foundational hybridity. Cast in 
languages that identify institutions belonging to the state as effective and legitimate, 
international protagonists of police reform recognized the central role of paramount and 
lesser chiefs. They failed, however, to see the resilience and productivity of the chiefs in 
translating and fitting these reforms to the hybrid authority that they represent. 
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7 The reproduction and consolidation of hybridity through police reform 
7.1 Introduction 
At the heart of international support to building legitimacy and effectiveness of the Sierra 
Leone state in the late 1990s was the “intention to introduce effective visible policing” and 
“for the police to resume primacy in maintaining law and order” (CPDTF September 
1999). In the context of war, introducing effective visible policing meant the articulation of 
symbolic languages of stateness by building police stations, writing codes of conduct and 
training and equipping officers. This was a political project that entailed re-composing the 
justice and security field and the distribution of authority was within it. The SLP – 
representing the system and idea of the state – was to monopolize the enforcement of order 
and establish “state legitimacy” (Albrecht and Jackson 2009:29). 
However, as this chapter argues, police reform as state-building reproduces rather than 
overturns the hybrid order. Indeed, the position of paramount and lesser chiefs in rural 
Sierra Leone was ratified by police reform. Given the authority that flows from the chiefs’ 
central position in articulating a hybrid order, they have had a key role in the appropriation, 
interpretation, translation and at times, rejection of SSR assemblages that were introduced 
to transform the justice and security field from one articulated in hybridity to one 
articulated in stateness.  
Police reform was cast in languages biased towards the state and modified, but never 
fundamentally altered the hybrid. This argument is explored by comparing a number of the 
assemblages that SSR as police reform constitutes and articulates through languages of 
stateness to how order is conceptualized and enforced in Motema Division of Eastern Kono 
and Peyima. 
First, the chapter outlines the key elements of police reform and its different phases since 
the late 1990s. The first phase began during open conflict in the late 1990s and constituted 
a rigid and narrow articulation of state-building. In the second phase, chiefs entered the 
reform discourse, but emphasis remained overwhelmingly on coordination among 
institutions of the state system in Freetown. The third phase of reform began in 2012 and 
was centered for the first time on what is referred to as ‘non-state justice and security 
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actors’, but without acknowledging a hybrid order. Also in the future, it is concluded, will 
the hybrid order that paramount and lesser chiefs articulate be mis-recognized in attempts 
to reorder the justice and security field. 
Second, the chapter explores a particular element of the police reform effort in the context 
of Motema Division (and Peyima), namely Local Policing Partnership Boards (hereafter 
referred to as ‘LPPBs’ or ‘Partnership Boards’). Because LPPBs are an SLP (rather than an 
international) response to the hybrid order in the justice and security field, they cannot be 
reduced to expressions of neo-liberal principles that “extend market discipline, 
competition, and commodification throughout all sectors of society” (Brenner and 
Theodore 2002:3).93 Rather than offsetting the distribution of authority in the justice and 
security field, the introduction of Partnership Boards consolidated the position of chiefs, 
who became the main interlocutors in establishing them. 
 
7.2 A decade of state-building through police reform 
The UK, with the agreement of Sierra Leone President Kabbah, supported the 
establishment of a police force within the internationally defined borders of the country 
that could monopolize instruments of violence and assert territorial sovereignty of the state. 
Re-composition of the justice and security field was intended to compartmentalize the 
armed forces, and project vertical encompassment through police presence throughout 
Sierra Leone. Kabbah’s objective was to make the SLP the primary security force of the 
country in order to drive state building forward. This was an objective that UK state-
building experts arriving in Sierra Leone during the 1990s and 2000s could understand, 
appreciate and support.  
 
                                            
93 It has been said that the recent Blair government in the UK emphasized new responsibilities among 
“recipient communities” as a condition for receiving “welfare and state benefits” (Raco 2003:78). This was 
not, of course, a de-selection of the “will to govern” (Rose 2006:155), but rather the form of “new 
mechanisms, relations and practices of centralized control” (Raco ibid.). Raco (ibid.), who takes a 
Foucauldian approach to how subjects are created, brings out “new ‘community-based’” policing strategies, 
which constitute attempts to mobilize subjects in their own governance. This is not dissimilar to the notion of 
‘empowerment’ of communities, he argues, that cuts across a range of policy areas and often takes the form 
of new mechanisms, relations and practices of centralized control. 
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7.2.1 Phase I: ‘Blue sky thinking’ – re-articulating the justice and security field  
Building a police force during the later years of the war in the 1990s was supported 
primarily by the UK-funded Commonwealth Community Safety and Security Project 
(CCSSP). How re-organization of the justice and security field in Sierra Leone was 
envisioned and pursued cannot be analyzed separately from how investments were 
channeled by the CCSSP into equipment, infrastructure, logistics and human capacity to 
establish a particular type of police force. As a political entity, Sierra Leone might have 
been characterized by foundational hybridity. However, the assembling of words, actors 
and things into what became known as police reform during the 2000s was intricately 
linked to the effects of externally supported and -driven programming. 
The CCSSP constituted the ‘heyday’ of police reform in Sierra Leone. From 2000 to mid-
2005, investments of approximately ₤27 million were made in equipment, training and 
advisors with the sole purpose of establishing a police organization that could enforce 
‘internal security’ and replace the perceived chaos of war and military coups with the rule 
of law (Ball et al. 2007).94 New vehicles, uniforms and radios procured by the UK became 
essential props in the articulation of symbolic languages of stateness, thus laying the 
foundation to project state authority yet again (Albrecht 2010:33; Krogstad 2012b: 171). 
Given the extent to which the Sierra Leone state was considered a failure in the late 1990s, 
police advisers believed that they were working from a clean slate after the war, and that if 
the state did not fill the ‘power vacuum’ created by the war, criminal groups and warring 
factions would (Jackson and Albrecht 2011:52-53; CPDTF July 1998; December 1999). 
Adrian Horn, who became manager of the CCSSP, believed that “a complete re-structuring 
of the police service in Sierra Leone,” and by extension how order was made, was not only 
necessary, but also possible (Horn quoted in Albrecht and Jackson 2009:32). “I had the 
luxury of free thinking,” Horn recalls, “my previous involvements in developing change 
were usually constrained by systems and procedures, which only allowed tinkering and not 
‘blue sky’ thinking. This was different” (notes, Adrian Horn, 2008). 
                                            
94 As I have argued elsewhere, the CCSSP will be remembered for a heavy focus on technical and operational 
support, including procurement of equipment and provision of training, and for overhauling the SLP 
organization (Albrecht 2010:33). 
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True to the reductionist state-building project of SSR, attempts were made through the 
CCSSP to attribute action to a small number of centrally governed institutions that were 
mandated by legislation produced by the state system in order to enforce its laws. Apart 
from re-composing the security and justice field by working upon construction of the SLP, 
Keith Biddle, a retired UK police officer, was appointed by Kabbah to become Inspector-
General of Police (IGP) in 1999 (Albrecht and Jackson 2009:33). This was in itself 
remarkable. Not since W. G. Syer headed the police force during the final years of colonial 
rule and handed over command to L. W. Leigh in 1963, had a non-Sierra Leonean been the 
executive head of the SLP (see Krogstad 2012b:131-136). Indeed, the appointment made 
some decision-makers in London uncomfortable. Clare Short had been “totally against” 
UK involvement in the appointment, Biddle told me, but Kabbah, with whom he had built 
a close relationship since arriving the year before, had insisted (Keith Biddle, interview, 
June 2009).95 
While they would not characterize their work as such, Biddle and Horn were involved with 
recreating the justice and security field as inter-connected assemblages of things, persons 
and words consisting of money, people, epistemological outlooks on the world, slogans, 
charters and technical knowledge of law enforcement. They did not intend to re-build the 
patrimonially networked governed space of pre-war Sierra Leone – that had in effect been 
an ineffective and illegitimate state. What they had in mind was a centrally governed state 
organized according to western universalist principles of statehood. As part and parcel of 
this process, the aim was also to marginalize or eliminate strong, often criminalized 
alternatives and ignore or absorb those that appeared weak, which could be papered over in 
program documents by simply not giving them a role in the reform process.  
During my long conversations with Biddle that began in 2007, it was clear from the way he 
spoke about his role in Sierra Leone that he believed it to be about protecting the remnants 
of the state, and that Kabbah who led those remnants was of a similar persuasion.  
                                            
95 The appointment of a British national to the position of Chief of Defence Staff was considered in 2000 
during the British intervention in Sierra Leone. However, the idea was rejected as being too contentious 
(David Richards, interview, 2008; Keith Biddle, interview, June 2009). 
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“He,” Biddle said, referring to Kabbah, “expected the police to be the primary force to 
maintain law and order and deal with problems inside the country” (Keith Biddle, 
interview, June 2009). In other words, Kabbah had ‘won’ a monopoly over the state idea 
and what was left of the state system from the likes of Norman, Sankoh and Koroma, 
children of the hybrid order. Biddle, a product of the western universalist state model, was 
dyslexic in any other languages than those of stateness. He knew of no alternatives, and by 
default became Kabbah’s truest and most trusted servant. “What was very heartening,” 
Biddle said “was that the president had a very clear view of where he was going.” Both 
men were articulate in the languages of stateness; while Kabbah was establishing a power 
base through state-building and saw the establishment of a police force as essential to this 
endeavor, Biddle was supportive of the President’s objective (Keith Biddle, interview, June 
2009). 
From the late 1990s and onwards, assemblages were taking shape that reflected the 
productive effects of SSR as police reform. Horn and Biddle had arrived in Sierra Leone in 
1997 to initiate project appraisal activities (Albrecht and Jackson 2009:29). Together, they 
wrote the new policing charter that was delivered to and signed off by Kabbah. “I did the 
first draft,” Biddle explained, which was circulated amongst senior SLP officers and 
subsequently refined. “That police charter was presented to Kabbah by Adrian and 
myself,” and made publicly available in August 1998. The new slogan of the SLP became 
‘A Force for Good’, which Biddle took from his time in Kent where police department 
stationery was produced that had “The Kent Police are a force for good” printed at the 
bottom. “So, Kabbah took up this and I christened the police in charge as a ‘force for good’ 
and he used that. That was the basis that we then gave to everybody and said: ‘that is the 
type of police force you’ve got to create’” (Keith Biddle, interview, June 2009). 
In line with the re-birth of the SLP as a ‘force for good’, its new doctrine was 
conceptualized as Local Needs Policing (LNP). Related to notions of community policing, 
it was defined as: “Policing that meets the expectations and need of the local community 
and reflects national standards and objectives” (Adrian Horn quoted in Albrecht and 
Jackson 2009:32; CPDTF November 1998). While ‘the community’ was treated as a black 
box – i.e., the relations of power that it is constituted by were not unpacked – it became the 
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center around which the police developed further. Financed by the CCSSP, dozens of 
Sierra Leonean superintendents attended training in the UK at the International 
Commanders’ Programme. At the training, most superintendents wrote papers titled ‘Key 
issues in Community Policing – Sierra Leone’. In these papers, variations on the theme of 
community policing are articulated (see Moore 1992; Thatcher 2001), deducted from the 
“history of policing in England and Wales.” Based on the basic formula of “police officers 
and private citizens working together to solve community problems” (Mannah 2001; not 
published), LNP emerged as a key principle in SLP community programs across Sierra 
Leone (see Krogstad 2012b:159-165; CCSSP Report June 2001). 
The first years of police reform began during open conflict. Therefore, before 2002, police 
reform took place predominantly in Freetown and emphasized strategic issues, in part 
because of a genuine need to do so, and in part because it was not possible to move outside 
the capital. In particular, emphasis was placed on building capacity among the senior levels 
of the SLP, including training at the Police College at Bramshill in the UK. The emphasis 
on Freetown at the time was also precipitated by the security situation, particularly the high 
number of internally-displaced people occupying any large building available, including 
former railway train sheds and derelict factory buildings in the east end of Freetown 
(Albrecht 2009:29-41).  
After the war ended, it became possible to move SLP operations outside Freetown and 
move from a theoretical, strategic approach to a more practical one. It was during this 
period that deployment across the country began, which would not have been possible 
without a massive investment in a vehicle fleet and nationwide communication systems, 
investments undertaken by the UK (Albrecht and Jackson 2009:86-97; CCSSP 2000, 
December 2001). By 2004, one assessment noted, “the SLP has improved its 
responsiveness and its visibility. A major factor in achieving this situation has been the 
communications, vehicles and infrastructure support provided through the CSSP” (CSSP 
2004). 
In these efforts, the traditional role of chiefs, who presided over justice and security issues 
outside Freetown, was considered marginal, and in any case was not well-understood by 
external actors coming in. However, as the second part of this chapter demonstrates, they 
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came to play a central role in reform efforts in rural areas of the country and thus in the 
making of order in Sierra Leone’s localities. Before exploring these dynamics in some 
detail, however, the chapter looks at the shapes that police reform took after the CCSSP 
was concluded. 
 
7.2.2 Phase II: Approaching the justice and security field holistically 
In 2005, the CCSSP was taken over by another program cycle with different priorities. 
Biddle had left Sierra Leone in 2003, and a Sierra Leonean, Brima Acha Kamara, had been 
appointed to the position of Inspector-General of Police (Albrecht and Jackson 2009:91-
92). The Justice Sector Development Program (JSDP) that replaced the CCSSP reflected a 
turn to what was referred to in international policy discourse as a more ‘holistic’ approach 
to SSR, and included attempts to encompass rather than marginalize hybrid organizational 
formations. It was a process, however, that continued to be cast in languages of stateness  
(JSDP December 2005). 
Rather than targeting one organization within, such as the SLP, and addressing its 
effectiveness as an enforcing agency, the justice and security field and its governability 
was to be worked upon now as an inter-connected whole of organizational formations. The 
JSDP constituted a fundamental break with previous efforts, in the sense that chiefs, as 
well as bureaucratic oversight, for instance, were now factored into re-composition of the 
justice and security field. A ‘holistic’ approach meant that the primary focus now was on 
establishing an inter-linked state system, something that Horn and Biddle under the aegis 
of CCSSP had worked against by focusing exclusively on the SLP (Albrecht 2010:69). 
Until 2005, investments of approximately ₤27 million had been made in equipment, 
training and advisors with the sole purpose of establishing a police force of 9,500 officers 
that could manifest articulations of stateness across the territory of Sierra Leone and 
replace the perceived chaos and anarchy of war with one centrally-governed organization 
(White 2010:77). In this next phase, approximately ₤25 million were to be distributed 
among the actors considered to make up the justice and security field as a whole, which 
encompassed, inter alia, the judiciary, prisons and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Only 
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£3-4 million was to be spent on the police (Albrecht 2010:69+70). In practical terms, this 
turn of events had dramatic consequences for the position of the SLP in the course that 
programing took. 
With the demise of the CCSSP and the onset of the JSDP, the SLP had lost Biddle as a 
clearly identifiable and decisive international leader. However, the SLP continued to be 
financially dependent on contributions from international donors. As one key advisor to the 
JSDP noted, this was somewhat of a double blow to the SLP: “Withdrawal of international 
funding inevitably leads to short-term paralysis and degradation of service with a real 
danger of attrition to the status quo ante” (Howlett-Bolton 2008:8). 
 
7.2.2.1 Application of holistic principles to the justice and security field 
Under the holistic approach to the justice and security sector, priority reform areas were 
expanded beyond any one organization in particular (Howlett-Bolton 2010:101). As 
expressed in Output to Purpose Review, a technical assessment produced by UK-based 
experts in 2007, areas to be reformed included out-of-date and inaccessible laws and 
procedures such as the indexing of customary law, prison overcrowding, delays in courts, 
absence of juvenile justice provision and the lack of support mechanisms to meet the 
“needs of the poor, vulnerable and marginalized to access justice and the lack of 
connection between community needs and police operations” (Bredemear et al. 2007:9-
10). The holistic commitment became a key component of the institutions governed by 
civilians that would manage and make order inside the borders of the country (see Albrecht 
and Jackson 2009:133). 
The focus on the SLP as an institution was eclipsed by DFID’s emerging reluctance to 
support programming considered too oriented towards security and ‘the state’ rather than 
‘the people’ and to be dominating issues relating to the broader justice sector, the judiciary 
in particular. JSDP thus marked DFID’s return to its perceived ‘core business’: bettering 
conditions for the poor (Bredemear et al. 2007:9-10). This shift was supported consistently 
 176 
by the JSDP in both Freetown and Moyamba District, which became the only ‘pilot 
district’ of the JSDP outside the Western Area where Freetown is located.96 
The JSDP placed a heavy emphasis on what can best be described as governance-related 
activities, i.e., the organization and inter-linking of state institutions. This was the practical 
recognition of the link between development, quality of governance and security (Call 
2008:1493; Egnell and Haldén 2009:30). A Justice Sector Reform Strategy and Investment 
Plan for 2008-2010 (JSRS-IP), launched in February 2008, was regarded by the donor 
community in particular as an important contribution to Freetown-based reform efforts 
across the justice sector. A Justice Sector Co-ordination Office, established in July 2007 
and located next to the Attorney General and Solicitor General’s offices within the 
Ministry of Justice, was considered pivotal to establishing an inter-linked and coordinated 
state system (Bredemear and Lewis 2008; Biesheuvel et al. 2009). 
The productive effects of JSDP in Kono District and Peyima specifically are difficult to 
ascertain. Program efforts were concentrated in Freetown and Moyamba District, and the 
CCSSP, unlike JSDP, pursued police reform as state-building during a period that centered 
on attempts to consolidate the SLP’s monopoly over the making of order within Sierra 
Leone’s borders. This is indicative of processes of institution-building that are 
concentrated in a capital. 
The holistic approach of the JSDP was the indication of a more comprehensive, and, on 
paper, a more intrusive variety of SSR as state-building that encompassed the justice and 
security field as a whole and focused on how it was to be governed. However, due to the 
breadth of activities under the JSDP, establishment of a networked state system in 
Freetown rather than in Sierra Leone as a whole became the default priority. In 2008-2009 
                                            
96 Moyamba District was chosen as the district outside Freetown in which the JSDP would ‘pilot’ its holistic 
approach. Practically, it was chosen because it had a number of statutory justice institutions, including a 
prison, four police stations and five police posts, encompassing 14 chiefdoms and a population of 260,000 
people. The district was also chosen because if its easy accessibility to Freetown. The original JSDP program 
document suggested that the JSDP would branch off into other districts. This, however, did not occur, which 
in all probability was due to the overwhelming ambition of encompassing the justice and security field in its 
entirety. By 2009, a review referred to Moyamba in the context of JSDP as “a district test-bed for new 
projects and ideas” (Biesheuvel et al. 2009). The general focus of the JSDP in Moyamba has been on 
community access to courts and, more generally, institutions such as Partnership Boards. A so-called ‘circuit 
court,’ holding sessions across Moyamba, was established in an attempt to overcome the inaccessibility of 
many parts of the district (Bredemear et al. 2007). 
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in Kono District, officers complained that uniforms were not being replaced, and that they 
were operating with fewer vehicles. While elements of early police reform were still 
visible, the ability of the SLP to project authority through these kinds of props was 
diminishing. In sum, one review conducted by the UK government noted in 2011, “an 
effective police force is not affordable within Sierra Leone’s domestic budget” (Horn et al. 
2011). 
 
7.2.2.2 Approaching chiefs in ‘languages of stateness’ 
Rather than working with the hybrid order that they constitute, police reform under the 
auspices of JSDP categorized chiefs as part of the state system. It was, however, not taken 
into account that the sources of authority that chiefs draw on are both locally embedded 
and of the state. This led to mis-recognition of how authority is produced in Sierra Leone, 
which ultimately led to the fact that police reform contributed to rather than eradicated the 
hybrid order. 
In late 2005, a National Policy Framework for the Justice Sector in Sierra Leone was 
presented within the JSDP framework. It was framed as a “holistic sector-wide” approach 
to support the “development of an effective, efficient, impartial and accountable justice 
sector capable of meeting the needs of all the people of Sierra Leone” (JSDP December 
2005:2). 
This document is long on formulations that emphasize the importance of 
‘Customary/Traditional Laws and Practices’, for example, the development of policies on 
the judicial role of traditional leaders, implementation of initiatives that promote 
constitutional principles and human rights and enhanced accountability of traditional 
leaders to the public. Likewise, the Justice Sector Reform Strategy and Investment Plan, 
launched in February 2008, has as one of six targets to “improve public satisfaction levels 
with Local Courts, Paramount and Local Chiefs” (GOSL December 2007:V).  
“Each system will have its own advantages and disadvantages and both need support,” one 
JSDP advisor noted, “even if the state system will inevitably require a greater share of 
financial resources” (Howlett-Bolton 2008:8). To some degree, this statement was more 
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theoretical than practical as working with the paramount and lesser chiefs never was a 
central objective of the JSDP (see Krogstad 2012b: 220). In Peyima specifically – and 
Kamara Chiefdom more generally – it was the paramount and lesser chiefs, rather than a 
government-appointed Court Chairman, who oversaw Local Court proceedings.  
The Local Courts were operated according to a hybrid order, and yet, JSDP documentation 
suggests that they were part of the state system, which implies that they are managed by 
that system. A 2007 assessment says, “local courts constitute the lowest level of the formal 
system” (Bredemear et al. 2007). However, while they are under the oversight of, they are 
not managed by the Ministry of Local Government, which in practice remains too weak to 
play a meaningful role in this capacity. According to a civil servant in the Ministry of 
Local Government, the Ministry also lacks the political will to actively regulate the local 
courts, primarily because it is accepted that they fall under the authority of paramount and 
lesser chiefs.  
Articulating this kind of distance is common. Brima Acha Kamara, Inspector-General of 
Police until 2011, suggested in an interview: “our own role is quite different from the 
chiefdoms, because we are accountable to the law” (interview, Brima Acha Kamara 2009). 
Inherent to Acha Kamara’s statement is the perception of a split between police (state) and 
chiefs (society) - one is not hierarchically above the other, and that they belong to and 
oversee two different systems of order. (As I turn to shortly, this is a distinction that 
dissolves when practice of how the SLP and chiefs interact is observed.) 
As noted above, substantive work had been undertaken in Freetown around the institutions 
that external advisers naturally gravitated towards as constituting the state. Inevitably, as 
the focus moved to the chiefdom level, as in Moyamba District, attempts by the JSDP to 
influence institutions controlled by the chiefs encountered the issue of distribution of 
power at the local level, and thus the composition of the justice and security field. Working 
with the chiefs became a deeply political endeavour where issues of power, resources and 
rights were at stake and where authority was being competed over (see Albrecht and Kyed 
2011:5).  
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During the implementation phase of JSDP, there was no attempt to fundamentally alter the 
Local Court system. Rather, focus centered on how to confine chiefs to their legally-
defined role, primarily through training in the arbitration of cases, a role that was intended 
for the effective and legitimate state, to recall Goldstone’s (2008:285-286) typology. 
However, actors belonging to the state system enter into a complex relationship with 
chiefs, where one cannot be said to stand hierarchically above the other. The two sets of 
institutions become integral to one another and their authority becomes mutually 
constitutive, not exclusive. It is not evident, as Baker (2008:158) suggests, that there is 
conscious intent behind state actions, that ‘it’, regardless of how “disunified” or 
“contradictory” it might be, “seeks domination over all other organizations within the 
national territory and is intent on establishing binding rules regarding the other 
organizations’ activities.” 
It is, however, a default position of donor-driven programing to work with and operate on 
organizational formations that may be articulated in languages of stateness. Donors and 
individual advisors avoid engaging with de facto hybrid orders, because they are convinced 
that state institutions are the rightful holders of a monopoly over the making of order (see 
Albrecht and Kyed 2011). This is seen reflected in assessments of the JSDP carried out in 
2007, 2008 and 2009, where remarkably little space, if any, is devoted to chiefs and the 
order they make (Bredemear et al. 2007; Bredemear and Lewis 2008; Biesheuvel et al. 
2009). 
The function and rationale of how chiefs operate, particularly in their political role, is not 
well understood by international actors. They believe that the institutions of the chief will 
wither away as state institutions are built. While some international actors may accept the 
importance of including chiefs in justice programs, the donors and the consultants they hire 
have yet to design programs that do not default towards the state-building rationale (see 
also Albrecht and Buur 2009). 
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7.2.2 Phase III: Embracing the hybrid order? 
As the JSDP was winding down in 2010, DFID in Sierra Leone proposed a ‘new 
intervention’ called Improved Access to Security and Justice Programme in Sierra Leone 
(IASJP) and intended to run for a three-year period (2012- 2015). IASJP would constitute 
the third phase of reform. 
At the time of this writing, the project design process for IASJP has taken place; roll out is 
about to begin. The terms of reference for this process suggest that the ‘delivery of 
improved access to security and justice’ is “at both the centre of our ongoing state-building 
and human development interventions” (UK Government 2009). They also suggest that a 
key threat to building sustainable peace in Sierra Leone is “a lack of individual or 
community legal redress or rights” (ibid). The program is expected to support the JSDP, 
which is described as “operating in several districts” (ibid.; see Albrecht 2012:249-250).  
The language of this document has relevance to the focus of this thesis: it recognizes that 
‘non-state’ security and justice providers are as vital as ‘state’ providers. However, it is not 
evident who the non-state providers are, how they operate and what sources of authority 
they draw upon. It simply refers to ‘informal’ and ‘traditional’ security and justice 
providers, which presumably can mean civil society groups and chiefs. 
The interim project design published in early 2010 indicates that IASJP will interact with 
“non-state justice and security actors,” “community mediation projects” and “legal aid 
endeavours” (Libra Advisory Group 2010a). While chiefs are referred to in connection 
with ‘GOSL MDAs’ (Government of Sierra Leone Ministries, Departments and Agencies), 
the category of non-state actors includes driver’s unions, market associations and so forth. 
In the final program document, chiefly institutions have a central and more explicit role. 
The “Chiefdom Administration and the local courts,” while mentioned in connection with 
‘justice sector MDAs [Ministries, Departments and Agencies]’, are not categorized as 
either state or non-state but merely considered to be part of the broader field of justice and 
security (albeit not within the framework of thinking of a hybrid order) (Libra Advisory 
Group 2010b:10). The immediate question is whether this is a first step towards the 
acknowledgment of working with a hybrid order in the justice and security field that avoids 
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the construction of programs around pre-defined conceptual distinctions between state and 
society.  
While this question cannot be answered at this point in time, it seems unlikely that 
programs will be developed that take a hybrid order into account, because policy language 
to do so simply does not exist. (Indeed, the notion of a ‘non-state’ constitutes a label rather 
than an explanation). It is therefore inevitable that a hybrid order is reproduced, precisely 
because it is not taken into account, and precisely because it is assumed that a state will 
emerge that, if worked upon in the right way, will be built to monopolise the making of 
order. In this framework, the issue is not whether state-building is possible, but how to do 
it correctly. 
I have explored above some of the elements that went into re-composing the justice and 
security field through police reform, emphasizing the languages in which these efforts have 
been projected, centering predominantly on establishing a centrally-governed political 
entity. Specifically, I have explored how chiefs have been excluded from, considered 
marginal to, and part of continuous re-iterations of external support to re-composing the 
justice and security field. However, where they derive their authority to act has been a 
mute point throughout the past decade of police and justice programming. Thus, the 
foundational hybrid order that they are constitutive of is not taken into account, and yet it is 
this order that police reform is translated into, both shaping and shaped by.  
The next section of this chapter explores how chiefs have been central actors with respect 
to shaping how the justice and security field has been re-composed through police reform. 
While the aim of police reform may have been to reinforce the articulation of stateness, it 
has rather, in a double pull, reproduced and consolidated chiefly powers to make order. 
 
7.3 Integrating languages of stateness and languages of public authority 
From the early 2000s, when Biddle and Horn were still the international leaders of police 
reform, a key component of how to re-compose the articulation of authority in the justice 
and security field occurred with the establishment of Partnership Boards by the police. 
These boards were set up, one review of the SLP produced in February 2011 notes, “to 
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enable the local communities to have a say and be involved in finding solutions to local 
problems, and to act as an interface between the SLP and the local community” (Horn et al. 
2011:36).97 It is in this capacity that Partnership Boards have become one of the concrete 
vehicles for hybrid reproduction outside Freetown.  
LNP, the ‘mantra’, if you will, for SLP community programs such as Partnership Boards, 
was meant to reflect that where it did operate, policing was no longer a regime-preserving 
instrument (Krogstad 2012b:161). As noted in an essay on community policing that SLP 
superintendent Amadu Mannah wrote in 2001 for a course in the UK before the war ended: 
“There are communities in some parts of the country where the national police have not 
established their presence” (Mannah 2001; unpublished paper).  
What the concepts of ‘local needs’ and ‘community’ encompass, and the order that they 
articulate, was never explored or made explicit, either by the international experts or, for 
that matter, in police headquarters in Freetown. The concepts are more often than not 
treated as a black box, as a depoliticized – unproblematic – administrative unit comprising 
a certain amount of people. Therefore little attention was paid to the foundational hybrid 
order that police reform was shaping as well as being shaped by. The underlying rationale 
of police reform, particularly prior to 2005, was that strengthening the SLP would 
automatically marginalize, dominate and encompass alternative makers of order, notably 
chiefs, and dictate rather than being dictated to by these actors (Albrecht 2010:9).  
And yet, at the very top of the formal security sector sat Kellie Conteh, the National 
Security Coordinator from 2001 to 2011. Conteh was from the countryside in the north and 
was raised under the rule of chiefs. He disagreed with the assumption that the national 
police should, or indeed could, dominate the enforcement of order. During an interview I 
conducted with him 2008, Conteh discussed the issue of how to approach Sierra Leone’s 
chiefs with a good deal of fervor:  
I think they [international actors] should help to strengthen chieftaincies in the 
sense that our people, whether you like it or not, for now seem to respect that 
                                            
97 I was the co-author, together with Adrian Horn and Martin Gordon, of this report, which included 
fieldwork conducted in January-February 2011. 
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traditional setting. No amount of education from, you know, human rights 
organisations, international organisations on this sort of thing would work right 
now. They would listen, yes, but as soon as you leave, they go back to their 
tradition. They [the general population] simply respect the chief. I think we should 
not undermine the authority of the chiefs by trying to introduce several layers of 
governance within the chiefdoms. At the end of the day it would only hurt 
government, because we would not have the capacity to do it properly, we simply 
don’t. Let’s not make ourselves look stupid on this matter. Let’s go back to basics. 
This is how our people live. They live in these villages and in the village there’s a 
town chief, they have a youth leader, a women’s leader – these are structures that 
are there, and they all respect the chief. Even if you want to put lawyers and judges 
at chiefdom level, do you have the roads for these people to be travelling to court? 
You want the farmers to leave their farms to come to court? No, that is not going to 
happen, so leave it with them, empower the chiefs if you want to regulate it, yes, 
we can do that, I’m sure the chiefs are open to that. This is not just about security – 
it’s the whole system we’re looking at which goes far beyond the security sector. 
It’s looking at transforming an entire culture, an entire society so that they would 
do things that will fit in security the country in order as to provide an enabling 
environment for development to take place (Kellie Conteh, interview, August 
2008). 
As the quote suggests, Conteh not only dismissed attempts to fundamentally re-compose 
the justice and security field, he also indicated that it would be impossible to do so. 
Working with the chiefs was and would in the foreseeable future be a question of 
negotiation, not imposition. Conteh acknowledged the authority of chiefs across rural 
Sierra Leone, and thus a hybrid order, without using the term, of course, and without 
describing in detail the structure of this order. Partnership Boards became the SLP’s 
articulated attempt to try and deal with this long-established order. 
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7.3.1 Local Policing Partnership Boards: a vehicle for hybrid reproduction  
From the outset of police reform, which was initiated during open conflict, it was 
inevitable that it would be guided by a hybrid order. Since this order was not created but 
merely accentuated by conflict, it seemed inevitable that it would also give shape to how 
police reform was articulated locally, including through the Partnership Boards. 
Brima Acha Kamara, who replaced Biddle as Inspector-General of Police in 2003, 
described the police’s scope to enforce order in the late 1990s as policing by consensus: 
“There were other forces, warring factions, RUF combatants, CDF, competition about who 
should really be in charge of internal security. We were not able to flex our muscle, and we 
were ultimately doing policing by consensus” (interview, Brima Acha Kamara 2009; italics 
added). Koroma was describing the mutual reinforcement of hybridity and war. However, 
in his assertion also lay the rationale of policing in the years to come, and inadvertently the 
basis for the role that the Partnership Boards would play in peacetime – the expression of 
policing by consensus.  
The reorganization of the justice and security field that was part of ending the conflict 
entailed the marginalization or elimination of these ‘other forces’ and ‘warring factions.’ 
Policing by consensus, to use Acha Kamara’s wording, was not simply the consequence of 
war and a breakdown of the state system, but rather the result of a deep-seated hybrid order 
that transcended the years of conflict. Logically, the re-establishment of the ‘state system’ 
was therefore unlikely to make the principle of policing by consensus obsolete. 
Partnership Boards became a concrete vehicle for appropriating and translating the SLP’s 
new ethos of LNP that emerged in the late 1990s. They were focused on ‘the community’ 
as the space in which the interface and amalgamation of different approaches to ordering 
would take place, stemming from practices in communities, states and global institutions. 
While the SLP used a language of benevolence and inclusion to explain the rationale of the 
Partnership Boards, their emergence was also articulated as a pragmatic response to the 
notion that the “numerical strength of the Sierra Leone Police (SLP) in coverage is smaller 
compared to the fast growing population for the entire nation.” The statement is taken from 
the Proposed Guidelines and Codes of Conduct for Operations of the Local Policing 
Partnership Boards of Sierra Leone 2005 (SLP 2005) that express the common perception 
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that Partnership Boards could compensate for the lack of resources within the SLP. People 
were to police themselves.98 
These guidelines, given to me by Mustapha Kambeh, Local Unit Commander in Motema 
Division covering Eastern Kono (and Kamara Chiefdom), provide insight into the 
foundational hybrid order that Partnership Boards would support. As a “community based 
structure” and a “non-partisan, inter-religious, social integration development group” the 
Partnership Boards were established “to create a peaceful and healthy police/community 
co-existence at all levels, with the ultimate goal to fight and reduce crime to an appreciable 
level and contribute to the socio-economic and political development of Sierra Leone” 
(SLP 2005). What this particular statement expresses is the extrapolation of certain 
representatives of the community, and their movement into an apparently neutral and de-
politicized space, where the hierarchy that centers on paramount and lesser chiefs and the 
figures of authority that they represent are muted. Nothing is stated about the chiefs’ role in 
appointing – and managing – the individuals who are to sit on the Partnership Boards. 
Kambeh, who had been involved in developing the Partnership Board concept when he 
was posted at police headquarters in Freetown in the mid-2000s, recognized their 
importance and had worked hard to set them up in the seven chiefdoms that Motema 
Division covered. Partnership Boards, he said, are: 
Critical in assisting the police to curb and mediate in conflict within the areas [of 
the police division]. They [Partnership Board members] know that [they have that 
role] because they’re part and parcel of the community and they [the police] listen 
to them [the Partnership Board] and will understand the situation very well. So that 
is helping us police our area. So what the Partnership Board is now doing is helping 
us [do] early warning, [they are an] early response mechanism to conflict, because 
of the resources given, and the economic trend in the country, and the whole world. 
The resources are inadequate if you allow conflict to erupt and grow within your 
                                            
98 Community policing could as such be cast as a neo-liberal propulsion to diagnose, prescribe and cure the 
fragile state, viewing “community” as an entity possessing the power to increasingly self-govern (see Herbert 
2008:851). However, it could also be regarded as the technical response to a hybrid order and a realization of 
the limitations of the state system rather than of the need to put limits on the state, as Kellie Conteh was 
quoted as indicating above. 
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areas of responsibility. The sooner we observe that conflict is about to erupt, we are 
able to move quickly to curb it in a timely way; it assists us in our resource use 
(Mustapha Kambeh, interview, March 2009). 
While drawing on the principles of LNP introduced by Biddle and Horn, Brima Acha 
Kamara, who had studied in the UK in 2002-2003 and observed community-policing 
programs on a trip to Northern Ireland, introduced Partnership Boards to the SLP. Indeed, 
Horn and Biddle had been uncomfortable with engaging the ’local community’, and the 
chiefs in particular. While the needs of the community were to be heard by the SLP, the 
intention behind LNP was not to reproduce a hybrid order of chiefs and police that while 
shaped by both, would be managed by the former. It was precisely to establish the imagery 
of vertical encompassment, a police force as separate from and yet encompassing and 
integrated with ‘the community,’ that was intended. Indeed, Biddle expected that the role 
of chief would diminish in importance and disappear as a relic of the past once the state-
building process had gathered momentum, and marginalized or toppled other makers of 
order (Keith Biddle, interview June 2009).99 
Simply ignoring the chiefs would not automatically lead to their marginalization. On the 
contrary, their position – and the foundational hybrid order that defines their power – was 
consolidated through the collaborative approach that defines the Partnership Boards. As 
they were established in Motema Division, and Kamara Chiefdom specifically, where 
Peyima is located, they did not constitute a fundamental re-organization of the security and 
justice field. Instead, these organizational formations fortified and consolidated an already 
existing relationship between the SLP and the chiefs. Kambeh urgently understood that the 
authority to act within the justice and security field depended on entertaining close 
relations with the chiefs:  
                                            
99 One example relates to how the Chieftain Police was handled by Biddle. Discussions of integrating the 
Chieftain Police into the SLP would have constituted the invigoration of languages of stateness, a reordering 
of the justice and security field that would have granted greater authority, on paper if not in practice, to the 
SLP. However, only after 2005, as the second phase of justice reform was being designed, was the Chieftain 
Police considered an actor that should be involved in police reform efforts, and only in a limited geographical 
area, namely Moyamba. Biddle himself noted about the decision not to engage: “The practical aspects, due to 
the inept management of the Chieftain Police by the Ministry of Local Government and the chiefs and district 
officers, proved to be too problematic” (Keith Biddle, interview, June 2009; see also Krogstad 2012:220). 
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Well, for me to work effectively, you must be in cordial relationship with your 
traditional leaders in the area you find yourself, because if there is an amicable 
relationship, I mean, between the LUC and the paramount chiefs and their section 
chiefs, town chief, et cetera, et cetera, it will go a long way to ease policing 
problems in that area. Because then there will be a common understanding among 
the chiefs and the police. They will understand the problems of the police and find 
ways and means how to harmonize their relationship and make sure that things 
work effectively to make their areas secure. We have to preserve the peace and 
public tranquillity and make sure that the fear of crimes is reduced to the nearest 
minimum within the area and make sure that people go about their normal activities 
without hindrance. So to achieve all these things, you must be in good relations 
with the paramount chief (Mustapha Kambeh, interview, March 2009). 
The SLP with the chiefs, as articulated through the Partnership Boards, constitute a central 
assemblage within the justice and security field. The SLP know their position, and that 
their room for manoeuvring is driven both by capacity and legitimacy vis-à-vis chiefs, who 
above all draw authority to act from their status as autochthons of the area over which they 
rule. The perception among Sierra Leonean police officers is that there is a shortage of 
personnel and equipment within the force, which adds to the importance of entertaining 
good relations with the ‘local community’. Actors within the state system in Kono are 
unaware of what happens in many parts of the District, notably in the border regions to 
Guinea and Liberia, and the SLP is dependent on ‘the community’ to provide them with 
that information. ‘The community’, however, is not constituted by neutrally-distributed 
interest groups, but by a field of power that centers on paramount and lesser chiefs. 
 
7.3.2 The role of Partnership Boards in order making 
What I wish to illustrate in the following section is how material and discursive aspects of 
the Partnership Board are configured in Motema Division within which Peyima is located. 
Partnership Boards, as construed above, are shaped by numerous, inter-related words, 
actors and things that come together, emanating from international policy discourse on 
community policing (LNP), the distribution of material and financial resources within the 
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police and the articulation of authority within the justice and security field. Paramount and 
lesser chiefs play a vital role in shaping how Partnership Boards operate, but at the same 
time they have also been presented as an important push by the SLP towards “increased 
collaboration between SLP and civilians” by NGOs that work with them (Hanson-Alp 
2008:14; Albrecht and Jackson 2009:189-197). 
The Board’s purpose is to liaise with the police to promote safety and security through 
consultations and joint operations. A divisional board is set up, headed by a Chairman, a 
Vice Chairman, Treasurer, a representative of the youth and women and two traditional 
chiefs. Five delegates from each section in the chiefdom are put forward for election, 
selected for their “reputable character” and only if they are “dedicated to the course of 
security and community development” (SLP 2005). A certificate awarded by the LUC 
marks their appointment; they meet once every month (Mustapha Kambeh, interview 
March 2009; SLP 2005). 
Police officers in Motema division, for example, understand the need for more 
collaboration between the police and citizens. In a questionnaire that I gave to a few 
intelligence service officers (formally the Special Branch), one response was phrased 
somewhat idealistically:  
We cooperate with the local communities by taking policing on to their doorstep 
through the formation of Local Police Partnership Boards (LPPB) through the 
length and breadth of the country. We hold consultative meetings with them in 
which their basic security needs are identified. We also sensitize and empower 
them, encourage them to solve some of their own problems at local level […]. With 
the formation of the LPPB under the new changed management, the local 
communities are no longer afraid of the SLP as it was before and during the war. 
Thus, while the SLP generally like to present ‘Local Needs Policing’ as the articulation of 
a changed attitude, the police rely heavily on Partnership Board members to access towns 
and villages across the chiefdoms. The so-called ‘central executive board’ of the 
Partnership Board, which meets at Motema division headquarters on a monthly basis, was 
‘statified’ ritually by having the elections overseen by the National Election Commission. 
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The candidates for election, however, were selected by the chiefs, and were often chiefs 
themselves (for example, the Chairman was a town chief in Nimikoro chiefdom).100  
It is also the case that only central executive members at police divisional level are elected. 
In the case of Kamara Chiefdom, members at section and village level are appointed by the 
chiefs and elders as in Peyima, where town chief Gborie personally appointed the 
Partnership Board member. During my fieldwork, this person was first a central member of 
the group of elders and was then replaced with a close ally of Gborie. Only if the 
Partnership Board and the Chief in Peyima deem an issue sufficiently important will it be 
brought to the Partnership Board Chairman of the chiefdom and/or the nearest police post 
or station. Furthermore, the SLP expects the chiefs to deal with matters within their own 
jurisdiction. Murder, sudden deaths, severe beatings (referred to as ‘blood crimes’) 
substantial theft and sexual abuse of children were considered to be ‘above’ the town, and 
to require police involvement.  
The case of the epileptic boy who drowned presented in Chapter 6 was one such case that 
was considered partly ‘above’ the town, and Kalilu, qua his position as the Partnership 
Board member in Peyima, came to play a central role in its resolution. Within the broader 
cosmology of Peyima, the boy’s death was construed as a case of the devil having taken his 
life. It was, however, also considered unusual because of the age of the deceased (he was 
only seven) and therefore warranted that the incident be reported to the police. Ibrahim, 
known as Kalilu, ‘the faithful’, who referred to himself as a Public Relations Officer of the 
Partnership Board in Peyima and was a ‘trusted somebody’ of Chief Gborie, came to the 
scene.101 Looking stern, like the police officer whose role he assumed, he told people that 
nobody should touch the body until the SLP had come to look into the matter. 
                                            
100 Anything to do with enforcing order within a chiefdom commonly involved the paramount chief. For 
example, the non-governmental organization National Movement for Justice and Development (NMJD) set 
up a paralegal program while I did my fieldwork in Kono District. The candidates that NMJD interviewed 
were all, however, selected by the paramount chiefs in the chiefdoms where the program was being 
established (Tankoro, Nimiyama and Nimikoro). 
101 In the Proposed Guidelines and Codes of Conduct for Operations of the Local Policing Partnership 
Boards of Sierra Leone 2005, the public relations officer has various functions, among them being “the 
liaison between the board’s community and police personnel” and “work with all areas of the police to reduce 
pressure, thereby reserve police time, energy and resources.” In other words, a Public Relations Officer could 
be considered to function as a police officer where the SLP was not immediately present. 
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Kalilu jotted down the course of events and went to the police post in Tombodu, both to 
report and to invite the SLP to come to Peyima. Kalilu explained:  
So when reaching there, they take statement from me, then we made radio 
communication to the head of the police station, the one in Motema. They asked me 
some questions about the deceased, whether there is any foul play, I deny; there’s 
no foul play there. To prove it, they gave me one police, a sergeant, and we came 
together and we observed the corpse that there is no foul play (Kalilu, interview, 
February 2009). 
Invitation of the police to the town is always done reluctantly, because the police will 
demand a ‘report in fee’ and expect to receive ‘transport money’ to go back and forth from 
Tombodu. Their arrival is therefore followed by some negotiation, which inadvertently 
involves an act of boundary-making. “I explain to them,” Kalilu told me as the police came 
to investigate the matter of the boy, “this is a community policing that I am doing, I’m not 
receiving any payment from the government so you are here to do your job. We are there 
to represent you, and if there is a case we will pay your transport to come and go, but [apart 
from that] we don’t have money to give you” (Kalilu, interview, February 2009). This 
simultaneous act of distancing and rapprochement between the Partnership Board member 
and the SLP, of boundary-making, constituted a tacit agreement.  
If the agreement that Kalilu made with the police was not abided by, however, if ‘transport 
money’ was not paid, instruments of the state would come more forcefully into play, at 
least this is what Kalilu anticipated: “If you won’t give them transport money, they won’t 
satisfy, some of the police will apprehend you, they will move with land rovers, take the 
corpse to the police station to see the doctor pathologist to check whether there is a foul 
play. They do all of this because they need money” (Kalilu, interview, February 2009). 
Thus, one of the stakes at stake in the justice and security field was financial gain; in this 
case, Kalilu was not an exception to this rule of engagement. He might have told the police 
that he was not formally paid for his efforts, but he did nonetheless receive money from the 
family of the deceased to deal with the police on their behalf. It was also evident that not 
withstanding the exchange of money, the articulation of authority through state 
involvement was pivotal in dealing appropriately with the matter. 
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If the body had simply been taken out of the swamp and buried, the police could have 
reached a conclusion that ‘foul play’ had occurred, regardless of the fact that no technical 
evidence was available. What was occurring, however, was the negotiation of authority, 
not an investigation per se. It was the symbolic quality of reporting that mattered, not a 
search for the ‘objective truth’ about the boy’s death (and in any case the SLP in Tombodu 
has no vehicle, nor is a ‘pathologist’ available).  
The police arrived a couple of hours after the boy had drowned. The situation had calmed 
down, and the boy’s family was queried about what had happened. The parents were 
scolded for not looking better after their child, transport money was exchanged, and the 
police officer said that he would report back to Tombodu and Motema to verify that the 
child had died in an accident – not by ‘foul play’. The boy was buried on the afternoon of 
his death, according to Muslim tradition, and with only men present. He was not spoken of 
again. 
As the embodiment of the Partnership Board, Kalilu represented the reproduction and 
consolidation of an already existing hybrid order, but he also negotiated police actions in 
Peyima. He inter-linked events in Peyima with the SLP and coalesced differently 
articulated sources of authority of both stateness and public authority. As the Public 
Relations Officer of the Partnership Board, he referred to the inspector of police as his 
boss. At the same time, he had been appointed to this position by Peyima’s town chief. 
Before the war, Kalilu explained, the SLP would not have come, and even if their presence 
did not make a big difference in technical terms of investigating the death of the epileptic 
boy, symbolically, the presence of the SLP certainly did. In the next example, the role that 
Kalilu came to play further demonstrates how the Partnership Board does not challenge, 
but supports the powers of the chief, and thus consolidates a hybrid order. 
 
7.3.3 A case of theft and the reproductive effect of the Partnership Board 
The case explored in this section involved 1,000,000 Leones (approximately US$300) that 
was stolen from me, a case that was subsequently dealt with by Chief Gborie and the 
Partnership Board, never reaching the police post in Tombodu or divisional headquarters in 
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Motema. On one level, it shows how the ethnographer becomes part of and influences the 
processes that he studies. On another level, it provides insight into the negotiated nature of 
establishing order in Peyima, with the Partnership Board assembling languages of both 
stateness and public authority. Summoning the SLP became a threat put forward by the 
town leadership, perhaps very real and emphasizing the severity of the situation. However, 
it was not acted upon. Thus, even though Kalilu was involved in his capacity as a 
Partnership Board member, the matter was dealt with ‘inside themselves’, i.e., in Peyima.  
It was a hot dry day in January 2009. I was going to Peyima for the first time since my visit 
in December the year before. The case of the stolen money had developed into a matter for 
the town chief to deal with. I had initially tried to tone it down; saying that the money was 
not really that important to me, but since I was not the only person implicated, it was not a 
decision that I could make on my own. I went to Jimmy Sahr’s house, where I stayed 
during my visits to the town, coming from Koidu that morning. No one was around, it was 
midday and since we had entered the driest and hottest season of the year, most of the 
town’s male population had gone to look for diamonds in the river and the mining pits 
dotting the surroundings of the town.  
The case had begun back in December 2008, during the first half of my fieldwork, when I 
promised Jimmy Sahr to help him refurbish his house. When I returned to Denmark for 
Christmas, I sent him 1,000,000 Leones through Western Union. Jimmy Sahr rarely went 
to Koidu, the District headquarters town, so Fasalie, an assistant of mine, went to the bank 
to get the money. Fasalie had subsequently handed the money over to Isaac, the first person 
I had met from Peyima, who had at one time been Peyima’s Partnership Board member 
and was politically active in whichever party was in control of the Government. A lot of 
people were suddenly involved in this money transfer. 
The problem was not only that the money was missing. The case had been further 
complicated because Isaac had told Jimmy Sahr and Gborie that I had sent the money for 
small-scale mining, which, if true, could have put me in an awkward, if not dangerous, 
position within the town. White men do not mine without a proper license to do so and as 
investors they are the only source of substantial income in an area where cash is in short 
supply. In addition, there are certain procedures that need to be abided by, such as making 
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sure to discuss opportunities with paramount and lesser chiefs, both to get formal and 
informal permission. To continue my fieldwork, I would need to explain to Chief Gborie 
why I had sent the money in the first place and to clarify that I had not come to mine and 
therefore had not brought money to do so. 
Jimmy Sahr came to his house where I was sitting and waiting and we walked to the 
opposite side of the town, next to the river where Gborie’s compound was located. We 
were seated in his Court Barry, where he usually held public meetings, surrounded by 
several elders who were always around whenever the town chief was in Peyima. (The chief 
had a house in the outskirts of Koidu, the headquarter town of Kono District, where he 
spent most nights with his other and much younger wife.) Isaac, the last person known to 
have handled the money, was there as well, looking extremely nervous. I could not help 
thinking that this meeting was a scam to make me believe that matters were being taken 
care of. If it was, they were all putting on a credible act. It is normal to wait for important 
people, chiefs in particular, which we did. Gborie came out, said hello, only to return to his 
house.  
After an hour or so of waiting in silence, I was called into Gborie’s house alone. He took 
me through one door into a room next to the bedroom and went from there into his 
bedroom and back into the room that we had entered through the front door. He said that 
somebody had smashed his locks and that he had to walk into his bedroom like that. It 
made very little sense, except of course, to tell me that he that needed money, 56,000 
Leones or approximately US$20, to repair the locks. I was sat down in the front room in a 
big, green Chinese sofa. He said he was the chief, meaning if I had something to say or 
give, I should do so now. I said I was a student, meaning I had nothing to hide or give. I 
stressed that I had not sent money for mining. If that had been the purpose of my trip, I 
would have come straight to him, particularly since, apart from being the town chief, he 
was also Mining Chairman of Kamara Chiefdom, signing off on all licenses in the 
chiefdom. 
Isaac and Jimmy Sahr were then asked to come into the room, and were seated on each 
side of me, facing Gborie. At this stage, Kalilu entered the house as the Public Relations 
Officer of the Partnership Board to hear what the final say in the case would be and to take 
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orders from Gborie. Jimmy Sahr was furious, demanding that the money be found. Isaac, 
becoming more and more timid, tried to defend himself, appeared surprised, even hurt, that 
Jimmy Sahr had taken the case to the town authorities. Jimmy Sahr was wondering out 
loud if Isaac did not want the house to be refurbished because it was not his property. 
Gborie intervened in the argument, telling Isaac to apologize to Jimmy Sahr. Suddenly we 
were interrupted by a group of men who appeared to be Asian, who had come to discuss 
the matter of washing gravel with the town chief. The meeting with Gborie was over, there 
were other more pressing matters to deal with, and Kalilu now took over. 
We went back to the small Court Barry next to the chief’s house. A public apology had to 
be given. Isaac needed to admit his wrongdoing in front of the authorities of the town 
elders, which he did. Kalilu explained the case in Kono and Isaac apologized to both 
Jimmy Sahr and me for what he had done. Kalilu then went on to say that ‘Mr. Peter’ had 
decided to let the case go, that the case was closed and that the police would not be 
involved. Thus, my case had been resolved ‘within themselves’, but it had also become the 
talk of the town and Isaac had been publicly humiliated. It appeared that this was 
punishment enough. The money was never returned; it had already been ‘chopped’. 
In this case, the Partnership Board member in Peyima, Kalilu personified a particular 
articulation of the hybrid order that police reform has reproduced. He assembled languages 
of stateness and public authority by assuming the authority conferred upon him by the SLP, 
but it was a hybrid order that could not be exploited or articulated without chiefly assent. 
The case had been overseen and decided by Chief Gborie and Kalilu, who embodied the 
hybrid order of Public Relations Officer and one of the town authorities in Peyima through 
the trust vested in him by the town chief. However, while the SLP may thus have 
manifested ‘languages of stateness’ in Peyima, the expression of LNP through Partnership 
Boards was shaped to fit, rather than disrupt, the chiefly hierarchy.  
In the end, Kalilu did not involve the police in Tombodu, although he could have; indeed, 
his relationship to the SLP was ambivalent. While he told me that in his capacity as a 
member of the Partnership Board he worked for the police, he also said that he had rejected 
their offer of a uniform. He told me: “They are not paying me, so why are they asking me 
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to take a uniform? I’m not interested.” Hybridity breed’s contradiction, one that Kalilu 
would have to deal with – and he did, in his own way. 
According to the aforementioned proposed guidelines for the Partnership Board, one of its 
key roles is to establish “a strong bond of friendship, trust, respect and cooperation 
between the police and the community” (SLP 2005). ‘The community’ implied in this 
authoritative symbolic language of stateness – and articulated explicitly by individual 
police officers – are paramount and lesser chiefs. This is the vertical rather than horizontal 
concept of ‘community’ that state authorities, including the SLP, work with, which is not 
recognized in the concept of ‘community policing’ that has guided internationally-led 
police reform. “We need to respect their culture,” a police officer in Tombodu noted. This 
was a kind of symbolic boundary established between languages of stateness and of public 
authority that broke down when dissected analytically, because of the foundational hybrid 
order that structures the locality of Peyima. 
 
7.4 Conclusion 
Since the late 1990s, police reform programing in Sierra Leone has been designed in a way 
that reproduced rather than overturned the foundational hybrid order. This, however, 
militated against attempts to re-articulate the justice and security field in languages of 
stateness. The intention behind police reform was to establish and consolidate a state-
society split that would situate the former as sitting above and at the same time containing, 
localities across the territorially-defined state space of Sierra Leone. In the first phase of 
reform, which began in the late 1990s during a period of open conflict, attempts were made 
to eliminate or marginalize hybrid orders, including paramount and lesser chiefs. In the 
second phase, from the mid-2000s and onwards, a so-called holistic approach was pursued, 
which sought to incorporate all actors in the justice and security field into one inter-linked 
state system.  
At the time of this writing, a new program has been designed that indicates a potentially 
significant conceptual shift in how paramount and lesser chiefs are articulated and 
incorporated into the process of re-composing the justice and security field. Rather than 
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seeking to cast chiefs as state or non-state, respectively – or as constitutive of a hybrid 
order – it appears programs now being designed are backing away from this dichotomous 
impasse. Precisely how this approach will evolve and how it will be translated into 
localities such as Peyima is not yet clear. However, with its ‘community focus’, but 
without explicitly seeking to alter local power structures, the new cycle of justice and 
security field re-composition is likely to corroborate the position of the chief and further 
support the reproduction of a foundational hybrid order.  
This effect of police reform is illustrated by the emergence of Partnership Boards and the 
role that chiefs have had in translating these assemblages into the localities of Sierra 
Leone, in this case, in Peyima. Kalilu, the Public Relations Officer of the Partnership 
Board in Peyima, came to represent the reproduction and consolidation of a hybrid order. 
He inter-linked events in Peyima with the SLP, and represents the differently articulated 
sources of authority of both stateness and public authority. However, while Kalilu referred 
to the inspector of police as his boss during my conversations with him, his appointment to 
the Partnership Board was dependent upon his good relations with the town chief. While 
this position may have “increased collaboration between SLP and civilians,” as noted by 
Hanson-Alp (2008:14), it did not challenge the power of the chief. In fact, the Partnership 
Board not only supports the position of the chief, it consolidates a hybrid order. 
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8 Integral hybridity – the Poro effect in the justice and security field 
8.1 Introduction 
SSR failed in Sierra Leone because international actors did not recognize the country’s 
hybrid order of authority and how it is produced and reproduced. This failure is linked to 
the predilection of much policy and academic literature to identify states as failed 
according to what they are not, i.e., effective and legitimate, rather than by what they are. 
Thus, SSR discourse separates state and society conceptually and guides programs to 
establish a clear line between state security agencies and other authoritative figures and 
institutions that give shape to the justice and security field. 
This chapter discusses one such institution, the Poro, a male secret society located on the 
Guinea Coast, and its position in the foundational hybrid order that governs the justice and 
security field in Sierra Leone.102 Membership in the Poro determines who can lay claim to 
resources, particularly land, and has implications for how order is made. Hence, the chapter 
describes the consequences of being excluded from decision-making as a non-Poro 
member in Peyima. This struggle is based on authoritative articulations of autochthony that 
center on claims of tribal identity, and the ability to point to a ‘home land’ or a ‘home 
village’ (symbolic acts of boundary-making). 
The chapter begins by outlining the history of the Poro, which emerged as a localized 
bulwark against and was therefore shaped by external interference (migration waves, 
colonial and post-colonial powers). The Poro inherently ties the individual to the locale in 
which he was born and initiated. In Peyima today, only Konos are allowed initiation, and 
only Poro members can engage firmly in land tenure decisions, for instance, and claim 
rights based on being a ‘son of the soil’, an autochthon, as opposed to strangers, 
allochthons.  
                                            
102 As an institution, the secret society has the quality of being a ‘total social phenomenon’ (Durkheim 1915; 
Evans-Pritchard 1940, 1956); its significance is therefore not restricted to the field of security and justice (see 
Bellman 1984). The term delineates institutions in which the economic, political and ideational dimensions of 
social life are simultaneously salient. In Peyima specifically, and Western Africa in general, all boys must 
and can in principle, if not always in practice, be initiated into the Poro society to become adult men in the 
locale in which they were born. “Bush schools” are established to teach initiates about farming, herb 
techniques, hunting and rules of the culture and, in particular, structures of authority (see Fulton 1972:1222). 
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The chapter also discusses an instance where the boundary between the ‘Poro bush’ and 
the town was breached, and where and how the SLP enters the secret society bush. This 
example demonstrates how symbolic boundaries are constantly being mobilized and 
demolished, excluding some from and including others in seeking redress, but always in 
favor of a Poro member. The Poro is not articulated in the discourse of SSR and as a 
consequence is not considered relevant by international practitioners as to how the justice 
and security field is ordered. Yet, its structuring effect of delineating son of the soil and 
stranger status, for instance, constitutes it as part of the hybrid order. 
Authority to enforce order is the hybrid outcome of exercising power by a variety of local 
institutional forms, drawing authority to do so from within and beyond the chiefdom. A 
dominant focus on the role and function of the state leads to a disregard of the fundamental 
micro-struggles that are part and parcel of what making order in Sierra Leone, including 
Peyima, means. This point harks back to and emphasizes that the instruments available 
through SSR makes it counter-intuitive to think beyond the logic of a state bureaucratic 
framework, and to see other institutional forms as little more than less developed 
alternatives. Thinking hybridly, however, helps us understand more comprehensively how 
assemblages take shape in the justice and security field, and how the Poro is significant on 
par with legislation in producing authority, and thereby in making order. 
 
8.2 Creating a space for secrecy and a vehicle for foundational hybridity: the 
Poro 
In the areas of the Guinea Coast (Sierra Leone, Liberia and Guinea), the Poro initiates 
almost every boy into its membership, passing on spiritual secrets and powers of witchcraft 
(la Fontaine 1986). (Girls are initiated into their own secret society, the Sande.) Its primary 
purpose is to regulate sexual identity, religious, judicial and educational matters and to 
mediate relations with the spirit world (CORI 2009). The Poro is based on the ideology 
that its leaders maintain control over the dangerous volatile nature spirits that their 
ancestors subdued upon arrival in a particular locality, beliefs that are used to support the 
power of the dominant group (Bledsoe 1984:456). 
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In its initiation rites, the Poro society provides a certain amount of social knowledge and 
instruction. Physically entering the bush, and undergoing the ritual of initiation is 
recognized as an important educational mechanism in Peyima. The objective is to turn 
immature boys into fully-fledged members of the adult community. The spirit swallows the 
boy when he enters the bush, and tribal marks are cut into his back, signifying the spirit’s 
teeth. At the end of initiation, he is delivered by the spirit and reborn. Obedience to the 
rules of the Poro and, by implication, to the social regulations of the community outside the 
bush, is stressed as the individual enters into the bush. 
No person can hope to occupy political office in the chiefdom without being a member of 
Poro.103 Hence, while drawing on local sources of authority, the Poro underpins the 
administrative unit of the chiefdom outlined by state law and propped up by the autochthon 
status of the chief (see also Bledsoe 1984:456; Jackson 2007:105). These local and extra-
local articulations of authority are an important expression of foundational hybridity; a 
loose but decisive historical integrative process of different systems of social and political 
relations to which I now turn.104 
 
8.2.1 The Poro: a mechanism of defense against and interaction with the extra-local 
world 
In his book West African Secret Societies from 1929, Butt-Thompson (1929:15) explains: 
“In the history of anything Pagan, there must always be hesitation in using dates. Suffice it 
then to say that when [between the 11th and the 13th century105] the Muhammedan invasion 
of the West Coast took place, the Pagan societies were well-established.” Butt-Thompson 
continues:  
                                            
103 The paramount chief is the head of the secret society to the world outside the Poro bush. While he draws 
significant symbolic capital from this position outside the bush, he is not afforded the same position inside 
the bush. While he may sit with the group of advising elders who are considered elders both in the Poro bush 
and in the township, Peyima Chief Gborie can be (and has been) challenged when the Poro convened in the 
bush. (Indeed, it has been noted that an important function of the Poro has been to hold chiefs accountable). 
104 Supportive of this integrative process has been the persistent failure of successive Sierra Leone 
governments to complete what Fanthorpe (1998:117) refers to as “modern measures of citizenship (i.e., the 
registration of births and deaths, written deeds and title to land) to the rural population.” 
105 Butt-Thompson is not specific about what he means by the ‘Muhammedan invasion’. However, Muslims 
started to arrive in West Africa during the 11th century, and Islam was adopted by regional rulers during the 
following decades where Muslim states began to emerge (Spice Digest, Spring 2009).  
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They [secret societies] were instituted to enforce and maintain tribal tradition, 
customs and beliefs that were in danger of changing or becoming obsolete. The 
organisers were the champions of the old against the new, as some of their 
descendants still are…. They were clever enough to know that prohibition alone 
was not sufficient foundation for any organisation desiring longevity, and, 
therefore, made their societies the repositories of the folklore, myths and history 
and the conceptions of art and culture and learning and wisdom the tribes possessed 
(ibid.:16; italics added). 
Evidently, it makes little sense to make a clear-cut distinction between the ‘old’ and the 
‘new’. Apart from setting up a dichotomy that reifies the Poro, it skews the fact that while 
secret societies have a long history in Sierra Leone, we are dealing with a dynamic 
institution that changes over time (See Bellman 1984:18). Nonetheless, the Poro continues 
to be used as an instrument in the struggle over who has access to sources of authority that 
may be translated into rights to land, a claim to political office and financial gain. The 
secret society is not an invented tradition in Hobsbawm’s sense, but it is manipulated to 
seek political influence.106 
In this regard it makes sense to see the “tenacity of the [secret] society,” as Bellman 
(1984:17) puts it, “as evidence for its general ability to adapt to different social 
environments and political situations.” This is what makes the secret society a component 
of the foundational hybrid order that shapes the expression of authority, and thus, 
inevitably, the actors that today appropriate and translate SSR components into practice in 
the dynamic space that justice and security assemblages constitute. 
Bledsoe (1984:456) suggests that no one knows the actual mode of origin of the Poro; she 
argues, with Butt-Thompson, that they grew out of political upheaval and migration in the 
Guinea Coast region. The Poro provided idioms of affiliation for diverse splinter groups of 
‘strangers’ to attach themselves to powerful landowner patrons. As today, these newcomers 
were regarded ambivalently, as potential allies, but also as potential subjugators of 
                                            
106 Hobsbawm’s (1983:1f.) concept of the ‘invented tradition’ is “taken to mean a set of practices, normally 
governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate 
certain values and norms of behaviour by repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the past.” 
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established authority. The landowners attempted to secure the allegiance of stranger 
families by drawing them under the influence and patronage of the local ancestral spirits. 
Written and oral sources on nineteenth-century Sierra Leone describe a land of numerous 
physical spaces containing networks of fortified settlements and their satellite villages. 
These observations are important to understand the political context in which the Poro 
emerged as a localized expression of defense, and its continued relevance. The larger 
settlements often competed with one another to attract traders. Yet they would also co-
operate in rituals, political-juridical affairs and mutual defense. As noted by Butt-
Thompson above, within these administrative arrangements, outsiders played a crucial role 
in consolidating and shaping the nature of authority, including the defensive measures that 
the Poro articulates.  
The Upper Guinea Coast was the site of an early intersection of trans-Saharan and trans-
Atlantic systems, which generated intense interaction within a large and ethno-
linguistically diverse population (Fanthorpe 2001:374; see Bledsoe 1984:456; Fulton 
1972:1218). Slave trade, for instance, had begun by the eighth century, first with early 
kingdoms of the western Sudan and later with Europe and the New World. Slave trade with 
European powers began in the mid-fifteenth century and filled a gap left when the Sudanic 
empires in the interior disintegrated around the same time. “As this change occurred,” 
Hardin (1993:45) notes, “people’s attention shifted westward toward the coast and toward 
the economic and political possibilities of the European slave trade.”  
Migrations continued to mark the history of this region in the modern era. In Kono, 
diamond mining which began in the 1930s, spurred not only major migrations from across 
Sierra Leone and West Africa into the area, but also an influx of overseas companies (see 
Keen 2005:12; Reno 1995). Peyima’s inhabitants are wholly dependent on diamond 
mining for income generation, and both non-Kono tribes from across Sierra Leone and 
‘investors’ from abroad are part and parcel of what defines the locality’s social make-up 
and history.  
External actors are part of the story of the early beginnings of Peyima, a period that was 
marked by conflict and subsequent building of relations with the “white men coming,” as 
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Pa Kongue explained to me, to mine the land and Bafi river around the town. As one of 
Peyima’s elders, Pa Kongue is also the de facto town historian. His story describes how 
mining began in Peyima and the coming of ‘strangers’ as exploiters: 
By then, the white people were prospecting. They were finding out what diamonds 
is, so they dig a hole. When they see the diamond, they don’t take it with their 
hand, but with something like a plier. They tell the people that when you touch the 
diamond it will shock you. The people get afraid and so they cannot steal. So the 
white man told the black people. They say when you touch the diamond with your 
naked hand you will die from the shock. When the black man meet the diamond 
lying down, you only take a stick and put it besides the diamond. You cannot touch 
it because you get afraid. The diamond is the devil’s tool and it will shock you if 
you touch it with your naked hand. So when the Burma war came in 1944, the 
white man took some black men to go and fight, and they discovered diamonds in 
India. The people that went to India to fight the Burma war saw how they mined 
diamonds in India. They told the black people: ‘Oh, that thing that the white man 
told, it’s a lot of money yes.’ They explain the secret to their brother that that 
diamond that they don’t allow you to touch is money. So the black started to steal 
the diamond bit by bit and carried it out. They carried it to the Lebanese people to 
sell it and became aware that diamonds had a lot of money. When the white people 
knew, they started to drive the black people not to dig the diamonds (Pa Kongue, 
interview, February 2009). 
Localized competition among settlements, the ‘Muhammedan invasion’ as Butt-Thompson 
noted, between the 11th-13th century, the slave trade, and the initiation of diamond mining 
in the 1930s all came to fundamentally shape the region’s social make-up. The Poro has 
throughout the modern history of West Africa acted as a localized bulwark against these – 
and other – external pressures, not in isolation from, but intermingled with and shaped by 
them. In this regard, the secret society has had and continues to have a significantly 
stabilizing – not a freezing effect – on how order is made in rural Sierra Leone.  
Drawing on histories of autochthony and adjusting to current social dynamics, the secret 
society continuously reproduces hybrid relations of power by establishing lines of 
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demarcation between Poro members and non-members. Power in this context is not 
external to how and where it works, i.e., imposed, nor is it the manifest confrontation 
between the dominant and the dominated (see Bell 1992:200). The option of acting 
differently, of rejecting initiation is always present and at times occurs, but this type of 
resistance has fundamental consequences for the authority that is available to lay claims on 
material resources. 
 
8.2.2 Producing authority in concrete physical space 
Within the politically-decentralized milieu in which the Poro emerged, constructing 
‘community’ became an exercise in maintaining and continuously demarcating boundaries. 
One of the mechanisms to delineate belonging to a community involved undergoing rites 
of passage, including initiation into the Poro. The defensive element to the Poro against 
‘the stranger,’ the danger he embodies, and the Poro’s stabilizing function became evident 
in the society’s organization. 
Little (1951:244) distinguishes “between the Poro as a society or general institution, and a 
“poro,” which is a gathering of Poro members called together for a specific object.” Using 
the term in the first sense denotes an association that lacks centralization, but that 
comprises a number of segments, each containing society members normally resident in 
one village with an ancillary ‘Poro bush’. Little (see also Fulton 1972:1224) refers to these 
as ‘lodges’, and notes that they are independent so far as administrative activities are 
concerned. The relative independence of a ‘lodge’ serves to harness local articulations of 
authority, and is a substantial articulation of authority by the group of autochthons, defined 
by being the first to occupy a locale. 
To a ‘stranger’, the superior status of being a ‘son of the soil’ and his position to make 
orders was and continues to be non-negotiable. Being a Poro member substantiates the 
boundary between members and non-members. Jimmy Sahr, a Kono elder in Peyima, 
confirmed this. As someone who could rightfully claim to become the next Section Chief, 
he was adamant about what being a ‘son of the soil’, an autochthon, meant, and also 
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stressed the importance of secret society membership. “Why?” he asked as we were 
discussing the importance of Poro membership:  
It gives you a small right of origin, yeah, it give you more rights. Like for instance, 
if you’re not associated with the secret society, you can’t be a chief. Also, if, for 
instance, I’m told there is any problem within the secret society about a piece of 
land, you can’t be able to decide if you’re not associated with them, you are not 
able to decide that matter (Jimmy Sahr, interview, March 2009).  
There is a close link between autochthony, political advancement, social status, rights to 
land and justice in the Poro (see Bledsoe 1984:457). Claims of Poro membership, 
combined with ancestral association, are transformed into land tenure decisions and claims 
to justice within the bush. If a person is not initiated in the locale where the claim is made, 
if he cannot draw symbolic capital from that particular locality, for all intents and 
purposes, his case will be weak. 
The method by which the Poro establishes authority is reflected in Hardin’s (1993:93) 
exploration of identity and authority, which is established along ‘spatial lines’ rather than 
‘in the temporal plane’. Hardin explains how the individual becomes tied concretely to a 
particular physical space through initiation practices by locating:  
Individuals in particular spaces by giving them rights, as well as obligations, to 
others who share those spaces. Where someone is born, where they join Sande or 
Poro, where their ancestors are buried, and where they themselves will be buried, 
work to limit the claims to identity and the rights and statuses available through the 
descent and kinship system (ibid.).  
It is this emphasis on belonging in a concrete physical space (rather than to ‘the nation’ in 
the abstract), and on being a ‘son of the soil’ in a literal, localized sense of the term, which 
is confirmed through Poro membership. This is what makes the secret society an obvious 
mechanism for inclusion and exclusion in Peyima. I now turn to a more detailed discussion 
of what the status as a stranger entails, as the stranger himself is a vital figure in and of the 
hybrid order. 
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8.3 The stranger and the secret 
At the heart of secret society membership lies the notion of belonging to as well as being a 
stranger in a place. Autochthony literally implies an origin “of the soil itself,” as Geschiere 
and Jackson (2006:6) note, meaning “a direct claim to territory.” The two authors suggest 
that the language around autochthony and fierce struggles over belonging are ‘resurgent’ as 
a consequence of recent political liberalization in Africa and ‘intensifying globalization’, 
more generally. Lentz (2007:45) argues, however, that the distinction between ‘sons of the 
soil’ and ‘strangers’ that permeates autochthon/allochthon discourse also has practical 
implications in areas where capitalist enterprise has played an indirect or no role. 
Discourse on autochthony is not of a purely colonial origin, but emanates from transformed 
pre-colonial configurations of first-comers and late-comers (ibid.). Secret societies in 
Sierra Leone, for instance, have long been a local source of authority and as such, have 
been central to reproducing local hierarchies of power. As a total social phenomenon (see 
note 1), the Poro is thus part of the societal order in Peyima, and is central to any 
individual who seeks authority in the community (see Richards et al. 2004:8). 
Endowing some and not others with the secrets of the Poro is an instrument in the struggle 
over decision-making in Peyima, as it is an important marker of inclusion and exclusion. 
The concept of ‘stranger’ signifies a lack of symbolic capital. It indicates that a person 
originates in a different soil and connotes “non-belonging, alienness, foreignness, non-
authenticity, a distinct distance from the soil and a lack of legitimate claim to it, the 
absence of an intimate relationship with the land” (Jackson 2007:99).  
By extension, the Poro society is constructed around the understanding that its leaders 
maintain control over the dangerous, volatile nature spirits that their ancestors subdued 
upon their arrival (Bledsoe 1984:457). The stranger is a potential threat to the group, and is 
therefore a member of the community while remaining detached (Simmel 1971; Wood 
1934). It is this belief that supports the power of the dominant group, the autochthons, the 
Konos. 
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 ‘Knowing the secret’ was vital in Peyima not for what it was, for the content it guards, but 
for the authority and rights to participate in social life that initiation brought with it (see 
Simmel 1950; Bellman 1984:17). In recent years, reference to belonging had become 
particularly pertinent because of a perception among the leadership in town that the 
number of ‘sons of the soil’, i.e., Konos, was diminishing vis-à-vis ‘strangers’. Korankos, 
Temnes, Mendes, Limbas and other tribal groups were living in enclaves across town and 
either mining or farming, each led by a tribal head. Gborie, Jimmy Sahr and other town 
elders therefore considered the political situation in Peyima volatile. A recent decision 
among Kono District’s 14 paramount chiefs to narrow the circle of people who could 
demand membership to only Konos was indicative of the pressure that the ‘sons of the soil’ 
were under. 
 
8.3.1 The Temnes and the ubiquitous threat of the Poro 
During my fieldwork, the Temnes – around 500 individuals – clashed with the Konos over 
how much community labor they, the Temnes, were obliged to perform. (All tribes are 
expected to do some work for the community.) Since the APC, a northern-aligned party, 
came to power in 2007, the Temnes, a northern tribe, had become bolder in the eyes of the 
Konos, who generally supported the SLPP, now the opposition party.107 In this regard, the 
Temnes drew on forms of political authority emanating from national level politics and 
created a space of opposition against Peyima’s leadership. However, these articulations of 
authority could not overrule those emanating from the authority drawn from being a Kono, 
and the Temnes were punished by having land that they were farming taken away from 
them. Nonetheless, it appeared evident at least to the Konos that the status of Temnes as 
supporters of the APC meant that they had a source of authority to draw upon which had 
not been available to them before 2007. 
While numerous languages connoting stateness and public authority were drawn upon as 
this conflict between the Temnes and Konos unfolded, the issue was addressed as a matter 
internal to the physical space of Peyima. The innate power of symbols of administrative 
                                            
107 The general reason that I was given by elders in Peyima was that the APC under Siaka Stevens had 
exploited and destroyed Kono, with little benefit to the population of the district. 
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and hierarchical rationalities that provide seemingly ordered links with the political and 
regulatory apparatus of a central bureaucratic state were absent. The police, with its 
symbols and paraphernalia of stateness, was not, and never became involved in the dispute. 
In other words, struggles over the consolidation of boundaries between the SLP and the 
paramount chiefs are not the only stake at stake in the justice and security field. These 
efforts of boundary-making within Peyima are of equal importance in order to differentiate 
that has access to which rights and resources. The threat of calling the Poro society and the 
authority that came from being a member played an important part in this. 
Sayoh, a Koranko, explained the almost doxic rationale of this to me. He himself was 
considered a stranger in the township. Even though he had been living in Peyima on and 
off since 1978 and was raising a family there, he was a Koranko born elsewhere. Like 
many others, he was ‘waiting for his luck’ – for that big diamond find – which would allow 
him to leave the township and move to Freetown as a bomba, a person with money and 
prestige. One afternoon, we were talking about the options available to the Temnes and the 
fact that even if they constituted the biggest tribe in Peyima, they could never claim the 
same rights to the land as the Konos. Sayoh said: 
That won’t happen, the Konos won’t allow it, they won’t allow the Temnes. We 
have something we call bylaws. No matter how your population is greater than the 
population of the indigenous, the government and the laws in the country, in the 
state, won’t allow that. Imposed laws – not laws that are written or accepted in the 
community – they will kick against them. But laws that have been accepted since 
time immemorial, they can’t kick against them. Like saying: ‘you people are 
strangers, you people are this, you people are that, don’t enter into our bushes.’ We 
[strangers] do accept them [the Konos] because we are here to find money; we need 
their diamonds. So whatever things they bring to us we do accept some, you 
understand? If we refuse, they will enter into their secret bush, and come up with 
their society and each and every one [of the strangers and all women] will enter 
into the house. It’s part of our tradition. However, even if we have five Konos here 
and all the inhabitants of Peyima are different tribes from different places, this 
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would not make a difference. The Konos are the owners of this area, because they 
have a secret society (Sayoh Jalloh, interview, March 2009; emphasis added). 
As Sayoh describes, the threat of activating the secret society against strangers is 
ubiquitous. This is the ritual enactment of boundary-making, an act and articulation of 
authority that does not lend itself to languages of stateness in any simple way, but 
authoritatively separates the inside and outside of the decision-making hierarchy in 
Peyima. Evidently, it was not the secret itself that was the stake at stake, but rather, the 
authority that flowed from engaging in Poro society activities.  
Whenever the Konos ‘came up with their society’, it meant that the devil, Bili, had 
emerged, the whole township would go silent, and all non-initiates would go inside their 
houses and lock their doors. This might, on one level, have been the quite straightforward 
communication and enactment of traditional values. More importantly, however, it 
constituted, to follow Bell (1992), the production and negotiation of power relations, 
enacting dominance and manhood (non-initiates are locked up in the houses with the 
women). The ritual confinement of non-initiates happens when central Poro members die, 
and towards the end of the initiation period during the dry season in December and 
January. The Pomansu, who leads the initiation, will consult the paramount chief, 
conveying the message that the rite of passage is coming to an end and that a sacrifice will 
be made, after which Bili will come out and dance the rest of the day and night. 
In the context of SSR in modern-day Sierra Leone, the Poro constitutes one of the registers 
that gives further shape to police reform and contributes to a consolidation of the hybrid 
order. The Poro symbolically marks off different levels of authority, not between state 
institutions and chiefly authorities, but between ‘sons of the soil’ and ‘strangers’, an 
ongoing and historic dichotomy in rural Sierra Leone. It is the ability of Konos in Peyima 
to establish symbolic boundaries between these two categories of actors that make the Poro 
crucial in establishing who has access to which types of resources. The enactment of these 
boundaries is key to producing the ‘stranger’. As the next section shows, however, 
boundary-making also becomes an instrument in the establishment of a hierarchy between 
secret society members themselves. 
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8.4 Boundary-making, violence and land disputes 
The inclusion-exclusion/member and non-member aspect of the Poro secret society and its 
counterparts in other tribal groups has a direct effect on how acts of violence and land 
disputes – justice and security - are addressed in rural Sierra Leone.108 However, Bellman 
(1984:139) rightly notes that there is “more to the expression of membership than simply a 
dichotomy between those who have knowledge and those who do not.” What is relevant in 
the context of this dissertation is how the distinction between those who know and those 
who do not know produces effects in the justice and security field, and sets up boundaries 
between ‘sons of the soil’ and ‘strangers’. The following case involving Taylor Kondeh, a 
young man living in Peyima who had recently been initiated into the Poro, illustrates that 
being privy to the secrets of the Poro is not necessarily sufficient to claim decision-making 
power. 
 
8.4.1 Taylor Kondeh’s search for authority 
Taylor Kondeh, who was in his early 30s at the time, was one of my key informants during 
my fieldwork. He was not a ‘son of the soil’, at least not fully. He was born and raised in 
Peyima, and therefore could not generate sufficient symbolic capital to lay claim to land 
and authority in another locale. His mother was a Kono and the first cousin of town chief 
Gborie. His father, however, was a Mandingo, which put Taylor on the margins of the 
chiefly hierarchy, struggling to claim authority in the township. He was forced to find 
innovative ways to make his voice heard in Peyima. 
Prior to the 2007 general elections in Sierra Leone, it had become evident to him that he 
would not be able to establish himself in Peyima as someone with a central role in local 
decision-making. He therefore made the rather radical decision (to some) to support the 
APC, which had been in opposition for a decade but ended up winning elections in 2007. 
Taylor’s rationale was that supporting the opposition, if they won, would open up a source 
                                            
108 The Poro society is found in many of Sierra Leone’s tribal groups. See Little (1949:1999); Parrinder 
(1962:95-96); Parson (1964:149-56); Dorjahn (1982:35-62). For various stories and myths about the origin of 
Poro, see Parrinder (1967:96-103). 
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of authority that could eventually be converted into financial gain to support his family and 
provide him with a platform from which he could make his voice heard in Peyima. When I 
was in Peyima in 2008-2009, Taylor’s strategy had not succeeded; he was still struggling 
to make ends meet, farming instead of mining, and zealously pursuing a political career. 
Taylor: “You know, our party here has become the winning party. So we are expecting 
jobs, developmental issues that are coming on should lie in our hand, we should be 
considered greatly. But up to now, you see, the chief is moving around with the SLPP 
guys” (Taylor Kondeh, interview, March 2009). 
 
8.4.2 The Poro society and the Kondeh’s loss of land 
After he affiliated with the APC, Taylor Kondeh and his family were involved in a 
boundary issue that was eventually handled in the Poro bush. Taylor’s story describes not 
only the struggle and competition over access to land, but how legitimate authority to settle 
conflicts was assembling in the town (see Lund 2008:10).  
In Peyima, explicit symbols of the state and its language and props such as contracts and 
deeds are not referred to and as a consequence do not figure in local decisions over land 
distribution. Land is not exchanged by written contract, but is consolidated verbally in 
front of witnesses. Therefore, proof of the right to mine or farm a piece of land has to be 
reproduced continuously and challenges to the claim are perennial. Effectively, this leaves 
room for both double-dealing and interpretation of rightful ownership. 
Moreover, land is taken and given according to allegiance to the town chief with the 
authority he derives from articulating the hybrid order, including from local government 
law that stipulates that Chiefs hold “land in trust for the people of the Chiefdoms” (Local 
Government Act, 28.(d)). Thus, following Juul and Lund (2002:4-5) in their discussions of 
land disputes in Africa, what comes into play is the ability of chiefs to negotiate and 
manipulate land claims and their freedom to deploy a raft of tactics and strategies in order 
to solidify this claim, including their autochthon status and political party affiliation. 
Inevitably, it was Peyima’s powerful and influential town elders who benefited from the 
ambiguity of land entitlements. 
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During my fieldwork, Chief Gborie took the land that the Kondehs had been farming since 
the early 1990s away from them. The family’s argument that they had been using the land 
for almost two decades did not constitute a sufficient public claim of ownership. Normally, 
eviction could not have happened unless the Kondehs had committed some serious crime 
or without suitable compensation with alternative land. In turn, it was not a viable option to 
approach extra-local institutions such as the local government District Council, the police 
or political parties to back up Taylor’s family’s counter-claim (see Juul and Lund 
2002:18). This, in short, would lead to further social exclusion in Peyima, and it was in any 
case not within the mandate of the SLP or other institutions of the state to overrule 
decisions made by the chief (in particular with respect to land issues). 
Taylor’s family was subjected to a strategy of exclusion through the Poro society, led by 
the town leadership. “So when the case reaches to a point where you say,” Taylor 
explained: 
Now this case is not going to be decided in town, they are going to decide it in a 
different world. If the issue is between two members, they know how to decide it. 
Okay, if they know that really, you are right, you have the right on a particular 
issue, they will foul you by calling the secret society members out (Taylor Kondeh, 
interview, April 2009). 
A bylaw of the Poro stipulates that when the members are out in the town, non-initiates are 
not allowed to leave their houses, “and you lock yourself inside,” Taylor continued, “while 
people [secret society members] stay outside and decide the matter, when it is over, they 
will tell you: ‘I’m sorry, we are sorry, this place is no more yours’” (ibid.).  
Gborie’s decision about the land farmed by the Kondeh family was not made in contrast to 
the state, as is often the case with respect to twilight institutions (see Lund 2006:687). 
Rather, in a double pull, the decision was made both within the state, because chiefs have 
been a part of the state formation processes since the colonial era of ‘indirect rule’, and 
beyond it (see Mokuwa et al. 2011:343; Jackson 2005:53). 
Both chiefly authority and the Poro are part and parcel of the continuously reproduced 
foundational hybrid order that is maintained in rural Sierra Leone. This process, however, 
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is detached from forces that could be cast as ‘national’ or ‘statutory’ in the sense that we 
understand these terms today, i.e., as a centrally-governed political entity. The handling of 
justice and land allocation through Poro involvement does not take place in competition 
with state authorities, but fully replaces or, perhaps more accurately, fully complements 
state functions (see Kyed and Buur 2007:2). In the process, Taylor was cut off from 
seeking alternative means of redress and had to accept that the family’s land had been lost. 
At the same time, however, the symbolic power of the chief derived from being an 
autochthon is embedded in his descent from those who first arrived in the particular 
locality of Peyima (see Bledsoe 1984:457). Drawing explicitly on local forms of capital, 
and implicitly on national ones, the articulation of references to the Poro society thus 
produced effects in the field of justice and security. These effects at once excluded state 
intervention and made it irrelevant, but at the same time drew on long-term state formation 
processes, which ended up having real effects for the Kondeh family’s ability to make a 
living. 
Town Chief Gborie further undermined Taylor’s status. In his capacity as the land-owner 
and hegemonic figure in Peyima, he told Taylor:  
‘Even someone who has property and land here for 50 years, I’m the only one that 
have the right to take it from the person’. He said that before going to the swamp 
[to oversee his farming]. But through our hard work we tried to extend the land, the 
swamp then. And the swamp was not even large at the time (Taylor Kondeh, 
interview, March 2008).  
The rationale was nonetheless fairly simple, as Gborie himself explained:  
Okay, for an example Peter, you want to grow rice in this swamp, and Jimmy Sahr 
allows you to do it, but it does not belong to you. Jimmy Sahr allows you to make 
the swamp here; you have been developing this swamp for five, ten, fifteen years. 
Then Jimmy Sahr says my friend, I want to work my land (Gborie, interview, 
March 2009).  
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Gborie’s rationale was that Taylor’s family had no argument, and even if Taylor 
maintained differently, it was his word against Gborie’s, and thus an argument that Taylor 
could never win. 
 
8.4.3 Articulating the Poro society as boundary-making 
By involving the Poro, the resolution of Taylor Kondeh’s case was transferred into a 
parallel space within the justice and security field where public confrontation, discussions 
and action were somewhat muted due to the hierarchy that exists in the bush. Drawing 
authority from the realm of the secret society where the decision to take Taylor’s land was 
made, the chief held a position of power that Taylor could never match. Taylor’s inferior 
position within the social space of Peyima meant that his affiliation with the ruling party 
was of little use to him.109 
Justice – how it is articulated and by whom – produced and reproduced power relations 
manifested in unequal access to land. At the heart of the Kondeh’s case lay the fact that the 
enforcement of order is a field where power was contested, authority was re-configured 
and constituted, and where different actor interests were at stake over power, resources and 
‘clients’. These struggles took place on the symbolic boundary between Poro bush and 
township, rather than between inside and outside the chiefdom; and between inside and 
outside the specific locality of Peyima. 
As the next section shows, the problem was not that initiates who were not full Konos were 
revealing the secret, a point often made by Konos in Peyima. The problem was the 
authority that being an initiate might bring, i.e., creating a space for individuals to 
                                            
109 On the contrary, Taylor’s involvement with the APC accentuated his position of inferiority. This was 
particularly the case in Peyima, where the majority of the Konos supported the SLPP. Indeed, while his 
strategy to affiliate with the APC had initially been launched to draw in authority to help support himself and 
his family, this strategy had backfired. He suspected that the land had been lost because of his political 
activities. Taylor’s case constituted a micro-struggle in the countryside and was of little interest to the 
paramount chief, a close ally of Chief Gborie, let alone the Local Unit Commander of the SLP. There was 
little ambiguity with regard to the state in the way Gborie handled the case. He neither appropriated state 
functions nor ‘state talk’. Rather, he pursued his own agenda by virtue of his position of power as the town 
chief derived from his command of a hybrid order of authority. Taylor knew that if he took the matter to the 
paramount chief or the police, he would be told that there was nothing they could do. 
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challenge the leadership of the town. Even if the challenge was in vain, as in the case of 
Taylor, it was nonetheless being articulated as a possibility. 
 
8.5 Non-Kono members of the Poro society 
Poro initiation lies at the heart of becoming a man and of male political advancement and 
social status in Peyima. Referring to eastern Sierra Leone, Fanthorpe (2001:373) notes that 
in “this cultural milieu, constructing ‘community’ is an exercise in crossing boundaries, in 
undergoing the same rites of passage in the same locale. That process does not exclude 
newcomers, but requires them to make social connections that establish a local identity.” In 
the mid-2000s, paramount chiefs across Kono district decided to deny allochthons the right 
to be initiated into the Poro. This decision indicates that the identity of ‘stranger’ had 
become a greater threat to the indigenes in Peyima, due to increasing numbers of 
‘strangers’ and perceived challenges to the Kono leadership.  
Jimmy Sahr, a particularly vociferous proponent of the rights of the autochthons, 
explained:  
Before, we did initiate the different types of ethnic groups like the Mandingo, the 
Karaka, the Fullah when they violate the law [when they entered the Poro bush as 
non-initiates, for instance]. But later we found out that when you initiate them, they 
will go and interpret our secret society, expose our secret outside. So we decided 
not to do it any longer. We saw them violate the law so that they could be initiated, 
coming in large numbers (Jimmy Sahr, interview, February 2008). 
Taylor Kondeh had become a Poro member before the bylaw of excluding allochthons 
came into force. Acknowledging the importance of the institution, he noted: “I didn’t have 
the right to become a town chief, but as long as I’ve become a society member, it’s one of 
the identities that will authorize you to become a leader in Kono District as a Kono man.” 
Combined with joining the APC, Poro membership was an important component of his 
attempt to bolster his authority in the town. It had always been a general rule that ‘sons of 
the soil’, autochthons, had a birth-given right to become members. However, among 
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autochthon and allochthon initiates alike, access to the inner circle of the Poro society was 
only for a select few individuals who could claim descent from the founders of the town.  
Because of his mixed tribal heritage, Taylor had struggled to become a member. Although 
he had now succeeded, it had made little difference to him, “because they marginalize me,” 
he noted, “that my father is a Mandingo. I told them you are a liar; you have lied. Why do 
you allow me to enter that forest? The day I entered there you told me that I have got the 
right to become even a paramount chief of this land, and now you are trying to move me 
out? It is not easy.”  
Taylor’s motivation to become a Poro member was not dissimilar to that of many others. 
On one occasion, Kalilu noted about Taylor: “Kondeh is not a Kono, he’s there because of 
ambition. He wants power, that’s why he’s going to the secret society.” Becoming 
politically active was one way to build authority in Peyima (as was involvement in the 
Partnership Board). Seeking secret society membership was another way, but now, any 
authority Taylor expected to gain from being a Poro member was being denied.  
Until this point, I have analyzed the Poro as an institution constitutive of foundational 
hybridity. It is inherently part of state formation processes, but was presented to me by 
informants in Peyima as separate from the state system, and as having an ordering effect on 
locally-embedded micro-struggles. This makes it evident that the making of such order, to 
which the Poro contributes, is not recognized if one focuses solely on the state and the 
assemblages of actors, things and discourse that constitute it. Moreover, the particular 
shape of the state in Sierra Leone, i.e., the foundational hybrid order upon which it rests, is 
ignored. 
The next section looks at a case where two young Poro members forcefully attempted to 
initiate a non-Kono. Because forced initiation was in violation of a bylaw passed by the 
paramount chief, the SLP and the Partnership Board were simultaneously involved. As the 
case unfolded, the inseparability and intermingling of languages of stateness and public 
authority became evident, and the foundational hybrid order was yet again confirmed. The 
example shows how the case shaped an assemblage constituted by chiefs, the Partnership 
Board, police officers and Poro members.  
 216 
 
8.6 Interfacing with the police 
A number of informants explained to me that the Poro society is a parallel world with its 
own cabinet. Chief Gborie, Jimmy Sahr, Isaac and Pa Kongue were members and thus part 
of the highest order of decision-making within and outside the Poro bush. Taylor, by 
contrast, was at the margins of decision-making – in the Poro bush and in the township. 
Among initiates there was a clear conception of an alternative public in the Poro bush, in 
which confrontations, discussions and action could take place in concert, not among the 
township, however, and not even among Poro initiates as a whole. It is thus not an 
alternative public in the sense described by Ekeh (1975) or Mamdani (1996) that is divided 
between an urban power that speaks the language of civil rights, and a civil power that 
claims to protect customary rights.  
The public in the Poro bush is not only established in opposition to state imposition, but, in 
the case of Peyima, also to other tribal groups who claim authority in the township by 
drawing on extra-local political affiliation with the ruling party, the APC. On one level, the 
public of the Poro bush becomes a boundary-making exercise to separate autochthons and 
allochthons in the locale, and to exclude the latter group, which included either non-
initiates or marginal members. Emphasizing the centrality of Poro membership, combined 
with the ascription of importance to where initiation took place, was a way of consolidating 
the power of the Konos in Peyima. 
On another level, however, it is also problematic to separate the public of the Poro society 
from that of the township or even the state itself. In the process of reproducing authority, 
the boundary between state and non-state becomes blurred, and the Poro becomes an 
analytically-privileged space within the justice and security field where the fragility of this 
distinction and how it is both created and dismantled, may be investigated. I have already 
described how the chiefs in Sierra Leone draw their authority from two legal codes, one 
emanating from the state and the other from locally-embedded discourses of autochthony, 
i.e., a hybrid order of languages of stateness and public authority. Labeling figures of 
 217 
authority state or non-state is equally problematic when we turn to events of crimes and 
violence committed in the name of the Poro. 
Peyima’s acting security officer, Ibrahim ‘Kalilu’ Kamara explained why the SLP as an 
institution of the state had no role to play in the Poro, while the individual police officers in 
their autochthon capacity did. This distinction demonstrates at the individual level that 
making a clear-cut distinction between stateness and public authority skews the 
simultaneity that hybridity is characterized by.  
Like Taylor, Kalilu was of mixed heritage, his father a Mandingo and his mother a Kono. 
Also, like Taylor, he had recently been initiated in order to pursue a position of authority in 
the township, namely that of Youth Chairman for Kamara Chiefdom. He had not been 
successful in his endeavor, but because he was a close ally of Chief Gborie, he had 
replaced Isaac as the acting security officer. The reason why the SLP could never play a 
role in Poro matters, Kalilu explained, is that:  
We’ve got the Mendes, the Temnes, and the Konos. They are all secret societal 
people. So when you tell them, any one of the police officers, you tell them 
something against the society, not Kono alone, but also in the north and the south, 
they will tell you: ‘My friend, an issue for the society is arranged in the society 
bush. It’s not our concern.’ Except if the matter is being brought to town, then it 
will be their concern, but if it’s in the bush, it’s not theirs (Kalilu, interview, 2009).  
Two points follow from Kalilu’s statement. On the one hand, the Poro bush becomes an 
arena within the space of justice and security where its rules have implications across the 
justice and security field. And yet boundaries are discursively created that deny a role for 
the SLP in the Poro bush, not as individual members, but in their capacity as police 
officers. On the other hand, the statement also indicates the dissolution of any clear 
distinction between ‘state’ and ‘non-state’ categories; indeed, this is an instance of 
complete overlap between the two in the individual who dissolves the boundary between 
being a police officer and Poro member. 
Crossing the physical boundary of the Poro bush and bringing a matter ‘to town’, as Kalilu 
put it, becomes vital in the practical re-establishment of these categories, and thereby of 
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boundaries between the state and the non-state. At the same time, the Poro society’s quality 
of existing in parallel to the external world vanishes, and the symbolic power that it 
possessed diminishes in the sense that the SLP in its capacity of being a state authority 
comes to play a role within it.  
The following case provides an example of where the physical and symbolic boundary 
between the bush and the town was transgressed. The productivity of SSR emerged yet 
again, and the SLP as well as the Partnership Boards became vital actors of authority amid 
the plurality of institutions creating order in the field of justice and security in the 
township. Confrontations within the Poro bush among members who had undergone ritual 
initiation were considered legitimate acts and subjected to rules and regulations set in the 
secret society.  
Crossing the boundary, i.e., acting violently against non-members in the name of the Poro 
society or forced initiation inevitably involved not only the chiefly hierarchy, but also 
animated the state system. When this line, which is formalized in bylaws, was crossed, the 
categories of state and non-state were reproduced, allowing ordering through acts of 
policing to take place. It is important note, relative to the argument in this chapter, that 
when the acts of violence in the name of the Poro society and forced initiation took place, 
the victims did not turn away from the state and the institutions representing it, but turned 
towards it for redress. 
 
8.6.1 Reproducing and crossing boundaries between town and bush, chiefdom and 
state 
This case took place in January 2009 and involved three young men in Tombodu: Osman 
Suma, Junior Bangura and Tamba Kellie. (Tombodu is the headquarter town in Kamara 
Chiefdom and is about six miles from Peyima.) Osman was 18 years old and a Susu by 
tribe. Junior and Tamba were around the same age, both Kono, and attending their last year 
of Alimadiga Muslim Secondary School in Tombodu.  
One evening, Junior and Tamba, who were Poro members, saw Osman, a non-member, 
lying on the veranda of his house, which was located on the dirt road leading to the secret 
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society bush. Walking home from ‘traditional dance’, as soon as they saw Osman, they 
demanded that as a non-Poro member he should follow the bylaw and go into his house so 
he could not see secret society activities.  
They started to call him bikamine, which means a Kono man who is not yet initiated. 
“Don’t say that,” Osman told them, “if I am or not, doesn’t matter, just leave me as you see 
me. I am a Sierra Leonean and that’s not my tradition.” The young men got into an 
argument and used ‘abusive language’. Junior and Tamba began to beat Osman with a 
stick, took out razor blades and emulated ritual acts of initiation by making cuts on 
Osman’s back along his spine from the neck to the waistline – symbolizing teeth marks 
from the devil. As is normally the case during initiation in the Poro bush, a lot of blood 
was spilled.  
A Mr. Foyah, who was passing by, tried unsuccessfully to separate the men, but Osman 
was able to free himself from Junior and Tamba and managed to find his way to the police 
post in Tombodu. Meanwhile, Mr. Foyah had gone to Yusuf Mansaray, the Partnership 
Board chairman of the chiefdom. Yusuf was a Mandingo by tribe, “my grandfather came to 
this place,” he noted one day when we sat in his compound discussing the case. Despite 
having grown up in Tombodu and his work as a businessman:  
Some people are not happy with me being the Partnership Board Chairman, 
because I am not part of their custom, I am not a member [of the society]. But the 
paramount chief said that he wants people who are active to be members, those who 
want to serve the community and do the work. The local Partnership Board is not 
part of the tribe. As long as the person is active and ready to serve the chiefdom he 
is supposed to be a member (Yusuf Mansaray, interview, March 2009). 
When Yusuf arrived at the scene of crime, Junior and Tamba had left, and Yusuf went 
straight to the police post. He met Osman and took him to the Government Hospital for 
treatment, where he was treated for three weeks. The SLP and Yusuf subsequently went in 
search for the two young men, who were nowhere to be found. The next day, however, 
Yusuf was told that the two boys were hiding in the Poro bush. Because he was not a Poro 
member, Yusuf was unable to act on this information (thereby reproducing the boundary 
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between the town and the Poro bush). He took the information to the police officer in 
charge of Kamara Chiefdom, who was a Poro member. The officer went to the bush, 
arrested Tamba and Junior and brought them to the police station for questioning. They 
were then sent to Motema for incarceration. 
As Partnership Board chairman, Yusuf helped Osman and his family take the matter to the 
police. The case was considered a ‘blood crime’, and the Sumas, Osman’s family, wanted 
to “refer the matter to [the Magistrate] Court,” Yusuf noted, “because the [Paramount] 
Chief has made it a [by] law that they should not force anybody who is not a Kono to be 
part of the tradition; they make it a law” (ibid.). In doing so, a boundary was produced by 
Yusuf between the bush and the town, but also inside and outside the chiefdom, since the 
matter was confined to neither Tombodu nor Kamara. By extension, this led to the 
consolidation of a role to be played by the SLP vis-à-vis the secret society. As Yusuf 
continued to be involved in the case, he continued to reproduce the dichotomy between the 
state and non-state, inside and outside the chiefdom. Once this dichotomy was 
substantiated, contradictions started to emerge in his actions.  
As he pursued the case with state institutions, the Konos, including the paramount chief, 
pushed Yusuf, who is a Mandingo, to mediate between the families of Osman, Tamba and 
Junior in Tombodu. Yusuf considered whether an agreement could be reached between the 
parties and whether “apologies could be made” as Yusuf put it, in order to withdraw the 
case from Motema, and avoid a trial and its inevitable costs (ibid.). 
By this point, a number of boundaries had been affected by this case. The boundary 
between the Poro bush and the town had been crossed, and a dislocation had taken place 
within the justice and security field, which allowed SLP involvement. However, in parallel 
to this process of boundary-transgression, by bringing the families of the defendant and the 
accused together in Tombodu, Yusuf also reproduced yet another boundary that existed 
between inside and outside the chiefdom. The case had already been handed over to the 
police, but in the capacity of Partnership Board Chairman, Yusuf sought to withdraw the 
case from the SLP in Motema. 
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With Tamba and Junior’s parents, and without the knowledge of Osman and his family, the 
decision was made to withdraw the case from Motema. “We arranged for some amount [of 
money] to be sent to Motema station to bail the boys and asked them to stay in Koidu 
town,” Yusuf told me, “because if they see them here in Tombodu without the consent of 
the people that take them to the police there will be trouble” (ibid.).  
As the case unfolded, the boundary between the Poro bush and the township had been 
reproduced. At the same time, as the SLP and other state institutions came into play, 
another boundary was reproduced, namely the one demarcating ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ the 
social and physical space of the chiefdom. Public authority became the amalgamated result 
of the exercise of power by a variety of local institutions (Lund 2006:686), including 
Partnership Board Chairman Yusuf, Paramount Chief Ngekia and police officers in 
Tombodu and Motema.  
As a figure of authority, Yusuf moved back and forth across boundaries within the security 
and justice field and reproduced physical domains of inside and outside that enabled the 
police to engage in the case. He embodied the Partnership Board, a local organization 
simultaneously deriving its authority from affiliation with both the SLP and the paramount 
chief. In this capacity, by his involvement in the case of violence committed by Tamba and 
Junior against Osman, he came to play a crucial role in the production of boundaries. These 
boundaries were drawn between physical and symbolic spaces within the justice and 
security field, allowing the police officer to act in his dual capacity of Poro member and 
state representative (police), for instance. In resolving the matter, however, practices 
affiliated with autochthony came to dominate. 
 
8.6.2 The practice of dissolving the state-society split 
The SLP were without a doubt paid off to release the accused, but there was more at stake, 
namely the fact that the case involved two Konos, i.e., autochthons, and revolved around 
the Poro society. On one level, the case was important because it suggests that even when 
violence is committed – blood crimes – the case may end up with the police, but it might as 
well be withdrawn and settled ‘within’ rather than ‘outside’ the chiefdom or by combining 
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those two spaces. More importantly, however, the case emphasized the reverse of what 
Kalilu considered impossible: that the SLP could play a role in society matters. Indeed, the 
case was instigated by Osman, a non-initiate, and a police officer, a Poro initiate, who 
arrested Tamba and Junior. Thus, the boundary between the township and the bush was 
crossed and the police officer was able to act precisely because he was fluent in both 
languages of public authority and stateness, i.e., as a Poro member and a police officer.  
Following from this, it became difficult, if not impossible to ascribe exercised authority to 
the ‘state’ as a coherent institution. The nature of the case and the actions of Yusuf, who 
zigzagged back and forth across physical and symbolic boundaries, disrupted and joined 
otherwise separate categories and in the process animated a variety of actors, including the 
institution of the Poro society, the chief and the police. Authority in this case became the 
amalgamated exercise of power that flowed from a variety of locally-embedded and extra-
local institutions.  
Following Lund (2006:686), it is “unrewarding to attempt an analytical distinction between 
state and civil society,” or the state and the non-state. But, Lund continues, “although 
analytically inert, the distinction between state and civil society has a lot going for it in the 
discursive and political organization of society on a grand and small scale alike” (ibid.). I 
would argue, however, that the case explored above suggests that even in discourse and 
political organization, the distinction between state and non-state must be questioned, 
given that the actors involved drew on the variety of sources of authority that they did. 
Certainly, there did not appear to be an “imposition of external institutions, conjugated 
with the idea of a state” to paraphrase Lund (ibid.). Yusuf, for instance, did not act against 
the SLP, but engaged police officers in Tombodu and Motema, drew them into the case, 
and then pushed them away by seeking to resolve the case in Tombodu and by ‘bailing out’ 
Tamba and Junior. The hybrid order was indeed reproduced through involvement of the 
Partnership Board member (one of the organizational forms shaped in part by the SSR 
process). 
The way that this case was handled ought to have implications for how SSR is formulated 
and programmed, but as the next, and final section of the chapter shows, this has not been 
the case. Indeed, the world of policy-making and parts of academia have treated the 
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constitutive effects of the Poro in the justice and security field fairly superficially. Yet, 
only by engaging these kinds of organization will it be more fully understood what forms 
of authority are being produced and how. In any case, it can safely be assumed that the 
political entity envisioned in international policy-making will not emerge through SSR as 
state-building. 
 
8.7 An academic and policy blind spot in the justice and security field 
Since the late 1990s, there has been a dearth of information about and discussion of 
institutions such as secret societies under the rubric of SSR in Sierra Leone. There has been 
little effort to consider how such secret societies co-establish a particular order in the 
justice and security field. In recent academic literature, the Poro is often mentioned as part 
and parcel of an ‘informal justice sphere’. Sawyer (2008:393) vaguely refers to them as an 
‘auxiliary mechanism’ among several that regulate “certain aspects of moral conduct and 
certain geographical spaces” (ibid.). Jackson (2007:105) notes that “critical governance 
issues” are “decided by the secret societies rather than in the chiefdom councils.” However, 
in the case of both Sawyer and Jackson, an analysis of the kinds of ordering effects that the 
Poro society has on how justice and security are enforced is not addressed in any detail.  
There are various reasons for this. Little wrote about The Role of the Secret Society in 
Cultural Specialization in 1949, but generally speaking, his observations still holds true 
today, namely that “Poro and other society secrets” remain “guarded very jealously” (Little 
1949:211). This implies that “discussion of society matters and Poro ones in particular, 
even when superficial, with a non-member and especially a European, is regarded as a 
serious offence…” (ibid.). Even if there were mechanisms within the state-building 
framework to discuss, translate and engage matters relating to institutions such as secret 
societies, limited will to do so on the part of Poro members remains an important 
impediment.  
Furthermore, as Jackson (2006:105) comments, explorations of secret societies are “a 
closed door” to most researchers, even if “their influence is a constant in Sierra Leonean 
politics” (see also Fulton 1972:1222). Policy-makers and academics alike are therefore 
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restricted with respect to the information they can obtain about secret societies, which is 
evident in the lack of recent substantive empirical studies of how they operate, including 
within the justice and security field (see Højbjerg 2007:21).110 A plethora of ethnographic 
studies does exist, however, focusing on Liberia and the borderlands between Sierra Leone 
and Guinea (see Bellman 1984; Fulton 1972; Gibbs 1962; Siegmann 1980). 
That secret societies fall outside the purview of SSR programming is compounded by the 
fact that project designs by international agencies are ‘technically expressed’ and 
‘politically shaped’, to paraphrase Mosse (2005:15). Program designers do not make the 
effort to incorporate knowledge of ordering practices such as those of secret societies into 
programs, because they can not be articulated in languages of stateness. The lack of 
information about a secret society such as the Poro is not only due to its inaccessibility to 
outsiders. It is also due to the fact that the Poro as a fundamental component of the justice 
and security field in rural Sierra Leone is disregarded in SSR programming. 
The SSR process of re-establishing the SLP that began in the late 1990s appeared to many 
observers to be based on the assumption that colonial regimes had in fact left behind the 
framework of a Weberian rational bureaucracy that sought, albeit unsuccessfully, to 
perform routine public administration that could be built upon. Furthermore, a ‘trickle-
down effect’ was assumed in the process of state-building in Sierra Leone (Albrecht 
2010:9), which disregarded processes of appropriation and translation that would occur as 
the discourse of SSR programming was turned into practice. Yet, as this and previous 
chapters have indicated, one cannot make this blanket assumption due to the distribution of 
power in the justice and security field, of which the Poro society is a structuring effect. 
 
                                            
110 Højbjerg (2007:21) has explored ‘so-called secret societies’ in Loma of Guinea, and argues that research 
on the political aspects of local religion has privileged the main male and female initiatory institutions Poro 
and Sande. However, it is generally unclear in many of these studies what actually characterizes the 
presumed connection between what is essentially a religious institution and the local political culture in many 
Upper Guinea forest and coastal societies. “This lack of analytical insight,” Højbjerg (ibid.) notes, “is due in 
part to the absence of first hand documentation concerning the processes of Poro politics, including the role 
and motivation of specific decision-makers, the commitment to rule-governed action by the majority of 
common Poro members, etc.” 
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8.8 Conclusion 
SSR as state-building articulates processes of concentration and differentiation/separation 
that are guided by the imagery of a reified state that stands above, and at the same time 
encompasses, controls and regulates society. This was the process of ‘statification’ that the 
UK supported during SSR: The incorporation of languages of stateness into and re-
configuration of the justice and security field. As this chapter has shown, languages of 
public authority that assemble and are reproduced through Poro activities might not be 
captured by the state-building discourse. This, however, makes them no less constitutive of 
order in the justice and security field. Indeed, to understand the productive effects of SSR 
as state-building is to take into account institutions such as the Poro society. 
The notion of belonging substantiates secret society membership. Claims of Poro 
membership, combined with ancestral association, profoundly influence land tenure 
decisions and claims for justice, both within and outside the secret society bush. The 
persistent articulation of ‘languages of stateness’ in the state-building discourse – and in 
academia and policy – amounts to a disregard for the fundamental micro-struggles that 
such claims constitute. ‘Thinking hybridly’ helps us reach a more comprehensive 
understanding of how assemblages take shape in the justice and security field, and deepens 
our understanding of the various sources that authority always already emanates from. 
Foundational hybridity is immanent. The Poro bush was spoken of above as a parallel 
world with its own cabinet – a space in the justice and security field where the SLP had no 
formal role to play. The reason for this is not simply that the SLP was and still is 
considered to be part of the state system, but that most police officers themselves are secret 
society members and therefore would not interfere as police officers in Poro matters. The 
Poro bush is an arena within the space of justice and security where rules are set that have 
implications across the field as a whole. And yet boundaries are produced that both allow 
and deny the SLP as a state system to play a role in the Poro bush. 
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9 Hybridity enacted: a case of diamond theft in Kamara Chiefdom 
9.1 Introduction 
Ferguson (2006 [1994]:284) notes about international development programs that “plans 
constructed within a conceptual apparatus do have effects, but in the process of producing 
these effects, they generally “fail” to transform the world in their own image.” It is one 
thing to understand and accept in the abstract that the western universalist state cannot be 
established in Sierra Leone through state-building. It is something different to appreciate 
how the principles of SSR have been translated into a locality such as Kamara Chiefdom, 
and accordingly, to understand how and by whom the field of justice and security has been 
and is organized. 
To understand these processes of translation, this chapter analyzes one case of diamond 
theft that began as a matter between two miners, moved to the verandah of Melvin Ngekia, 
Kamara Chiefdom’s paramount chief, and eventually ended up at Motema police 
headquarters with Mustapha Kambeh, the SLP Local Unit Commander. It shows how an 
assemblage took shape and evolved, and provides insight into the many sources of 
authority that went into dealing with, if not necessarily solving the case. SSR and police 
reform have been productive in re-composing the organization of the justice and security 
field. Its productivity, however, lies in reproducing and adding new elements to, rather than 
eradicating the foundational hybrid order that governs the countryside of Sierra Leone. 
Although tensions exist between them, positing languages of stateness in opposition to 
languages of public authority sets up yet another “ideal constitutive separation” (Buur 
2006:741) between ‘the state’ on the one hand, and ‘society’ on the other. Instead, I argue 
that the justice and security field should be approached analytically as a terrain of struggle, 
a field of distributed authority in which a range of actors assemble to enforce a hybrid 
order. Authority to do so inevitably draws simultaneously on both languages of stateness 
and public authority. By using the concept of field, the possibility of establishing a 
dichotomous relationship between these languages is decreased, as differences are set to 
play across symbolically-constructed boundaries (Hardt and Negri 2000:142). 
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If the state-building objective had been realized, it would have had both an essentializing 
and homogenizing effect. Yet, since hybridity is foundational and produces a strong basis 
of heterogeneity, establishing a centrally-governed political entity was always already an 
unlikely outcome. This is not a novel observation; it has been proposed by a number of 
authors (see Rotberg 2004; Ghani and Lockhart 2008; Call 2008:1499; Andersen 2010:29). 
Therefore, the important question is not whether state-building is possible or not, but what 
this process of seeking to reshape war-torn societies, and in my case, re-composing the 
justice and security field, looks like in practice. In the same vein, it is not about whether 
state-building per se works or not; even if it reproduced an already existing hybrid order, it 
has nonetheless altered how order is established in the justice and security field. The 
question is what alterations state-building produced and how the classificatory schemes of 
the individuals who appropriate and translate SSR assemblages shape the justice and 
security field in the process. 
This chapter explores the productivity of SSR and the types of authoritative languages 
expressed in the justice and security field. The case of diamond theft under scrutiny 
identifies the mix of authorities that come into play when a crime occurs, and how 
hierarchies of authority are shaped and reshaped, subverted and re-established by the types 
of authority that actors can invoke to resolve a criminal case.  
Individuals with a stake in the justice and security field sought to improve their own 
position in order to resolve the case by emphasizing the authority that was available to 
them, for example, by referring to their Partnership Board affiliation, by exposing symbols 
of statehood or by tacitly enacting their position within the chiefly hierarchy. Thus, a 
variety of actors were involved, including individual villagers, political party members, 
chiefs, Partnership Board members and police officers, providing insight into the hybrid 
order that continues to manifest itself in a rural mining area such as Peyima in Kamara 
Chiefdom. 
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9.2 Unfolding a case of diamond theft 
I first heard the details of the case of diamond theft from Isaac, himself an articulation of 
the hybrid order under discussion, and whom we met in an earlier chapter of this thesis. 
The case took place when Isaac was still Peyima’s Partnership Board member in late 2008. 
He was one of the only ‘intellectuals’ in Peyima, which means that he can read and write, a 
rare skill in an area where literacy is considered far less important than mining and the 
pursuit of ‘quick money’. Isaac’s authority had not been shaped by chiefly descent, 
although he had grown up in the family of the Tankos, which held claims to the position of 
town chief of Peyima. Isaac was concerned about how to maintain authority in the 
chiefdom. He not only explicitly noted this himself; he embodied it. His face expressed 
angst, he was extremely thin, and seemed to be verging on self-consumption. 
Isaac attended, but had not graduated from, Bo Government Secondary School, commonly 
known as Bo School, one of the biggest and most prominent secondary schools in Sierra 
Leone. Furthermore, as Peyima’s Partnership Board member, he entertained close links 
with the Local Unit Commander, Mustapha Kambeh in Motema, a relationship he was 
careful to nurture by frequent meetings and exchanges of information. Finally, Isaac was 
also politically active within ‘the party of the day’, the APC, the party in power in 
Freetown. Hence, Isaac was constantly renegotiating his authority; not only did he have to 
defend it, as is the case regarding chiefs, he had to continuously produce and reproduce it. 
Through his different activities, Isaac was able to establish and sustain a position among 
Peyima’s leaders, specifically, and the chiefdom more generally, from where he could 
authoritatively claim a role to play, both in the social and physical space of Kamara, 
including the chiefly hierarchy and the security and justice field. Indeed, his ability to 
claim affiliation with the SLP through Partnership Board membership became a significant 
source of authority and enabled him to play a part in resolving the case of diamond theft. It 
was from this position of authority that Isaac explained the case to me. 
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9.2.1 Two miners, a stone and statifying the case 
A villager from Peyima found a stone in one of the many diamond pits that perforate 
Kamara Chiefdom. The miner’s name was Abraham. He was not sure whether it was a 
diamond, but it looked like a chap-chap, a rough diamond. The way that you can tell 
whether you have made an interesting find is if the stone has ‘corners’. Some parts of this 
particular chap-chap looked ‘shiny’ and the color was ‘candle-like’. Abraham took the 
stone to his friend, Fasalie, who was down the road in Nemesedu, to ask his opinion.  
Nemesedu was also the home of the person under whose license the stone had been found 
(a license holder buys or is given the right by the Chief to mine at a given site). The license 
holder in this particular case was an old, blind man with candle-colored eyes – like rough 
diamonds. He had not always been blind, but suffered from ‘river blindness’ caused by a 
worm that breeds in fast-flowing rivers – a common condition for many ‘difers’ who find 
diamonds in the riverbed of Bafi. 
The fact that a mining license holder is part of the case is crucial – both to the analytical 
points of this dissertation, and to Abraham. Because a license is granted by an agency of 
the state, the license holder’s authority is sourced from symbolic articulations of stateness. 
He projects the importance of the state in producing authority, and provides the legitimacy 
to report the case of theft to the chief in the first place, as well as to the SLP. In fact, 
without involving a license holder, there simply was no case for Abraham to claim that the 
stone had disappeared or been stolen, since officially it would then have been an 
illegitimate find (and confiscated by the paramount chief if it was found). There was little 
doubt that the case would reach both the paramount chief and SLP’s Local Unit 
Commander if the stone was even suspected to be of any value.  
As I spoke to more people involved in the case, it became evident that in fact the blind man 
might not have been the person under whose license the stone was found. Isaac mentioned 
that Abraham had been doing unlicensed mining in the forest between Peyima and Bondu. 
However, the fact that a license holder could be identified meant that Abraham could 
report the case, and the blind man had agreed to stand in. These strategies needed to be put 
in place to circumvent the formal rules of mining to ensure that the rules are abided by at 
 230 
least symbolically (a man with a license is found), if not in practice (it was not under the 
blind man’s license that the chap-chap was found).  
Abass, a key informant, explained to me the process of bringing in a person to testify in a 
case of diamond theft who might have a license, but who was not necessarily the license 
holder under whose license the diamond was found. Because of the high cost and 
paperwork involved in obtaining a mining license, Abass had been mining without a 
license for several years in Kono District and had made some significant finds. As 
Abraham and many others in Kamara Chiefdom, Abass mined without a license on the 
outskirts of Peyima, and therefore could end up in a situation where he would need to find 
a person with a license to validate a find. Abass explained the key role of validating the 
license holder in these circumstances as follows: 
Well, if my brother has a license now and his own license is correct, and I have 
worked on a place where the license is not correct, I will invite my brother to come 
with that of his own license just to see. I will use his license so that I will be able to 
sell peacefully. But if I say I will never involve my brother, I will go and sell it like 
that. If my guys [collaborators] try to prosecute in case we get a big find, I will pay 
them. So when I’ve given them their money, they will come back to reveal my 
bluffing, you know, follow people’s wives, the chief’s wives. And when the chief 
knows, he will think ‘oh, these guys have got money, and it’s a big sum of money, 
oh, he is a big brother’, it’s a big trouble. They will just take us to the police and 
ask us where we sold the diamonds. If we sold it to Peter, we have to go and point 
to Peter, if Peter has ‘money in the fridge’. They will come to you: ‘Yes, Peter’, but 
if you too have a license to buy diamond then we are safe. But if we take it to a 
person who doesn’t have a license, and we did not get this diamond from a licensed 
place, oooh, that is a big problem for both of us (Abass, interview, February 2009).  
Only if a find is significant will the miners scramble to find a license in support of selling 
the stone (otherwise, it will end up in the informal diamond market behind the bus station 
in the center of Koidu). The blind man provided such an opportunity: “When they [the 
paramount chief and the Local Unit Commander] see the blind man,” Isaac said, “they will 
be very sympathetic – ‘Oh, look at this old blind man’. So the case will be taken very 
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serious.” Moreover, because he was blind, his role as a witness was limited – he held a 
license but could quite literally not claim to have played an active role in finding the stone 
or a stake in resolving the matter between Abraham and Fasalie. 
 
9.2.2 Consolidating hybridification: involving the paramount chief 
Before the scramble to find a license holder began, Fasalie had told Abraham that he would 
take the stone to Koidu where he would seek out one of the many licensed diamond dealers 
in the center of town. In other words, the license holder only became relevant because it 
had become a case of theft. A license holder is not required to sell a stone or have it valued. 
Thus, a diamond dealer can buy whichever stone he wishes from whoever offers it to him. 
Fasalie told Abraham that he would try to find a person with a ‘detector machine’ that 
could verify whether the stone was a diamond. When Fasalie came back to Peyima, he said 
that he had taken the stone to Alasi Bally. A known Marrakesh diamond exporter, Bally 
had told Fasalie that, in fact, it was not a diamond. Fasalie then told Abraham that he had 
left the stone with his brother and returned to Peyima without any ‘attestation’. Because no 
paper work existed from Fasalie’s meeting with Bally, it never became clear what the value 
of the stone was, indeed, if it had any.  
When Abraham asked if he could have his stone back, Fasalie then changed his story. He 
had not left it in Koidu, but in Tombodu, the headquarter town of Kamara Chiefdom and 
the base of the paramount chief. At this point, from Abraham’s perspective, the stone had 
“disappeared”: it had been stolen. 
It was in Tombodu that Chief Gborie heard about the incident. He hurriedly called the man 
who had found the diamond as well as the ‘license holder’, the blind man from Nemesedu, 
who is normally known as the supporter of the miner.111 The Chief arranged a meeting 
with the men in Bondu village, headquarter of the section in which Peyima is located. 
                                            
111 The ’supporter’ is different from the ’investor’. The supporter operates at the local level with a license to 
do alluvial mining in a specifically demarcated area. Investors, on the other hand, deal with capital-intensive 
mining, which is still alluvial, but with help from ‘caterpillars’ that cost US$1000 to rent per day.  
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Chief Gborie did this with support from Isaac, who had been following the case closely 
and consciously in order to avoid involvement of the paramount chief. Both Chief Gborie 
and Isaac had an interest in solving the case as close to home as possible, because the 
higher the case climbed up the chiefly hierarchy, the less they would gain financially from 
resolving the case. No one was keener to do so than Isaac, because the kind of authority he 
could mobilize would be considerably diluted by engaging the paramount chief, and even 
more so if the police were involved. After all, he was merely Peyima’s Partnership Board 
member. 
Isaac’s ability to ‘withdraw’ the case from the chiefly hierarchy, as he put it, was hindered 
by the disappearance of the stone and the fact that the explanation of the ‘accused’, Fasalie, 
was not consistent. He was perceived to be lying by a growing number of people in 
Peyima, who were becoming engaged in the case.  
The suspicion that he had come into sudden money was fuelled when Fasalie began to 
display acts of ‘conspicuous consumption’, which is usually done by organizing big parties 
in and for the local community. “He even bought some sheep!” Isaac noted: “So the boy 
[Abraham] said, this is my money that you are using to buy these things. The time I was 
giving you this stone, there was nothing with you. We were all living an average life, but 
now I’m seeing you living a happy life.” (Isaac, interview, December 2008). 
Attempts to resolve the case locally led nowhere; as a last resort, it became a matter for the 
paramount chief to investigate and prosecute further. Isaac summed up his role in the case, 
and the implications of the case going to the paramount chief: “So we intervene, we try to 
interrogate them, investigate – so we find out that the matter is above us, and we took them 
to the paramount chief. There our own stage of investigation ends, because it’s actually to 
the higher level.” (Isaac, interview, December 2008). 
 It was evident that the authority that Isaac could draw upon, partly embedded in languages 
of stateness that had been introduced through police reform and partly by virtue of chiefly 
appointment to that position, was not sufficient to resolve the case. 
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9.2.3 Articulations of stateness in Kamara Chiefdom 
It is important to emphasize that Kamara Chiefdom is not a non-state space 
‘uncontaminated’ by languages of stateness. The presence of the license holder in the case 
invoked the office of the state-appointed Mining Chairman of Kamara Chiefdom, who 
approves all licenses to mine. And the Mining Chairman of Kamara Chiefdom is Chief 
Gborie. “Only he can approve the development fee and surface rent, only he can approve 
the company” Taylor noted, “so you cannot mine in Kamara without consulting Chief 
Gborie” (Taylor Kondeh, interview, January 2009).  
However, the paramount chief appointed Gborie to the position of Mining Chairman for 
Kamara Chiefdom precisely because Gborie was Peyima’s Town Chief and because he had 
supported Ngekia when he had run for elections a few years earlier. Thus, Gborie 
embodied a hybrid order, because the base of his authority to take on this position 
emanated from his status of autochthon, secret society membership as well as from the 
power conferred upon him in state legislation. In fact, he was only able to take on the role 
of Mining Chairman because of the hybrid base of his authority, which in turn bolstered his 
position in the security and justice field. It was, however, not enough, and the case had 
now moved to the center of hybrid authority in Kamara Chiefdom, the paramount chief. 
 
9.2.4 The paramount chief as gatekeeper- ritualizing chiefly power 
When the case arrived on the doorstep of the paramount chief, it had reached the highest 
authority, what may be referred to as the ‘gatekeeper’ of Kamara Chiefdom. In his hybrid 
capacity, Paramount Chief Ngekia put on public display the power he held to decide 
whether the case should be resolved ‘within’ or ‘outside’ the chiefdom, whether the case 
should be handed over to the SLP or not. He was the formal center of decision-making in a 
conglomerated personification of politics and economy, justice and security in Kamara. 
To solve the case, a meeting, or rather a ‘courtroom’ scenario, took place one Sunday 
morning on the verandah of the paramount chief’s house in Tombodu. By law, every 
chiefdom in Sierra Leone should have between one and four Local Courts, presided over 
by a Court Chairman, Court Clerk and a panel of elders known as members (see Local 
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Courts Act 1963). The Chiefdom Council nominates the Court Chairman for a three-year 
term with final approval from the Ministry of Local Government (Koroma 2007).  
However, no Court Chairman was present at the hearing of Abraham and Jimmy’s 
diamond theft case that Sunday morning. While he had been appointed, the Court 
Chairman himself told me that he could not dedicate any time to the job since he was not 
being paid. And so, Ngekia was the judge, he questioned the parties, made the ruling and 
decided next steps on what to do based on what Abraham and Fasalie had to say. 
As the case unfolded that day, it became something of a secular ritual, a socio-cultural 
construct of the distribution of power within Kamara Chiefdom on public display (Moore 
and Myerhoff 1977). The ritual practice was not an ‘instrument’ of the Paramount Chief 
Ngekia, but was itself constitutive of the production and negotiation of power relations 
(Bell 1992:196). At this point the authority of the paramount chief was mobilized in a final 
attempt to resolve the case ‘within’ themselves in Kamara Chiefdom. Moore and and 
Myerhoff (1977:4) argue that rituals, sacred or secular, endow “authority and legitimacy to 
the positions of particular persons, organizations, occasions, moral values, views of the 
world” and “structure the way people think about social life.” As the de facto judge that 
day, the paramount chief ritualized his position in the chiefdom.  
The courtroom scenario also demonstrated the boundary between within and outside the 
chiefdom, as the chief consolidated his own turf and that of the police. At the same time, 
the inseparability of the two figures of authority – chief and police – also became evident. 
The chief blurred his own base of foundational hybrid authority by separating ‘within’ and 
‘outside’ the chiefdom, but it was a separation that collapsed when the practice of how the 
case was dealt with was scrutinized, particularly since the chief would stay involved, even 
if the case was handed over to the SLP. 
That Sunday morning, the paramount chief was sitting in his pajamas at the far right of the 
verandah, rather inconspicuous, almost inappropriate in his appearance – to me, at least; no 
one else seemed to take notice. For a while now he had suffered from a heart condition; he 
came across that morning as heavily medicated, moving and speaking slowly and 
sometimes incoherently. His house is situated on a hillside overlooking Tombodu and is 
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encircled by old mango trees. The verandah itself is elevated two or three meters above the 
ground, which allows the chief to always look down on people standing in front of the 
house.  
Many people criticized the Chief because he was not permanently based in Tombodu. He 
spent most of his time in Koidu – as did many other paramount chiefs in Kono District – 
and only visited his chiefdom occasionally mostly for business reasons. Effectively, the 
case between Abraham and Fasalie was considered relevant for ‘business reasons’, since 
the potential for monetary gain was present.  
During the meeting – or de facto courtroom hearing – the ‘accused’ and the ‘defendant’ 
were seated to the left of the paramount chief on the verandah. Fasalie had arrived on his 
own, while Abraham had brought a support group. Isaac, Peyima’s Partnership Board 
member and at the time soon-to-be Deputy Chairman of the APC in Kamara Chiefdom, 
was present in support of Abraham. Present also were Peyima’s Youth Chairman and the 
APC Youth Chairman of the constituency who had worked with Isaac to resolve the matter 
before the case reached the paramount chief. (The significance of the presence of youth 
representatives at the hearing is worth emphasizing. They play a vital role in providing the 
physical aspects of security such as apprehension in most places outside district 
headquarter and chiefdom headquarter towns, and usually operate under the leadership of 
an elder. In fact, Partnership Board member Isaac referred to the youth in Peyima as ‘his 
boys’). The old blind man alleged to be the license holder was also present at the meeting, 
led to the hearing by one of his younger relatives.  
The paramount chief opened the meeting by emphasizing that he would prefer the matter 
be settled “among themselves,” so they did not have to take it to the police. As I had 
observed on several other occasions, the involvement of the police was presented as a 
threat and a last resort, something to be ashamed of, indicating that the chiefdom 
authorities were unable to deal with their own matters in the chiefdom. This is an 
articulation of the language of relationality between the chiefdom governed by the 
paramount chief and outside authorities such as the SLP over whom his powers were 
incomplete, but as it turned out nonetheless substantial.  
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A simple separation between state and chiefdom is impossible to maintain analytically, 
even if that was the imagery that the paramount chief projected through the threat of 
involving the SLP. This is first and foremost the case because the figure of the paramount 
chief is integral to state formation in Sierra Leone. At one level, therefore, the threat of 
taking the matter to the police, “let the law take its course” as the paramount chief put it, 
resembled an interim, if not permanent, expulsion of Fasalie from the chiefdom into 
corners of the justice and security field over which the paramount chief represented himself 
as having little or no control.  
Buur (2006:752) argues that socially- and politically-situated actors use discourses to 
support and justify actions that fit their own concerns; one should always be aware of the 
inherent reflection of power that is part of any articulation. The paramount chief might 
have produced a dichotomy in public discourse by instrumentalizing the distinction 
between ‘within’ and ‘outside’ Kamara Chiefdom, between the chiefdom and the SLP. As 
will be explored in greater depth below, however, the Local Unit Commander and the 
paramount chief remained closely interlocked even as the case and Fasalie were transferred 
to police headquarters at Motema.  
However, political rhetoric and official representations of crime, authority and boundary-
making have a symbolic weight and practical effectiveness with real consequences. 
Therefore, even if there is no clear cut differentiation between the chiefdom (paramount 
chief) and the state (police) in a hybrid order, the threat of letting “the law take its course” 
would only work if categorical boundaries were maintained, in words at least, if not in 
practice. Equally important, the paramount chief had to put on display for Abraham and the 
general population in the chiefdom that he had done what he could under the 
circumstances, both to maintain authority vis-à-vis the inhabitants of the chiefdom and to 
appease them. 
 
9.2.5 Visualizing hybridity: from Kamara to Motema  
At the hearing, the Chief asked Fasalie and Abraham to tell their versions of what had 
happened. Fasalie, who was not very talkative, maintained that the stone had not been a 
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diamond. Speaking in a whisper, his official story on the verandah was that he had gone to 
Koidu, and that he had thrown the stone away when he found out that it had no value. 
What mattered at the hearing was that he was unable to produce the stone and return it to 
its rightful owner, Abraham. Abraham said little, and looked puzzled, almost hurt. His case 
had already been made for him, a license holder had been found, and his story had been 
told and reiterated numerous times.  
In sum, therefore, as the case reached the top tier of the chiefly hierarchy within Kamara, it 
appeared evident that resolution was not possible, it was one man’s word against another’s, 
and a decision had to be made as to whether the case was to leave the locality of the 
chiefdom. After some interrogation the paramount chief quietly, yet firmly urged Fasalie to 
‘speak the truth’. However, Ngekia decided that the hearing had not led to the desired 
outcome and asked one of his staff to go down to the police post in Tombodu, and find a 
police officer to bring back to the meeting. 
By this time, it appeared that Fasalie was considered guilty by the paramount chief, and 
was on the brink of expulsion from the chiefdom. He then came under verbal attack from 
Abraham’s group of followers, who asked where the stone was, why it had not been 
handed over to Abraham and why he had changed his story several times along the way – 
questions that had already been asked and answered unsatisfactorily.  
In the middle of this verbal assault, the paramount chief’s assistant returned, saying that 
there was no officer at the police post. It was Sunday, a slow day in Tombodu. He was 
therefore sent to ‘Number 11’, an industrial mining site on the dirt road to Koidu where a 
police post had been set up. The attacks on Fasalie quieted down, and we all sat there in 
silence, waiting for a while. 
Fifteen minutes later, the Police Inspector turned up with Yusuf Mansaray, Kamara 
Chiefdom’s Partnership Board Chairman. They were not invited to sit on the verandah; 
they stood in front of the house, dressed in civilian clothing and looking up at the 
paramount chief, awaiting his orders, hesitant. The atmosphere was not hostile, but there 
was some doubt about what would happen next and whether Fasalie would indeed be 
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handed over to the police. It was not for the Police Inspector or Yusuf to make that 
decision. 
The physical separation on the paramount chief’s verandah, i.e., where the villagers from 
Kamara Chiefdom sat, and where the state, represented by the police, stood in front of the 
house, was a symbolic separation of chiefdom and the state that the paramount chief was at 
pains to produce in discourse and that militated against his foundational hybrid status.  
Moreover, the police officer did not arrive in a vehicle or wear a uniform, both of which 
are important symbols of statehood. This was equally true for the Chairman of the 
Partnership Board, who represented the crucial link between the police and the community. 
However, the fact that the police could be summoned and used by the paramount chief was 
a real threat to Fasalie, and in a double pull, supported the establishment of a clear 
discursive line of demarcation with practical consequences between the safety of the 
chiefdom and the uncertainty he might face at Motema police headquarters.  
While the SLP may have been resurrected through SSR, police reform did not 
fundamentally alter hierarchical relations within the chiefdom. It did not establish vertical 
encompassment of a state that stands above while at the same time containing its localities. 
Rather, it re-shaped the way assemblages took shape within the justice and security field, 
connecting components of recent police reform, historically shaped articulations of 
authority, embedded in discourses of autochthony, secret society membership, and so forth. 
The police were neither invited to sit on the verandah, nor able to force Fasalie into 
custody: this was a decision for the paramount chief. However, the building of a police 
force after the war had come to an end had established a force that could be engaged in 
resolution of the case of diamond theft, something that had not been the case before the 
conflict. 
The hearing on the verandah that Sunday morning projected an image of the state police 
that emphasized its spatial and conceptual dispersion, given the role of the chief in 
organizing and directing the SLP. By extension, it also provided insight into the challenge 
of the state’s universal reach, which SSR as state-building has done little to change. Within 
the justice and security field, the SLP had regained a position, but it was a position that 
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could never be enacted independent of the general distribution of power in the justice and 
security field, and the position of the chief. 
The paramount chief concluded the meeting and addressed the Police Inspector: “He 
[Fasalie] is very arrogant and he lies. He’s trying to take this chiefdom for a ride, so let the 
law take its course. Invite the two parties to the station to make statements.” Eventually, 
the public display of interrogation and case resolution concluded by Fasalie leaving the 
safety of the verandah to be taken to Motema police headquarters. The Police Inspector 
never went up the stairs to make an arrest, but waited for Fasalie to come down, quietly, 
and took him away. Thus, Fasalie became the object of secular ritualization, to follow 
Bell’s (1992) actor-centered approach to ritual practice, which is enacted to perform and 
articulate social control and domination.  
Quite literally, the paramount chief displayed his authority by structuring the movement of 
Fasalie from one location to another, a physical movement that also indicated that the case 
was being transferred from one set of actors to another within the justice and security field. 
Drawing on the authority of both his historical position and legal status, he enacted a 
boundary in discourse and practice between the chiefdom and the police. In this respect, 
the paramount chief was not only seeking financial gain, which was his primary and most 
immediate reason for engaging in resolution of the case. He was also engaging in the 
production of his own turf, of his own authority, but thereby also, in a double pull, 
reproducing the authority of the SLP. 
This display of relationality, i.e., the transfer of the case to the police and the movement 
from inside to outside the chiefdom, did not demarcate a boundary in practice between 
chief and police. Rather, the handover was followed seamlessly by the paramount chief’s 
re-possession of the matter. While clear lines of demarcation were drawn in public between 
the chief and police, and inside and outside Kamara Chiefdom, this distinction was not 
reflected in the practices that followed. Rather, it became evident that the two figures of 
authority, chief and police, could not act independent of one another. Indeed, they 
depended on each other’s positions in the justice and security field in order to project 
authority (if they were to ensure financial gain) and to confirm their positions of power by 
resolving the case.  
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9.2.6 Subjugation of the Partnership Board 
Hybrid authorities engaged in this case, who drew on each other’s ability to make order, 
were assembling in a simultaneous articulation of languages of stateness and public 
authority. It was this assembling of different types of authority and the strength of its 
articulation that led to resolution of the case in the end. A few days after the trial, I met 
with Isaac, who explained to me what had happened when Abraham, Fasalie and the rest of 
Kamara’s villagers left the verandah, why Fasalie had not told the truth, and why the 
paramount chief had left the case with the SLP. Isaac had “interrogated,” as he put it, those 
people in Koidu who had been mentioned at chiefdom level, the Marrakesh diamond dealer 
in particular, who told Isaac that he had returned the stone to Fasalie. 
In his capacity as a member of the Partnership Board, Isaac had then sought to withdraw 
the case from the police and return it to be resolved within the chiefdom. From his 
perspective, it was essential that the chiefdom remain in the game of resolving the matter 
and that the case be moved back inside the chiefdom.  
Isaac also considered withdrawing the case to be his responsibility: “The police partners 
now have to intervene,” he explained, “if they can call all interested parties, the people can 
encourage them to speak the truth.” That the accused had already been taken to the station 
to make a statement was not important: “That’s just paperwork; it’s my right to investigate 
and take a statement from the accused” (Isaac, interview, December 2009. But since the 
case had left the chiefdom to become an SLP issue in Motema, authorities from Bondu and 
Peyima had limited, if any, leverage. 
By virtue of his Partnership Board membership, to follow Bourdieu (1989:20), Isaac was 
seeking a strategy of presentation of self that was designed to manipulate his self-image, 
and especially, the image of his own position in social space and in the security and justice 
field. Remember, Isaac was endlessly occupied with the task of negotiating and 
renegotiating his own identity, in order to compensate for his lack of chiefly descent, 
which would have endowed him with immediate symbolic capital, if not necessarily 
symbolic power (see Bourdieu 1989:21). 
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Furthermore, given how the SLP and the paramount chief cooperate, and despite the 
authority that was available to Isaac as a Partnership Board member, the type of authority 
he held did not reach Motema police headquarters. Since the authority Isaac articulated had 
been granted to him by the Chief, he could never challenge the authority of the paramount 
chief, a title of symbolic property that gives the latter a right to share in the profits of 
recognition. The same is true for the Local Unit Commander, Kambeh, who draws 
authority from his affiliation with a state system that had been re-articulated, in part, 
through a police reform process that endowed him with the symbols and status of 
statehood. If Isaac and other villagers in Bondu Section were to gain from a settlement, 
Isaac would have to use whatever ad hoc strategy he could devise to withdraw Fasalie from 
the hands of the police.  
Isaac did not succeed, which was hardly surprising, given the ruling of the paramount 
chief. It was even suggested by some observers that Fasalie had already gone to the Chief 
to solve the case. Taylor Kondeh explained what this conversation probably had sounded 
like:  
’Papa!’, yeah, it’s true, but I’ve already used the money, just have this Kola [gesture of 
giving an amount of money] for you to help me to finish with the matter. Father, please 
hold this Kola and save me from this problem. Really, it’s true, I’ve sold it, so-so amount 
to so-so dealer. So that’s, whenever someone stole a diamond, they try very hard to grab 
him before he stole the diamond [sic], because as soon as he sold the diamond, he get the 
money (Taylor Kondeh, interview, April 2009). 
While not successful, Isaac’s attempt to withdraw the case was nonetheless one of the 
productive aspects of police reform as SSR, in that it projected the SLP’s return to Sierra 
Leone’s countryside, the introduction of the LNP doctrine and establishment of Partnership 
Boards. Isaac’s failure to withdraw the case did not, however, leave him overly jaded – it 
was simply an opportunity lost to make a few Leones, but others would come.  
On a regular basis, Partnership Board members and traditional leaders negotiate the release 
of people arrested by or initially handed over to the police in cases of theft as well as 
domestic violence. Often the case dealing with a matter ‘within themselves’ revolves 
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around money and is based on the assumption that the criminal can not afford the financial 
burden of being arrested and getting into contact with figures of authority of the state 
system.112 In this case of diamond theft, however, money was already in circulation and so 
was the interest of actors with substantial authority. 
 
9.2.7 The rule of hybridity through the interlocking of authority 
Parallel to Isaac’s lack of success in withdrawing the case from the police and the 
dynamics in Kamara Chiefdom, the case had run its course in Motema and Koidu. Formal 
resolution in Tombodu had ended with Fasalie’s ‘invitation’ to Motema, where he testified 
that what Abraham had given him was a simple stone, not a gem. This was the official 
report that went back to the paramount chief, who subsequently “demanded that Fasalie 
should be out of prison,” Isaac noted (Isaac, interview, December 2008).  
However, this did not constitute the end of interaction between the police and the 
paramount chief. Relations of power between these two figures are ubiquitous and are re-
negotiated continuously. As Lund (2002:4) notes, and this was explicitly the case here, 
social situations of opposition, acts of subversion or compliance, of evasion or 
confirmation, and of transgression or inculcation are ways of negotiating a specific order. 
The paramount chief and the Local Unit Commander, figures of authority in the justice and 
security field, were competing for a resource to improve their livelihoods while at the same 
time consolidating their turf.  
In practice, this worked out as a process of reciprocal transferences between the two 
figures of authority, continuously crossing boundaries between secrecy and public display 
and moving symbolically from one point within the justice and security field to another. 
Thus, while a formal transfer of the case to the SLP had taken place that morning on the 
paramount chief’s verandah, the paramount chief had not disengaged (indeed, this was not 
possible under the terms of the hybrid order). Taylor explained:  
                                            
112 Not once during my time in Peyima – and Kamara Chiefdom – did a case end up in the Magistrate Court. 
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Even if the police interfered into the matter, the paramount chief has a right to go 
and tell the police that I have an interest in this matter; and they [the police] will 
look, pay respect to him and then hand over the matter to him. While maybe for me 
as the local man to see the LUC is not going to be easy. The paramount chief, 
maybe he will just be sitting at his home, then call: ‘Hello: I get interest, I have 
interest in the matter. So please, I will be there at 10AM so I want to get a special 
talk with you. Then in fact I have a package for you [money]’. ‘Okay, okay sir,’ 
[the police replies], ‘you will see the police’. The police encourage corruption in 
this country – not even this country, all over the world (Taylor Kondeh, interview, 
January 2009). 
Taylor continued: 
So the police have the problem, yeah. So the paramount chief is an authority, he has 
a right as a dignitary to even stay at his home and call the LUC, then the LUC will 
report to him. Let me tell you one thing about the Kono paramount chiefs. All the 
LUCs that are working in Kono District, they love Kono. Because when you come 
to Kono you make it up quick because criminal cases are so much higher in Kono. 
But if you come as LUC and you don’t cooperate with them [the paramount chiefs], 
they will play another gun game; you will move out of the district. They transfer 
you another where [sic] (ibid.). 
The diamond dealer had also played a role in this regard. According to Taylor, he would 
have told Fasalie to deny any knowledge of where the diamond had ended up, and that he, 
Fasalie, would be rewarded for his acquiescence, which indeed he probably had been, 
considering his sudden acts of conspicuous consumption. As the case unfolded, it became 
more and more evident that the diamond dealer sat at the top of the food chain, as it were – 
“because he has money,” Abass explained: 
When somebody has a diamond, he will go to the [diamond] dealer. So in times of 
problems, if there is any problem, the dealer can settle the matter because he has 
money. He can settle the matter. Because of the way they are doing things; that is 
why all the dealers have a license. There are also agent licenses, who are running 
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under the dealers. Each dealer has three agent licenses. Agents cannot buy 
diamonds, but they can encourage someone to go to the diamond dealer. And even 
if you as an agent buy a diamond, you can put it under the name of the dealers. As 
soon as problems arrive, when they go to the police they will just mention the 
dealer’s name so that the dealer will answer for the diamond – all receipts are given 
under their name. As soon as he gets the diamond, he’ll book the diamond under 
the dealer’s name. Then as soon as the agent books it, he contacts the dealers: ‘I 
have some diamonds here.’ But it is still a problem diamond. So the dealer just 
says: ‘Come with it here, if there is any problem just put it under my receipt’. If the 
agent gets a problem diamond, as soon as the dealer takes over the matter, there 
will not be much problem,’ because the government empower him. That’s why they 
are paying a lot of money to get the license (Abass, interview, March 2009). 
According to Isaac, the diamond dealer had told Fasalie: “When the chief or the police 
come to you, whatever they say, deny, I’ll fight the matter for you” (Isaac, interview, 
December 2008). The first thing the diamond dealer would have done after having spoken 
to Fasalie, according to Isaac, was to go straight to the Local Unit Commander and pay 
him off, and prepare him for the probability that the case might be coming his way. “That’s 
why the boy acted the way he did, he cannot respect elders, chiefs. Whenever the Chief 
calls, he rejects” (ibid). Involvement of the SLP had become a strict necessity to resolve 
the case or at least to put it to rest, something that the paramount chief was not able to do in 
front of the villagers that Sunday morning on his verandah. 
Monetary gain from the case was now restricted on more than one level. Isaac explained: 
Normally, when you steal a diamond, if you are caught, then you will go and show 
where you sold the diamond. The price you sold it for will be revealed, but if the 
dealer has a license he will only pay 500,000 Leones, regardless of how much the 
diamond is worth. If they see any diamond, they can buy it (Abass, interview, 
March 2009). 
 And with a license to buy diamonds, regardless of how or where it was found, the dealer 
was in a position to simply state: “Yes, yeah, they sold it to me. I’m not here to buy gun or 
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buy their palm wine – I am here to buy diamonds, look at my license, I bought it and I have 
paid them.” In other words, Isaac continued: 
The issue of diamond cases here, if you are having your diamond stolen, you have 
lost already, because the issue is money, money, money. It starts to cost money 
when it comes to Motema. If it arrives in Motema, the Diamond Chairman, the 
LUC, the magistrate – they all need money. They will call the paramount chief and 
he will be paid off. So there are 3 [sets of] percentages. One will go to the person in 
the village, two to handle the case. When you have money you have justice. If the 
paramount chief, the Local Unit Commander, the diamond dealer and the Chairman 
are all involved, who will you next go to? (Isaac, interview, December 2008). 
So the case of diamond theft ends with a question that remains unanswered: “who will you 
go to next?” The case also ends with a sense of how the hybrid order works, and the 
impossibility of making a clear line of demarcation between state and chief, or the ‘weak 
state’ and ‘strong society’ in Sesay’s (1995:166) words. In the hybrid order, languages of 
both stateness and public authority are simultaneously at play. It may be that police reform 
as part of SSR has reshaped how order is made, but it has not fundamentally altered how, 
and by whom, authority is articulated in the justice and security field. 
 
9.3 The security and justice assemblage and the reproduction of hybridity 
As indicated earlier, the SLP specifically (and the security sector generally) was 
resurrected by SSR to “reclaim its rightful primacy in the maintenance of public tranquility 
and law enforcement” (CPDTF, July 1998). A review of the SLP produced in 2011 
presented a more varied picture, acknowledging that “balanced support must be given to 
both local and national systems [of policing]” (Horn et al. 2011). The review continues, 
reflecting on the past ten years of police reform in Sierra Leone, “it is unclear whether the 
government has the will to take over the role of all security providers currently operating at 
the local level, be they LPPBs, Chiefdom Police or vigilante groups. Certainly, they do not 
have the financial means to do so” (ibid).  
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The review nevertheless maintains that these agencies must deliver their services “within 
national standards and guidelines, and in turn these must reflect international norms and 
standards, particularly in relation to Human Rights, corruption and equal opportunities” 
(ibid). This remains a fundamental oxymoron of police reform and broader SSR in Sierra 
Leone: on the one hand, acknowledging that it is ‘unclear whether the government has the 
will’, and on the other maintaining that security – and justice – should be provided within 
national and international norms and standards.  
As this chapter demonstrates, it is only through the assembling of various forms of 
authority that the diamond theft case, and no doubt similar justice and security cases, could 
be resolved. The authority engaged in the diamond theft case was not lodged in one 
particular institution. Rather, it was produced in practices performed by a number of actors, 
drawing their authority to do so from sources both within and beyond Kamara Chiefdom. 
The articulation of authority constitutes the ability to make symbolic boundaries, to draw 
on sources of authority that are derived in local physical space, to undergo and undertake 
the same rites of passage in the same locales and to defend the stake that is being fought 
over against external challenges from the state and other tribes. This is not to emphasize 
the failure of government institutions to maintain control. It is rather to say that a square 
usage of the concept of the state is misleading in terms of analyzing the assemblages of 
actors that exercise authority and compete over the jurisdiction to make order in the 
process. 
Moreover, the assemblage is not well-analyzed as a zero-sum game (although Ray and van 
Rouveroy van Nieuwaal (1996:29) see the relationship between state and chief as such). 
By extension, the concept of twilight institutions proposed by Lund (2006) is not the best 
way to capture how actors act within the justice and security field in Peyima, Kamara 
Chiefdom and beyond. It makes greater sense to apply the concept of the security and 
justice assemblage to suggest that it is a particular constellation of actors – not one or the 
other – that creates order in the field and leads to resolution of criminal cases in a place 
such as Kamara Chiefdom.  
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As the case of diamond theft analyzed in this chapter moved from a conflict between two 
villagers to a case involving two figures of authority, it was clear that a stake in the stone 
came to depend directly upon the paramount chief and Local Unit Commander’s ability to 
assemble and draw on each other’s authority in a way where one did not exclude the other. 
One could not overrule the other in any equivocal sense, neither sought to do so, but they 
were dependent on one another to make a ruling.  
Constituting the core of a security and justice assemblage, these two actors stood in a 
double-binding relationship of interdependence. The interesting question that the case 
raises is not who made the final ruling – neither did in isolation – but the fact that they 
were dependent on each other’s articulations of authority to do so. Their combined 
enactment of the hybrid order was crucial. 
SSR as state-building was productive in establishing the outcome of the case, technically, 
organizationally and in terms of symbolic representation of stateness. This is the case, even 
as SSR processes failed to transform the police into a force that was able to uphold a 
monopoly on legitimate physical and symbolic violence and to extend its authority evenly 
throughout the territory of Sierra Leone.  
Indeed, the paramount chief would not be able to engage in boundary-making activities in 
public discourse between ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ the chiefdom today without the re-
establishment of the SLP after the war. It was the ability to draw this boundary that 
allowed for the diamond theft case, or any case for that matter, to be resolved outside the 
chiefdom and, not incidentally, for financial gain to be pursued.  
It is evident that while SSR as a set of processes and practices was initiated and sustained, 
these effects failed to fundamentally marginalize the paramount chief’s central role in the 
field of justice and security. Failure here does not mean “doing nothing,” as Ferguson 
(2006 [1994]:284) notes, “it means doing something else,” a ‘something else’ that has its 
own logic – a logic of hybridity. 
Within this logic, the police force that emerged did not reflect a justice and security field 
that could be articulated in languages of stateness. This fact evidently questions the 
concept of development as a “knowledge/power regime (a discourse) of political or 
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cultural domination” (Mosse 2005:13). SSR policies may have dominated the articulation 
of what the UK considered its role to be in Sierra Leone, but how SSR, and police reform 
in particular, was translated into practice in Peyima and Kamara Chiefdom was above all 
shaped by a hybrid order. In the diamond theft case just outlined, this order gravitates 
towards paramount and lesser chiefs, though this does not mean that they act in isolation 
from other actors of authority, notably the SLP. 
 
9.4 Conclusion 
In the context of Peyima and Kamara Chiefdom, there was nothing spectacular about the 
case of diamond theft: such cases occur regularly. But it became somewhat of a 
paradigmatic case with respect to diamond theft at the local level in Kamara Chiefdom. 
One villager stole a stone from another villager. The stone had subsequently disappeared, 
and different actors claiming a stake in the justice and security field entered the struggle to 
solve the crime. In the process, authority to act was drawn from sources emanating from 
recent state-building efforts as well as from longer-term state formation processes.  
The stone itself was never found again. Indeed, it was never verified whether the stone 
existed at all or whether it was a diamond. These facts do not materially affect my 
argument about how SSR has reproduced a hybrid order; the facts suggest that the stake 
being fought over does not even need to exist, it need only be a potentiality. What did 
become evident was that the hybrid order articulated in the attempts to solve the matter 
could not in any unequivocal sense be found in the articulation of one particular order. 
The case can be seen as a prism through which the order of foundational hybridity was 
articulated – the basis of the chief’s power. It also illustrates the fundamental reductionism 
that operating with the state vs. non-state dichotomy reflects. Even if they exist in 
discourse and are articulated, such dichotomies are not particularly appropriate 
mechanisms to by which to analyze the productive dimension of SSR or the general 
practices of enforcing order in Kamara Chiefdom. 
This case also provides insight into the productivity of SSR through both the visibility of 
the police in the case and their involvement in resolving it. It also shows how the 
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translation and appropriation of SSR into the justice and security field reproduces a hybrid 
order that it may have become integral to, but has not fundamentally altered. As noted 
elsewhere, in Tombodu, the headquarter town in Kamara Chiefdom, the police explicitly 
stated how they worked for the paramount chief. The particular order established through 
foundational hybridity and the symbolic capital emanating from fluency in both languages 
of stateness and public authority gave the chief the authority to dictate order-making in the 
justice and security field. Forming part of and reproducing foundational hybridity, other 
actors articulating various languages of authority, including Partnership Board members 
and police officers, challenged the Chief’s position with the forms of capital available to 
them. However, rather than subverting the powers of the chief and the order he makes, they 
shaped its reproduction and sharpened its contours. 
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10 Conclusion 
From the late 1990s, attempts to make peace in Sierra Leone became synonymous with 
externally-led state-building efforts that focused explicitly on establishing security on 
behalf of the remnants of the state system (and idea). A civil war was fought against the 
RUF, the armed forces were overhauled, intelligence organizations and a police force were 
established by the central government of Sierra Leone with leadership and financial 
support from the UK. Security was seen by the international policy-makers who were 
involved as not only a prerequisite for the state to be rebuilt, but as its very foundation. 
External actors who came to Sierra Leone, as state-builders did not intend to re-establish 
the patrimonially networked political entity that had characterized Sierra Leone since its 
independence in 1961. Rather, the objective was to lay the foundation of a centrally-
governed state structured according to western universalist principles of statehood. 
State-building in Sierra Leone emerged through the 1990s and 2000s as a form of 
international intervention. SSR, shaped by the end of the Cold War and the beginning of 
the War on Terror, became one of its central components. Guided by a purist concept of 
what a centrally-governed political entity should look like, state-building came to reflect a 
neo-liberal propensity to diagnose, prescribe and cure what were considered to be weak 
and failed states. This was not a principled rejection of government. It reflected the belief 
that the failure of government to achieve its objectives should be overcome by inventing 
new strategies of government that would succeed. 
SSR failed according to its own objectives in Sierra Leone. A primary reason for this 
failure lies in the concept of authority that state-building projects, and that much of the 
academic literature on the subject supports. This dissertation suggests that applying 
hybridity, to the concept of authority creates a theoretical foundation to state-building and 
SSR that neither privileges ‘the state’ nor its anti-thesis, ‘the non-state’, and the ability of 
either to make order. The dissertation demonstrates empirically how this is the case in 
Sierra Leone, more specifically in Peyima, a small town in Kamara Chiefdom, Kono 
District. It does so by exploring how actors such as paramount and lesser chiefs, who can 
not be categorized as strictly ‘state’ or ‘non-state’, have been and continue to be the 
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primary makers of order in rural areas of the country. In sum, neither war nor an 
international intervention has fundamentally changed this state of affairs. 
Through the lens of state-building, re-building the failed state of Sierra Leone was to be 
approached by separating state and societal forces. The former were to be isolated and 
worked upon in a way that would allow them to stand above and at the same time contain 
and order localities across Sierra Leone. However, the attempt to establish such a centrally-
governed state entailed a fundamental disregard of the foundational hybrid order that the 
Sierra Leone state is the product of and continuously reproduces. 
 
10.1 Foundational hybridity 
The dissertation argues that the colonial policy of indirect rule formed the basis of a 
foundational hybrid order. Indirect rule was the colonial state’s attempt to identify and 
fixate interlocutors between colonial administrators and the population in the hinterland. In 
Sierra Leone, this approach led to the emergence of semi-autonomous administrative units, 
chieftaincies, which became and remain a historic focus of struggle for political control in 
the countryside. Hence, Sierra Leone developed into, and has remained, a multi-centered 
system of governance expressed through the figures of paramount and lesser chiefs. 
Articulated in symbolic languages of stateness such as legislation, including the 1992 
Constitution and the 2004 Local Government Act, Sierra Leone’s chiefs are integral to the 
system and idea of the state, both of which are the partial product of chiefly authority. 
Simultaneously, however, they are important protagonists of what Fanthorpe (2001:372) 
refers to as “extreme localism,” which is constituted by the articulation of authoritative 
languages around, inter alia, autochthon status and secret society membership. 
Autochthony and secret society membership establish categorical distinctions between 
‘natives’ and ‘strangers’ of a locality. They are articulated and reproduced by the same 
rites of passage in the same locales and constitute a defense of particular ways of making 
order from extra-local challenges, be they from ‘the state’ (system), other tribes or SSR 
programs. In other words, they embody the hybrid order. 
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Membership and activities of the secret society, the Poro, are also central to the concept of 
extreme localism, as they are also constitutive of order in the justice and security field. In 
rural Sierra Leone, claims of Poro membership, combined with ancestral association, 
metamorphose into land tenure decisions and claims to justice, both within and outside the 
secret society bush. If a person is not initiated into the Poro in the locale where he seeks 
redress, if he cannot articulate the authority that comes with it, his appeals for justice in 
land tenure decisions is inevitably weak. 
The persistent articulation of languages of stateness in the state-building discourse – in 
both policy and academia – disregards the fundamental micro-struggles that such claims 
for justice constitute and the sources of authority that enable them. Thinking hybridly helps 
us understand how assemblages take shape in the justice and security field. It sharpens our 
understanding of the multitude of different sources from which authority always already 
emanates. As a concept, hybridity clarifies that ‘the state’ and ‘society’ are not pure 
sources of authority; they are mutually constitutive and interdependent – and therefore 
inseparable. 
 
10.2 Hybrid authority 
The dissertation also discusses the theoretical implications of how authority is articulated. 
It implies a dissolution of dichotomies between categories of state and society and the real 
and ideal as separate domains. Instead, these categories of thinking are evoked 
simultaneously; it is this quality of simultaneity that characterizes hybridity. 
The first step in conceptualizing hybridity begins with de-stabilizing ahistorical and 
apolitical conceptions of what the unitary state is. In turn, this supports the rejection of an 
ideal state form against which other political entities inevitably fail. Disaggregating the 
state in this manner implies considering the state as a multitude of discrete practices in the 
everyday life of ordinary people. As such, the state is constituted by a system of tangible 
institutions, combined with an idea of what it is and ought to be. From this perspective, 
political manifestations of the state are both illusory and a set of concrete institutions: they 
are on the one hand distant and impersonal and on the other hand localized and personified.  
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Simultaneously, however, this preoccupation with de-naturalizing the state may also 
constitute a somewhat state-centric approach. While de-naturalizing the state is done in an 
attempt to deconstruct the concept of the unitary state, it is still pre-occupied with 
exploring its disaggregated nature to a degree that leaves little space for developing further 
how other types of authority may be conceptualized. Following this line of argument, 
Hansen and Stepputat (2001:5) emphasize that the modern state is in a “continuous process 
of construction,” and that this process takes place through “globalized registers of 
governance and authority,” which they refer to as ‘languages of stateness’. 
While Hansen and Stepputat’s approach is useful, I propose that an adjustment is necessary 
to conceptualize what the hybrid order is. I introduce the additional concept of ‘languages 
of public authority’ to reflect the variety of languages that individual actors use in order to 
act authoritatively. This is an analytical departure from notions of authority as inherently 
bound to ‘the state’ or ‘the stateness’ of particular actors. As such, the concept of hybridity 
takes into account in equal measure legal documents produced by state institutions, 
community policing discourse, secret society membership and autochthon status - all of 
which constitute authority simultaneously. 
The hybrid order blends the two languages – stateness and public authority. As 
components of hybridity, these two languages do not lend themselves to empirical 
investigation in their pure form, because they do not exist in a pure form. They do not 
constitute separate entities; there is no distinction between state-based and liberal practices 
on the one hand, and local customs and everyday life on the other. They are articulated 
simultaneously, which reflects the fact that authority always already emanates from 
multiple sources, and they are co-constitutive. 
Herein lies the fundamental principle of hybridity and the theoretical contribution of the 
dissertation: The simultaneity of how a multitude of sources of authority are articulated in 
the justice and security field makes it impossible to isolate ‘the state’ or ‘the stateness’ of 
an actor, in academia, in policy and in practice. In each case, isolating ‘stateness’ leads to a 
biased and inaccurate analytical take on the multiple sources of authority that justice and 
security actors such as paramount and lesser chiefs articulate. Therefore, exploring 
authority through the concept of hybridity not only has implications for how authority is 
 254 
conceptualized theoretically. It also indicates what can be expected to follow from the 
practices of state-building, namely a reproduction of that order. It has been the aim of this 
dissertation to provide insight into why this has been the case, not only theoretically, but 
also empirically. 
Hybridity is conceptualized as justice and security assemblages that are located within a 
justice and security field. Thinking in terms of assemblages brings unpredictability and 
dynamism to the process of making order. It points to the unexpected and sometimes 
unpredictable ways in which orders unfold. At the same time, ‘objective structures’ exist 
independent of the consciousness and will of agents that have a shaping effect on how 
people, things and discourse form assemblages. Thus, the concept of a field is useful in 
clarifying the resources that shape the assemblages, i.e., the different languages of 
authority that may be drawn upon at any one given time, shaping and being shaped by 
assemblages in their continuous process of construction and de-construction. 
 
10.3 Hybridity reproduced 
The rationale of a foundational hybrid order is expressed in the continuous process of 
integrating different articulations of authority. This dissertation has demonstrated that in 
the case of Sierra Leone, the hybrid order was reproduced rather than eradicated by the 
one-sided focus on establishing the western universalist state model in SSR. 
Internationally-led efforts to re-compose what was seen as a chaotic and anarchic security 
and justice field in Sierra Leone began with a military intervention to end the civil war. It 
continued with the arrests of war criminals and SSR programs to create a western 
universalist state-centric structure to manage justice and security.  
These international protagonists of state-building believed that these different elements 
together would produce a pure justice and security field in which only languages of 
stateness would be articulated. They believed that over time, the authority of paramount 
and lesser chiefs in rural areas of the country would automatically be subjected to the state 
as the sole maker of order in the justice and security field. 
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However, SSR did not recognize the resilience and productivity of local security and 
justice actors and institutions that are integral to the foundational hybrid order. 
Furthermore, SSR failed to recognize the hybrid nature of all actors in the justice and 
security field and the fact that authority to act within the security and justice field emanates 
from numerous sources across physical and symbolic space. 
This myopic view of state-building was evident symbolically and in practice from the very 
outset of international attempts to re-compose the justice and security field. To support the 
government of Sierra Leone in fighting the war against the RUF, the UK supported the 
establishment of what at the time was referred to as the ‘Unholy Alliance’. This loose 
coalition of the warring factions that included former soldiers, traditional hunters and rebel 
fighters became the basis of the new army – and the new state – after the war. Thus, the 
basis of establishing and consolidating security in post-war Sierra Leone was founded upon 
an assemblage of force elements that drew on numerous sources of authority – it was 
hybrid. 
Parallel to these efforts to contain and overhaul the army, police reform became the 
centerpiece of SSR from the late 1990s onwards. The intention behind police reform was to 
establish and consolidate the split between state and society that would situate the former 
as sitting above and containing localities across the territorially defined state space of 
Sierra Leone. In the first phase of police reform, begun during open conflict in the late 
1990s, efforts were made to eliminate or marginalize paramount and lesser chiefs by 
establishing and consolidating a role for the SLP, first in Freetown, and in the countryside 
after the war ended in 2002.  
In the second and third phases of police reform, from the mid-2000s onward, the approach 
to paramount and lesser chiefs was altered. Police reform now sought to incorporate all 
actors of the justice and security field into one inter-linked state system. Thus, while the 
reformers had become more sensitive to the central role of paramount and lesser chiefs as 
makers of order, police reform still operates with the long-term aim of establishing a 
centrally-governed state entity.  
 256 
However, if a fundamental break does not occur with the hybrid order that lies at the very 
base of the Sierra Leone state, the position of chiefs is likely to be corroborated. Simply 
ignoring locally- embedded sources of authority such as autochthon status and secret 
society membership will not eliminate the order that they are co-constitutive of and replace 
it with one acceptable to outside observers. They will only reproduce that order. 
The effects of police reform are well illustrated by analyzing the emergence of by 
establishing policing Partnership Boards, and the role that chiefs have had in translating 
these assemblages into the localities of Sierra Leone, including Peyima where I carried out 
my fieldwork. Established to act as liaisons between localities and the Sierra Leone Police, 
the Boards are the only permanent mark of police presence in Peyima. However, that they 
have come to represent the reproduction and consolidation of a hybrid order, interlinking 
events in Peyima with the SLP, and assembling the articulation of both stateness and public 
authority. In fact, Partnership Boards express the simplest of examples of hybridity: board 
members in Peyima may refer to the inspector of police as their boss, but their appointment 
is dependent on good relations with the town chief.  
Failure to understand and engage the sources of authority that are not necessarily 
articulated in languages of stateness, including autochthony and secret society 
membership, leads to a misrecognition of how the justice and security field is composed. In 
turn, this amounts to misinterpreting how authority is distributed in Sierra Leone – and 
Peyima specifically. The hybrid order of Sierra Leone is by extension seen as the failure of 
the state to become ‘effective’ and ‘legitimate’, and if only its capacity is built to a 
sufficient degree, the order that other actors make will be subjected to vertical 
encompassment.  
Due to the foundational hybrid order that exists in Sierra Leone, vertical encompassment is 
not a potential outcome. It cannot be assumed that paramount and lesser chiefs, often 
presented by international policy-makers as little more than relics of a colonial past, will 
whither way. By extension, it cannot be assumed that Sierra Leone – and any other 
internationally-recognized state space – is pre-destined to project the western universalist 
model of statehood.  
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We are better served theoretically and in policy-making by striving to understand the 
foundational hybrid order that structures the justice and security field and how assemblages 
take form within it. Doing so would have the added benefit of injecting a dose of realism 
into what can be expected from state-building as SSR. 
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12 Abstract in English 
Foundational hybridity and its reproduction – security sector reform in Sierra Leone 
The thesis argues that security sector reform (SSR) has failed according to its own 
ambition of establishing a ‘centrally governed state’. A primary reason for this failure is 
found in the concept of authority that state-building projects and much of the academic 
work that underpins it.  
Since the late 1990s, internationally supported efforts to make and consolidate peace in 
Sierra Leone have been synonymous with SSR. Support was given by the United Kingdom 
(UK) in particular to contain and ultimately overhaul the armed forces, which staged two 
coups in 1992 and 1997. Support was also provided to the central government to institute 
national security coordination and intelligence organizations, and to reestablish the Sierra 
Leone Police (SLP). The collapsed, but internationally recognized state was to be rebuilt, 
and security was seen as not only a prerequisite for this process to begin, but its very 
foundation.  
The first question of the thesis revolves around why the western universalist state concept 
came to guide SSR in Sierra Leone, and why it was considered of such fundamental 
importance to stability internationally. The second question revolves around how to 
conceptualize authority when actors such as paramount and lesser chiefs that may neither 
be categorized as state nor non-state are the primary makers of order in rural areas of the 
country. 
Speaking of the weakness or failure of a state is a way of describing what it is not, namely 
a centrally governed set of institutions that is able to make order within the territorial space 
that defines it. A focus on the state as an analytical concept does not, however, tell us much 
about how order is then made, and by whom it is made in Sierra Leone. 
The thesis rethinks what authority is in a way that does not privilege ‘the state’ as an 
analytical category, a tendency that has dominated much policy and academic thinking. 
The thesis’ empirical basis of doing so is data relating to international policy-making 
processes, interviews among the key actors of Sierra Leone’s SSR process, and 
 285 
ethnographic fieldwork in Peyima, a small diamond mining town in Kamara Chiefdom, 
Kono District. 
In a view of authority tied to ‘the state’ lies the conceptualization of a political entity, a 
bordered power container, which stands above, is detached from, and at the same time 
encompasses, controls and regulates society. In UK support of Sierra Leone’s state-
building efforts, the practices of traditional leaders and their productive effects in the 
justice and security field, and enforcing order, were acknowledged. However, failure to 
respond adequately to their central role in governing Sierra Leone’s countryside came in 
two ways, both of which are related to concepts of the western universalist state that 
continue to guide SSR. 
The first failure was embedded in misrecognizing the resilience and productivity of local 
actors and institutions, and their authority to appropriate, interpret, translate and above all 
shape the elements of what was offered through SSR. The second failure came in not 
recognizing the hybrid nature of all actors in the justice and security field, based on the fact 
that they draw authority to act within the field from numerous sources across physical and 
symbolic space, in local and national domains. Hybridity is integral to state formation in 
Sierra Leone. It is foundational, and is historically grounded in the colonial era, articulating 
an infinite mixture of various forms of authority (from state legislation to status of 
autochthony and secret society membership). Inevitably, this order was reproduced by 
SSR, even if the aim of the international actors who supported this process of change had 
been to eradicate it. 
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13 Resumé på dansk 
Fundamental hybriditet og dens reproduktion – sikkerhedssektorreform i Sierra 
Leone 
I denne afhandling argumenteres det for at sikkerhedssektorreform har fejlet ifølge egne 
ambitioner om at etablere en ’centralt administreret stat’. En af de afgørende grunde hertil 
skal findes i det begreb om autoritet, der bruges i praksisser omkring stats-opbygning samt 
i store dele af den akademiske litteratur, der underbygger disse praksisser. 
Siden de sene 1990ere har internationale forsøg på at skabe og konsolidere fred i Sierra 
Leone været lig statsopbygning gennem sikkerhedssektorreform. Af internationale aktører 
var det først og fremmest England, der gav støtte til at pacificere hæren, der begik to 
statskup i henholdsvis 1992 og 1997. Støtte blev også givet til at etablere institutioner der 
kunne koordinere sikkerhedssektoren nationalt, en efterretningstjeneste og en politistyrke. 
Staten i Sierra Leone var kollapset og skulle nu genopbygges. Sikkerhed blev ikke kun set 
som en forudsætning for denne proces, men som selve dens fundament. 
I afhandlingens første problemstilling, undersøges det hvorfor det vestlige universelle 
statsbegreb kom til at spille så afgørende en rolle i forsøget på at skabe stabilitet i Sierra 
Leone. Den anden problemstilling drejer sig om hvordan man skal begrebsliggøre autoritet, 
når aktører som traditionelle ledere, der hverken kan kategoriseres som statslige eller ikke-
statslige, spiller en så central rolle i forhold til at skabe orden i Sierra Leones landområder. 
Fordi traditionelle ledere ikke kan kategoriseres som  hverken stat eller ikke-stat, har denne 
afhandling til formål at problematisere hvad autoritet er på en måder, der ikke privilegerer 
’staten’ som en analytisk kategori. Denne tendens har domineret meget af den litteratur der 
eksempelvis er skrevet om skrøbelige stater. Det empiriske grundlag herfor er data, der 
relaterer sig til hvordan internationale politik-processer udfolder sig, interviews blandt en 
række af hovedaktørererne i Sierra Leones sikkerhedssektorreform-proces, samt 
etnografisk feltarbejde i Peyima, en lille diamantmineby i Kamara, et høvdingedømme i 
det østlige Sierra Leone.  
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I det begreb om autoritet der underbygger statsopbygning, ligger der en antagelse om en 
politisk enhed, ’en stat,’ der står over og er løsrevet fra, men samtidig omslutter, 
kontrollerer og regulerer ’et samfund.’ I engelsk støtte til Sierra Leones statsopbygning lå 
en anerkendelse af traditionelle lederes helt centrale rolle i at skabe lokaliseret orden. 
Forsøg på at involvere traditionelle ledere i statsopbygning slog imidlertid fejl af to grunde. 
Statsopbygning havde for det første ikke en tilstrækkelig forståelse for lokale aktører og 
institutioners rolle i forhold til at tilegne sig, fortolke og forme sikkerhedssektorreform. For 
det andet var der en utilstrækkelig forståelse af den hybriditet, der kendetegner alle aktører 
der har en ordensskabende funktion i et sted som Peyima, baseret på det forhold at de 
trækker på former for autoritet i både lokale og nationale domæner. Hybriditet er en 
integreret del af Sierra Leones statsdannelsesproces. Den er ’fundamental’, opstod historisk 
set i kolonitiden og blander en række forskellige autoritetsformer (statslig lovgivning, 
autoktoni, medlemskab i ’hemmelige broderskaber’). Afhandlingen viser, hvorledes det var 
uundgåeligt at den hybride orden blev reproduceret gennem sikkerhedssektorreform, 
selvom det internationale mål var at skabe en stat, der stod både over og omslutter 
samfundet. 
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